THE CHATTANOOGA 
CAMPAIGN 7 


By MICHAEL HENDRICK FITCH 


WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION 
ORIGINAL PAPERS NO, 4 




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THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 





























































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The Chattanooga Campaign 

Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi ValMy in the Civil War, p. 260 














Wisconsin History Commission: Original Papers, No. 4 


THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

With especial reference to Wisconsin’s 
participation therein 


BY MICHAEL HENDRICK FITCH 

» # 

Lieutenant-Colonel of the Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry 
Brevet Colonel of Volunteers, Author of "Echoes 
of the Civil War as I hear Them ” 


» 

J J 

© I 

X) 


WISCONSIN HISTORY 


COMMISSION 


MARCH, 1911 













"T rJfc 


\ 

TWENTY-FIVE HUNDRED COPIES PRINTED 


Copyright, 1911 

THE WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION 

(in behalf of the State of Wisconsin) 


Opinions or errors of fact on the part of the respective authors of the Commission’s 
publications (whether Reprints or Original Narratives) have not been modified or 
corrected by the Commission. For all statements, of whatever character, the Author 
alone is responsible 




DEMOCRAT PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTER 



Contents 


PAGE 


Wisconsin History Commission . . ix 

Introduction .xi 

The Chattanooga Campaign : 

Chapter I. The Preliminary Campaign . 1 

Organization . . . . . 11 

Organization of the Confederate Army . 33 

The advance of the Union Army . . 39 

Chapter II. The Chickamauga Campaign 

and Battle . . . . . 51 

The Confederate line on September 20 . 95 

The Confederate attack upon the Union 

right.104 

Wisconsin troops at Chickamauga . . 126 

Chapter III. The occupation and battles of 

Chattanooga . . . . .155 

The Battle of Lookout Mountain . . 194 

Wisconsin troops in the Battle of Mission¬ 
ary Ridge ..... 225 


Index. 235 












Maps 

PAGE 

The Chattanooga Campaign . . Frontispiece 

Chickamauga, September 19, 1863 . . .82 

Chickamauga, morning of September 20, 1863 . 98 

The fatal order to Wood, at Chickamauga . .112 

Chickamauga, evening of September 20, 1863 . 114 

Chattanooga and Vicinity, November, 1863 . .194 














Wisconsin History Commission 


(Organized under the provisions of Chapter 298, 
Laws of 1905, as amended by Chapter 378, 
Laws of 1907 and Chapter 445, Laws of 
1909) 

FRANCIS E. MCGOVERN 
Governor of Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. ESTABROOK 

Representing Department of Wisconsin , Grand 
Army of the Republic 

REUBEN G. THWAITES 

Superintendent of the State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin 

CARL RUSSELL FISH 

Professor of American History in the University of 
Wisconsin 

MATTHEW S. DUDGEON 

Secretary of the Wisconsin Library Commission 


Chairman , COMMISSIONER ESTABROOK 
Secretary and Editor , COMMISSIONER THWAITES 
Committee on Publications , COMMISSIONERS THWAITES 

and Fish 



INTRODUCTION 


After the battle of Gettysburg in the East, and 
the siege of Vicksburg in the West, attention was 
riveted during the later summer and autumn of 
1863 on the campaign around Chattanooga. 
Seated on the heights along the southern border 
of Tennessee, that city commanded highways 
running through the very heart of the Confed¬ 
eracy. The result at Gettysburg had demon¬ 
strated that no Southern army could invade the 
North; the Union victory at Vicksburg deter¬ 
mined that the Mississippi should run unhindered 
to the sea. The battles of Chickamauga, Look¬ 
out Mountain, and Missionary Ridge not only de¬ 
cided that Kentucky and Tennessee should 
remain in the Union, but they opened the way for 
Sherman’s advance on Atlanta and his March to 
the Sea, which cut the Confederacy in two and 
made Lee’s surrender a necessity. 

The War between the States saw no more stub¬ 
born fighting than raged on September 19th and 
[xij 


20th around the old Cherokee stronghold of 
Chickamauga. Two months later, occurred the 
three days’ battle around the hill city of Chatta¬ 
nooga. In all these events, the citizen soldiers of 
Wisconsin played a conspicuous part, which is 
herein described by a participant and student of 
these famous contests. In these battles the repu¬ 
tations of officers were made and unmade, and 
from them emerged the great generals who were 
to carry the Union arms to complete victory— 
Thomas, Sherman, Sheridan, and Grant. 

Colonel Fitch, the author of this volume, began 
his service July 16, 1861, as Sergeant-Major of 
the Sixth Wisconsin; he was commissioned First- 
Lieutenant in October following, and in the suc¬ 
ceeding April was appointed Adjutant of the 
Twenty-first; he became, in succession, Major 
and Lieutenant-Colonel of that regiment, and in 
March, 1865, was brevetted Colonel of Volun¬ 
teers “for gallant and meritorious services during 
the war.’’ He served chiefly with the Army of 
Potomac, Army of Virginia, Army of Ohio, and 
Army of Cumberland. He commanded his regi¬ 
ment from July 1, 1864; and on the March to the 
Sea; and in the Carolinas headed a wing of the 
[xii] 


brigade, consisting of the Twenty-first Wiscon¬ 
sin, the Forty-second Indiana, and the One Hun- 
dred-and-fourth Illinois. Later, he was assigned 
to the command of the Second Brigade of the 
Fourteenth Army Corps. He now lives at 
Pueblo, Colorado. 

The maps illustrating the text are adaptations 
from John Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the 
Civil War (Boston, 1900), which we are per¬ 
mitted to use through the generosity of the pub¬ 
lishers, Houghton Mifflin Company. 

The Commission is also under obligations to 
the editorial staff of the Wisconsin Historical So¬ 
ciety for having seen the volume through the press. 
The index was compiled by Dr. Louise Phelps 
Kellogg, a member of that staff; the proof-read¬ 
ing has been the work chiefly of Misses Annie A. 
Nunns and Daisy G. Beecroft. 

R. G. T. 

WISCONSIN HISTORICAL LIBRARY 
MARCH, 1911 


[xiii] 



The Chattanooga Campaign 


CHAPTER I 

The Preliminary Campaign 

The Union Army of the Cumberland, com¬ 
manded by Major-General William S. Rose- 
crans, was, in June, 1863, encamped at Murfrees¬ 
boro, Tennessee, thirty-two miles south of Nash¬ 
ville. It had been lying here since January 5, 
1863, having marched from the adjacent field of 
Stone’s River. The Confederate Army of the 
Tennessee, was, at the same time, in camp near 
Tullahoma, forty miles south of Murfreesboro. 
The Confederates had been defeated at Stone’s 
River, and had fallen back to Tullahoma at the 
same time the Union forces had taken up their 
camp at Murfreesboro. 

I will designate the campaign of the latter army, 
beginning on June 23, 1863, by marching from 
i [i] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


Murfreesboro, as the “Chattanooga Campaign of 
1863.” The various engagements in that cam¬ 
paign, beginning with Hoover’s 1 and Liberty 
gaps 2 on June 24, down to that of Missionary 
Ridge, at Chattanooga, on November 25, are in¬ 
cidents of that campaign, and necessary parts of 
it. A description of the campaign immediately 
preceding, which started when General Rosecrans 
assumed command of the army of the Cumber¬ 
land at Bowling Green, Kentucky, in October, 
1862, and ended with the victory of the Union 
forces in the battle of Stone’s River, and the occu¬ 
pation of Murfreesboro—would give a prelimin¬ 
ary historical setting. 

In fact, a full history of the Chattanooga 
campaign may well include the entire move¬ 
ments of the army under General Buell, from 
October 1, 1862, when it marched out of Louis* 
ville, Kentucky, in pursuit of Bragg’s army. 
The latter was then supposed to be in the vicin¬ 
ity of Frankfort, the capital of that State, engaged 


1 Nineteen miles southeast qf Murfreesboro. 

3 Thirteen miles south of Murfreesboro, five west of Hoover’s Gap. 


[2] 



THE HISTORICAL SETTING 


in the inglorious occupation of coercing the legis¬ 
lature to pass an ordinance of secession. It was 
also trying to recruit its ranks from the young citi¬ 
zens of Kentucky, and was restocking its commis¬ 
sary from the rich farms of the blue-grass region. 
Buell found it, on October 8, at Perryville, 
seventy-five miles southeast of Louisville. He 
drove it out of Kentucky, and then marched 
to Bowling Green, on the railroad between Louis¬ 
ville and Nashville, where in the same month he 
was superseded, as commander, by Rosecrans. 

The Atlanta campaign, immediately following 
that of Chattanooga—beginning on May 4, 1864, 
and ending in the capture of Atlanta on Septem¬ 
ber 8 of that year—gives a subsequent historical 
setting: a connection in time as well as in space, 
to the operations of the Army of the Cumberland 
in 1863. By referring to these several important 
military campaigns of the war, the reader may ob¬ 
tain a synchronous perspective of the most import¬ 
ant events in the Middle West, in the department 
occupied by that army. 

A larger setting can be given to this campaign 
for the capture of Chattanooga, by framing it into 
[3] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

the two military fields of the Potomac on the east, 
and the Tennessee on the west. The Army of 
the Potomac was opposed to General Lee’s forces. 
It operated generally between Washington, 
D. C., and Richmond, Virginia, the latter being 
the objective. At the time the Army of the 
Cumberland marched out of Murfreesboro, Lee 
had taken advantage of the defeat of the army 
under Hooker from May 1 to 3, 1863, at Chancel- 
lorsville, Virginia, and invaded Maryland and 
Pennsylvania. He was decisively defeated in 
the battle of Gettysburg, on July 3 following, by 
Major-General George C. Meade, which closed 
his campaigning into the North. The old field 
north of Richmbnd was reoccupied by the Army 
of the Potomac, then in command of Meade, as 
successor to Hooker. It was the latter who, in 
October, brought the Eleventh and Twelfth corps 
from the Army of the Potomac to the Army of 
the Cumberland, at Chattanooga. 

On the west of the Army of the Cumberland, 
was the field of the Army of the Tennessee. Its 
task was the opening of the Mississippi River. 
At this time, General U. S. Grant was in com- 
[4] 


THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS 


mand, and had his army at Vicksburg. That 
stronghold surrendered to him on July 4. Thus 
the great river was opened. This left the greater 
part of the Army of the Tennessee free to cooper¬ 
ate in the autumn with the Army of the Cumber¬ 
land in the battles around Chattanooga; and from 
that date to assist in the Atlanta campaign, and 
the March to the Sea, the following year. 

It will thus be seen that victory crowned all 
three of the great armies during the time of the 
Chattanooga campaign. The confidence and dis¬ 
cipline of the Union forces, increased at this time; 
the discovery, by the governing powers at Wash¬ 
ington, of those of the general officers who dis¬ 
played the most ability; the placing of such offi¬ 
cers in the command of the Union armies; and the 
gradual weakening of the secession armies, were 
the principal factors contributing to the final end 
of the war. The resulting campaigns of 1864 
and the early part of 1865, sufficed to crush the 
most powerful rebellion in history. 

During its long occupancy of Murfreesboro, the 
Army of the Cumberland had been somewhat re¬ 
cruited; its equipment was restored to its former 
[51 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


condition; and it had also been very much im¬ 
proved, as well as reorganized. During this time 
the formidable Fortress Rosecrans was built at 
Murfreesboro, so that a small force might con¬ 
tinue to hold the place after the army moved on. 
This fort proved of great value during the 
Hood campaign against Franklin and Nashville, 
in November and December, 1864. Nashville 
had to be permanently occupied. In fact, the 
line of railway running from Louisville through 
Kentucky and Tennessee to Chattanooga, through 
Bowling Green, Nashville, Murfreesboro, Tulla- 
homa, and Bridgeport, formed the line for 
carrying supplies, as well as the line of opera- 
lions. This line, about three hundred and forty 
miles long, had to be defended and kept open, as 
the Union Army advanced. As part of it—if 
not the whole—lying in southern Kentucky and 
Tennessee, was in the enemy’s country, it was 
necessary to build and man as the army advanced, 
a line of forts and block houses, for the protection 
of this railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga. 

By glancing at a good map, the reader can 
see the immense difficulty involved in the mainte- 


A DIFFICULT TASK 


nance and defense of this line of supplies consist¬ 
ing of but a single-track railroad. The task re¬ 
quired the services of about a fourth of the entire 
army. The field of operations contained no 
navigable rivers parallel with the line of advance, 
upon which gunboats might assist the army in its 
conflicts with the enemy, and by which the rail¬ 
road could be assisted in carrying supplies. Two 
somewhat important streams traversed the field, 
or rather ran at right angles to it—the Cumber¬ 
land, on which Nashville is located; and the 
Tennessee, flowing past Chattanooga. These 
run westward from the Cumberland Mountains, 
and for very small craft plying for limited dis¬ 
tances only, were navigable within the field of the 
Army of the Cumberland. But they were of 
practically no use to the Union Army, except at 
Chattanooga after its occupation—when for a 
time, supplies were thus transported from Bridge¬ 
port and Stevenson pending the repairing of the 
railway from those places. There were also two 
smaller streams in southern Tennessee, running at 
right angles to the line of operation, called the 
Duck and the Elk. It was necessary that the 
[ 7 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

Union commander consider these in his advance 
from Murfreesboro, for they were fordable only 
in places, and not even there when floods were 
rampant. They were bridged on the main wagon 
roads, but these bridges were easily destroyed by 
the enemy. In its campaigns from Louisville, 
Kentucky, to Chattanooga, the Army of the 
Cumberland did not have any assistance from the 
navy. 

In this sketch, it is not necessary to give a tedious 
account of the most difficult natural obstacles, 
such as streams, mountains, and distances. These 
are apparent upon the study of any good map. 
But mention must be made, that the Union Army 
faced a chain of mountains lying between it and 
Chattanooga, at the northwestern edge of which 
then lay the Confederate Army. This is the 
plateau of the Cumberland Mountains, extending 
in a southwest direction from West Virginia to 
northern Alabama, and covering what is known as 
East Tennessee. This plateau is about 2,200 
feet above tidewater. 

Chattanooga is the commercial gateway 
through which run both the Tennessee River and 
[ 8 ] 


IMPORTANCE OF CHATTANOOGA 

the railways from north, east, and south. It lies 
near the junction of the boundary line between 
Alabama and Georgia, with the south line of 
Tennessee, at the eastern edge of the Cumberland 
Mountains, where the Tennessee River, flowing 
westward, cuts through the range. It is in a direct 
southeast line from Nashville. The occupation 
of Chattanooga by the Union Army cut the Con¬ 
federacy asunder. Hence, the struggle for this 
position became a fierce one. It cost both sides 
strenuous campaigns, an immense number of lives, 
and the destruction of an incalculable amount of 
property. Its possession by a Union Army was 
an inhibition of any serious Confederate invasion 
into Middle Tennessee or Kentucky. The ob¬ 
ject of the Chattanooga campaign was, therefore, 
the capture of that city; and ultimately, the de¬ 
struction of the Confederate Army. Should the 
capture of the city be accomplished, but the army 
of the Confederate escape, Chattanooga could be 
made the sub-base of a new campaign, which 
would effectually dismember the Confederacy, 
and greatly hasten its downfall. Such was the 
Union theory, and this actually occurred, 
f 9l 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

Followed by the “March to the Sea,” the At¬ 
lanta campaign dismembered the enemy’s domain 
and made possible the end of the war. Lee’s sur¬ 
render would not have occurred at the time it did 
(April, 1865), if the homes of his soldiers in the 
Carolinas, Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama 
had not been invaded by the Western armies of 
the Union; and his rear threatened by Sherman’s 
troops. These results were made possible only 
by the capture and continued possession of Chatta¬ 
nooga. 

After Sherman had marched through Georgia 
and South Carolina, and penetrated North Caro¬ 
lina, with a large part of the old Army of the 
Cumberland and troops from other armies, thous¬ 
ands of Lee’s army deserted, and lined the roads 
leading back to their homes. When captured 
and paroled, as they were in immense numbers, by 
Sherman s ‘ bummers,” they invariably said that 
they left Lee when Richmond was abandoned; 
and would not longer fight for a Confederacy that 
could not defend their homes. Love of home is 
greater than love of country; unless the state or 
nation can protect the homes from invasion and 

[ io] 


ACCOUNT OF THE COUNTRY 


desecration, there is little incentive for its volun¬ 
teers to fight for the abstract principles of pa¬ 
triotism. 

A description of the contour of the field, from 
Murfreesboro to the Chickamauga, would be only 
an interminable and profitless account; it being a 
tangle of flat and rolling land, from Murfrees¬ 
boro to the gaps in the first hills, where the enemy 
was met; and thenceforth steep mountains and 
deep valleys. But the grand strategy subse¬ 
quently adopted by Rosecrans, depended so en¬ 
tirely upon this contour, that when each separate 
movement or battle shall hereafter be described, 
a somewhat minute account of the country con¬ 
tiguous to that particular military event will be 
given. 


ORGANIZATION 

After the battle of Stone’s River and while 
lying at Murfreesboro, the Army of the Cumber¬ 
land was reorganized. As previously stated, 
Rosecrans joined it as the successor of Buell, at 
Bowling Green, in October, 1862. Stone’s 
River was the army’s first battle under Rosecrans. 
[ii] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

In that, the army was called the Fourteenth Corps, 
Department of the Cumberland; and it was di¬ 
vided into three divisions—the centre, right, and 
left wings. General George H. Thomas com¬ 
manded the centre, General Alexander McD. 
McCook the right, and General Thomas L. Crit¬ 
tenden the left. In the new organization, the 
command was called the Army of the Cumber¬ 
land, and divided into three corps, the Four¬ 
teenth, the Twentieth, and the Twenty-first. 
Thomas was assigned to the command of the 
Fourteenth, General McCook to the Twentieth, 
and Crittenden to the Twenty-first. 

Rosecrans came to the Army of the Cumber¬ 
land with considerable prestige. He was then 
forty-three years old, having graduated from West 
Point in 1842. As brigadier-general he had 
gained the battle of Rich Mountain, Virginia, in 
July, 1861; won the battle of Carnifex Ferry, 
Virginia, in September of the same year; as com¬ 
mander of the Army of the Mississippi was victor¬ 
ious in the battles of Iuka in September, 1862, and 
of Corinth in October following. He came to the 
Army of the Cumberland with a record of un- 
[ 12 ] 


GENERAL ROSECRANS 


broken successes behind him. He was genial, 
and had untiring industry. His heart and head 
were devoted to the Union cause. His troops 
saw him frequently. He was a lover of appro¬ 
bation, and had the confidence of his generals, 
and the love of his rank and file. The men affec¬ 
tionately nicknamed him “Old Rosy,” and that 
was his usual cognomen with the whole army. 
He was a strategist of high order. A study of his 
Chattanooga campaign will show his eminent abil¬ 
ity, in so maneuvering as to compel the enemy to 
fight in the open. When an engagement was thus 
brought on, and the actual combat occurred, he 
lacked (in those which he fought with the Army 
of the Cumberland) the proper supervision of his 
line of battle. He too implicitly relied upon his 
subordinates. During the whole of the Chatta¬ 
nooga campaign his strategy was of the first or¬ 
der; but at both Stone’s River and Chickamauga, 
the right of his line was too attenuated; in both 
engagements, disaster occurred to this part of his 
troops. 

The chief of staff to Rosecrans was General 
James A. Garfield, who was then thirty-one years 
[13] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


old, brainy and very energetic. Although not a 
graduate of West Point, he was possessed of de¬ 
cided military instincts. Before the war he was 
an instructor in, and later president of, Hiram Col¬ 
lege, Ohio; and later was a member of the Ohio 
Senate. Entering the army as lieutenant-colonel 
of an Ohio regiment, he defeated Humphrey Mar¬ 
shall in the battle of Middle Creek, Eastern Ken¬ 
tucky, January 10, 1862, and was that year pro¬ 
moted to be a brigadier-general. Able and con¬ 
scientious as an officer, he was perhaps rather too 
democratic and academic to become a typical sol¬ 
dier. He became very nervous at the delay in 
moving from Murfreesboro, and instituted an in¬ 
quiry into the reasons, both for and against an earl¬ 
ier advance on Tullahoma. A majority of the 
subordinate generals in the Army of the Cum¬ 
berland supported General Rosecrans in his delay. 
Later on, notice will be taken of Garfield’s service 
in the battle of Chickamauga, and his retirement 
to a seat in Congress. 

Next to Rosecrans, the most important figure 
among the subordinate commanders was Thomas. 
He was then forty-seven years old, and a graduate 

[ 14] 


GENERAL THOMAS 

of West Point in 1840. Between that time and 
the Civil War, he served in the war with Mexico, 
and against the Indians in the West. At the be¬ 
ginning of the War between the States he was 
major of the Second Cavalry, of which Albert 
Sidney Johnston was colonel, Robert E. Lee lieu- 
tenant-colonel, and William J. Hardee senior 
major. Thomas was the only field officer of that 
regiment who remained loyal to the Union. He 
was commissioned colonel of the regiment, reor¬ 
ganized it, and during the first battle of Bull 
Run served in General Patterson’s detachment, 
in the Shenandoah Valley. He was commis¬ 
sioned brigadier-general in August, 1861, and was 
sent to Kentucky to serve in the then Army of the 
Ohio (afterwards the Army of the Cumberland), 
under General Robert Anderson of Fort Sumter 
fame. Thomas organized the first real little 
army of that department at camp Dick Robinson, 
Kentucky, between Danville and Lexington; and 
in January, 1862, with this force defeated the 
Confederate troops under Zollicoffer, at Mill 
Springs, Kentucky, on the Cumberland River. 
This force and this place were then the extreme 
[iSl 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

right of the Confederate line of defense, of which 
Forts Donelson and Henry, in Tennessee, and 
Paducah, Kentucky, constituted the left. This 
line was fortified, and extended through Bowling 
Green. A month after General Thomas had 
turned its right at Mill Springs, General Grant 
also turned its left, by capturing both Forts Don¬ 
elson and Henry. This necessitated the estab¬ 
lishment of a new Confederate line farther south, 
the evacuation of Kentucky, and the eventual loss 
to the Confederates of Middle Tennessee. Just 
before , the battle of Perryville, Kentucky, the 
President offered General Thomas, on September 
29, 1862, the command of the Army of the Cum¬ 
berland at Louisville, but he declined it. Buell 
was in command of the army during the battle of 
Perryville; after which he was superseded by 
Rosecrans. Thomas was a soldier, pure and 
simple, having never resigned from the army after 
his graduation from the Military Academy. He 
had shown great ability in the recent battle of 
Stone s River, as well as in every position in 
which he was placed, prior to that battle. It 
will be seen, further on, what important 
[16] 


move- 


OTHER OFFICERS 


ments he directed in the battle of Chickamauga, 
which saved the Army of the Cumberland from 
imminent disaster. 

General McCook, who commanded the Twen¬ 
tieth Corps, belonged to the younger class of West 
Point graduates, of which General Sheridan was 
a type. He graduated in 1853, and was thirty- 
two years old in April, 1863. He was a hand¬ 
some man, of striking presence, and commanded 
with some dramatic effect. 

General Crittenden, commanding the Twenty- 
first Corps, was then a year older than Rosecrans 
—forty-four years. He was not a graduate of 
West Point, but had served as a volunteer in the 
Mexican War. He was a son of U. S. Senator 
John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky. 

The Fourteenth Corps was made up of four 
divisions. These were commanded respectively 
by Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau, Major- 
General James S. Negley, Brigadier-General 
John M. Brannan, and Major-General Joseph J. 
Reynolds. Each of these divisions contained 
three brigades, and three light field batteries. 


[17] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


The brigades were generally composed of four 
regiments, but sometimes of five. 

The Twentieth Corps contained three divi¬ 
sions, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Gen¬ 
eral Jefferson C. Davis, Brigadier-General Rich¬ 
ard W. Johnson, and Mqjor-General Philip H. 
Sheridan. These were made up of brigades of 
four and five regiments of infantry and three bat¬ 
teries of artillery. 

The Twenty-first Corps likewise was organ¬ 
ized into three divisions, commanded by Briga¬ 
dier-General Thomas J. Wood, Major-General 
John M. Palmer, and Brigadier-General Hor¬ 
atio P. Van Cleve, each with three brigades and 
several batteries. The artillery of each division 
of the army was commanded by a chief of artil¬ 
lery. 

All of the cavalry were organized into a separ¬ 
ate corps, commanded by Major-General David 
S. Stanley. This was divided into two divisions; 
the First was composed of two brigades, and com¬ 
manded by Brigadier-General Robert B. Mitch¬ 
ell; the Second, also of two brigades, was com¬ 
manded at first by Brigadier-General John B. Tur- 


RESERVE CORPS 


chin. Prior to the battle of Chickamauga, Tur- 
chin was assigned to an infantry brigade. These 
cavalry brigades were much larger than the infan¬ 
try brigades, for they contained five or six regi¬ 
ments. Generally there was a battery attached 
to each brigade of cavalry. 

On June 8, 1863, a reserve corps was organized, 
with Major-General Gordon Granger in com¬ 
mand. It contained three divisions, commanded 
by Brigadier-General James D. Morgan, Briga¬ 
dier-General Robert S. Granger, and Brigadier- 
General Absalom Baird, respectively. The last- 
named was afterwards transferred to the First Di¬ 
vision, Fourteenth Corps, being succeeded by 
General James B. Steedman. It was the duty of 
this reserve corps to guard the communications in 
the rear of the army; but it was also subject, in 
emergency, to be ordered to the front, as will be 
seen further on—for example, when General 
Granger with three brigades, marched from 
Bridgeport, Alabama, to Rossville Gap, Georgia, 
and assisted very greatly in the battle of Septem¬ 
ber 20, at Chickamauga. In this reserve corps 
should also be included certain miscellaneous 
[19] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

troops, scattered in forts along the line of the Louis¬ 
ville & Chattanooga railroad, such as Nashville, 
Clarksville, and Gallatin, Tennessee. At this 
time Colonel Benjamin J. Sweet of the Twenty- 
first Wisconsin Infantry was in command of the 
forces at Gallatin. He had been wounded se¬ 
verely in the battle of Perryville, Kentucky, on 
October 8, 1862, and was not able to endure active 
service at the front. 

The First Brigade of the Third Division, re¬ 
serve corps, was stationed at Fort Donelson, Ten¬ 
nessee, and commanded by Colonel William P. 
Lyon, of the Thirteenth Wisconsin Infantry, that 
regiment being a part of the garrison. The First 
Wisconsin Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Os¬ 
car H. LaGrange, was attached to the Second 
Brigade of the First Division of the cavalry corps. 
Captain Lucius H. Drury, of the Third Wisconsin 
Battery, was chief of artillery to the Third Divi¬ 
sion of the Twenty-first Corps. 

This organization of the Army of the Cumber¬ 
land remained substantially the same, until after 
the battle of Chickamauga. Sometime in the 
latter part of July, or first part of August, General 
[ 20 ] 


SOME PERSONAL ESTIMATES 


Rousseau received leave of absence, and General 
Absalom Baird was assigned on August 24 to 
command the First Division of the Fourteenth 
Corps in his stead. Baird remained in command 
of this division until after the battle of Chick- 
amauga, when Major-General Lovell H. Rous¬ 
seau again took the command. Rousseau was 
a loyal Kentuckian, who at the very beginning 
of hostilities had raised a regiment for the service 
of the Union. He was then forty-five years old 
and had served in the Mexican War. He 
was a spectacular officer of great bravery, who is 
entitled to much credit for his unflinching devo¬ 
tion to the Union, under circumstances which 
made other men desert our cause. 

Major-General John M. Palmer of Illinois, a 
lawyer of eminence in his State, was an officer of 
more than usual ability. He was not a West 
Point graduate, and was forty-six years old. 

General Granger was then forty-two years old, 
a graduate of West Point in the class of 1845, 
and had fought in the Mexican War. It will be 
noticed that many of the general officers of the 
Army of the Cumberland served in the Mexican 
[21 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

War. The experience they then acquired in the 
field, in actual campaigning, and by some of 
them in actual battle, undoubtedly served to give 
to the Army of the Cumberland much of its esprit 
de corps, and its general success in winning battles 
and in holding the territory over which it marched. 
General Granger was an unusually able and gal¬ 
lant officer. Later on, it will be told what im¬ 
portant service he rendered General Thomas in 
the battle of Chickamauga. 

Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was then 
thirty-two years old. He graduated at West 
Point, rather low in his class, in 1853. At the 
outbreak of the war he was promoted to a 
captaincy. In May, 1862, he was commissioned 
colonel of cavalry in the volunteer service, and 
brigadier-general of volunteers July 1, 1862, be¬ 
ing made a major-general on December 31,1862. 
He had commanded a division in the battle of 
Perryville, Kentucky, in October, 1862, and was 
at Stone’s River December 31,1862, to January 
3, 1863. He is entitled to this special notice 
more for what he became, than for what he had 
done prior to the Chattanooga campaign. He 
[ 22 ] 


SOME PERSONAL ESTIMATES 


had as yet shown no extraordinary ability as a 
commander. His age was the same as that of his 
corps commander, General McCook, and they 
graduated in the same class at West Point. 

Generals Absalom Baird, John M. Brannan, 
Jefferson C. Davis, Thomas J. Wood, R. W. 
Johnson, and David S. Stanley were all officers 
of the old regular army, soldiers by profession, 
whose minds were not distracted from their duties 
in the field by politics or academic proclivities. 
They were brave and always at the front, working 
for success with military spirit. All of them 
served faithfully until the close of the war. Davis, 
Wood, and Stanley afterwards commanded corps 
—commanded them ably and with notably unas¬ 
suming manners. There was no taint about these 
officers of “playing to the galleries.” They were 
not expecting applause, and did their work without 
brass bands or reporters to sound their achieve¬ 
ments to the country. Such were the officers of 
this great central army. 

What of the musket bearers? Who were 
they? Where did they come from? Were 
they soldiers by profession or merely citizens in 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

arms for a special purpose? I have already said 
that very many of the general officers of the Army 
of the Cumberland were of the regular army. 
The United States regular army was represented 
only, however, by one brigade of the regular 
troops, namely, the Third Brigade of the First Di¬ 
vision of the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by 
Brigadier-General John H. King. Thus almost 
the entire rank and file of the army were volun¬ 
teers. The regiments were filled and officered 
by the executives of the different states. The men 
were mustered into the service of the General 
Government as volunteers for three years or during 
the war. These volunteers were citizens of the 
states, and each company elected its officers among 
those who had originally enlisted as privates. 
The musket bearers were men from all callings 
in life—farmers, mechanics, merchants, teach¬ 
ers, students, and laborers. They were the voters 
who made up the political divisions of the town¬ 
ships, counties, and states, whose ultimate power 
lay in their voting franchise which they shared 
with the men, who—for various reasons—re¬ 
mained at their homes during the war. The vol- 
[24] 


THE VOLUNTEERS 


unteer-regiments which composed the Army of 
the Cumberland were mostly from the states of 
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Kentucky, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota; Pennsylvania had 
three infantry and two cavalry regiments; Mis¬ 
souri had two regiments, and Kansas one; Tennes¬ 
see was represented by several regiments. The 
great bulk of the troops came, however, from the 
states north of the Ohio River—the Northwest 
Territory. No drafted men in the army partook 
in the Chattanooga Campaign of 1863. These 
volunteers sought the service and understood what 
it involved. Very few of them knew what regi¬ 
mentation meant, and the great majority had never 
before handled a musket. But they were young 
and teachable. They readily learned the drill, 
and became good marksmen. These soldiers real¬ 
ized very soon that a clean musket, plenty of am¬ 
munition, and obedience to orders, composed the 
military moral code of efficiency. By the laws 
of their states, they were entitled to vote for officers 
and affairs at home, and to have their votes counted, 
just as if they had been cast at home. The sol¬ 
diers received during the prolonged war as many 
[25] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

furloughs as were compatible with the exigencies 
at the front, and thus they were occasionally en¬ 
abled to visit the folks at home during their stren¬ 
uous service. The intelligence of the private sol¬ 
dier was often superior to that of his officer. Never¬ 
theless he obeyed faithfully that officer’s com¬ 
mands, because he fully understood that discipline 
could be maintained only by implicit obedience 
and the object of his service, viz: the suppression 
of a rebellion be accomplished. Many of these 
volunteers enlisted directly from the public schools, 
which they were attending. They had been 
taught the history of their country; how its inde¬ 
pendence from the tyranny of a foreign power had 
been gained by the valor and patriotism of Wash¬ 
ington and his volunteers, that by the discipline and 
perseverence of the revolutionary soldiers the sov¬ 
ereignty of a foreign king had been transferred to 
the citizens of their native land; that a new foe was 
now trying to dismember the nation, and that the 
corner stone of the Union was the principle, that 
all power is derived from the people. These vol¬ 
unteers were convinced that no power had the 
right to protect the maintenance and perpetuation 
[26] 


Wisconsin's contingent 

of slavery. They were soldiers therefore until the 
Union was re-established; and they tacitly re¬ 
solved to fight until slavery was abolished. Such 
was the personnel of the Army of the Cumber¬ 
land. 

Wisconsin was well and ably represented in this 
army by the following organizations, viz: The 
First, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-first, and Twen¬ 
ty-fourth volunteer infantry; the First Cavalry; 
and the Third, Fifth, and Eighth light batteries. 

The First Wisconsin Infantry was a noted regi¬ 
ment in more than one way. It served as the only 
three-months regiment from Wisconsin, and was 
organized under President Lincoln’s first call for 
75,000 men. It was mustered out after the 
ninety days’ service August 21, 1861, and reor¬ 
ganized under the second call for three years’ ser¬ 
vice. This second mustering was completed Oct¬ 
ober 19, 1861. The regiment proceeded from 
Milwaukee to Louisville, Kentucky, and the vol¬ 
unteers served during the next three years in the 
Army of the Cumberland. It was active in various 
parts of Tennessee during the first year of its ser- 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

vice, marching as far as Bridgeport, Alabama, to 
which place it returned during the campaign of 
Tullahoma. John C. Starkweather was its first 
colonel. He was made commander of the brig¬ 
ade when it was reorganized at Murfreesboro, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Bingham com¬ 
manded the regiment. This regiment had fought 
in both the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. 
It was assigned to the Second Brigade of the First 
Division of the Fourteenth Corps. 

The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry was mustered 
into the service October 14, 1861, at Milwaukee. 
Alfred R. Chapin was its first colonel. Proceed¬ 
ing to Louisville, Kentucky, it became part of the 
future Army of the Cumberland, and advanced 
with General O. M. Mitchell’s forces to Steven¬ 
son and Huntsville, Alabama, in the spring and 
summer of 1862. The regiment returned to 
Louisville in September with Buell’s army and 
engaged in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s 
River. When the reorganization at Murfrees¬ 
boro took place this regiment became a part of 
Scribner’s Brigade of Rousseau’s Division of the 
Fourteenth Corps. Almost side by side with the 
[28] 


Wisconsin's contingent 

First and Twenty-first infantries, it took part in all 
engagements. 

The Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was a Scan¬ 
dinavian regiment, and its first colonel was Hans 
C. Heg. It was mustered into the service on Feb¬ 
ruary 14, 1862, at Madison. It had taken part in 
the siege of Island Number Ten. It did not join 
the Army of the Cumberland until just before the 
battle of Perryville, in which it took active part, as 
in the battle of Stone’s River. In the reorganiza¬ 
tion at Murfreesboro, it became a part of the Third 
Brigade—and was commanded by its colonel, 
Hans C. Heg, of the First Division, Twentieth 
Corps. 

The Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry was or¬ 
ganized at Oshkosh, in August, 1862, and on Sep¬ 
tember 11,1862, it joined the Army of the Cum¬ 
berland at Louisville, Kentucky. Benjamin J. 
Sweet was its first colonel; he was so severely 
wounded in the battle of Perryville as to be dis¬ 
abled for further field service. This regiment was 
brigaded with the First Wisconsin Infantry at 
Louisville, and served also in the battles of 
Perryville and Stone’s River. At the time of 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

the reorganization at Murfreesboro it was com¬ 
manded by Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison C. Ho¬ 
bart, and it was assigned to the Second Brigade of 
the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps. 

The" Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Infantry was 
mustered into the service at Milwaukee, August 
21, 1862. It proceeded to Louisville, where it 
became a part of the Army of the Cumberland. 
This regiment engaged in the battles of Perryville 
and Stone’s River, and was assigned to the First 
Brigade, Third Division, Twentieth Corps in the 
reorganization at Murfreesboro; its commander 
was Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore S. West. 

The First Wisconsin Cavalry was mustered in¬ 
to the service at Kenosha, on March 8, 1862, with 
Edward Daniels as its first colonel. It was sent 
to Benton Barracks, near St. Louis. There and 
in various parts of Missouri its first year of service 
was performed. On June 14, 1863, at Nash¬ 
ville, it was made a part of the Army of the Cum¬ 
berland, with which it was from that time identi¬ 
fied until the close of its service. This regiment’s 
activity in the Tullahoma campaign, the Chicka- 
mauga campaign, and in pursuit of Confederate 
[30] 


Wisconsin’s contingent 

cavalry in the Sequatchie Valley on October 2, 

1863, and along the line of communication during 
the battles around Chattanooga is mentioned in 
more appropriate places, relating to the general 
movements of the army. It was commanded by 
Colonel Oscar H. LaGrange, and assigned to the 
Second Brigade, First Division, Cavalry Corps, 
during the reorganization. 

The Third Wisconsin Light Battery was mus¬ 
tered into the service at Racine, Wisconsin, Octo¬ 
ber 10, 1861. Lucius H. Drury was its first cap¬ 
tain. The regiment went first to Louisville, then 
to Nashville, whence it marched with Buell’s 
army in order to reinforce General Grant at Shiloh. 
It was engaged in the battles of Perryville and 
Stone’s River. The regiment was assigned to the 
Third Brigade, Third Division of the Twenty- 
first Corps, and was commanded by Lieutenant 
Courtland Livingston. 

The Fifth Wisconsin Battery was mustered into 
the service at Racine, October 1, 1861. Oscar 
F. Pinney was its first captain. March 16, 
1862, it arrived at St. Louis. Afterwards it pro- 
ceded to New Madrid, Missouri (on the Missis- 
[3i] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

sippi River), and became a part of General John 
Pope’s army, in the reduction of Island Number 
Ten. It was also active at the siege of Corinth, 
and marched about two hundred miles from Iuka, 
Mississippi, to Nashville, Tennessee, where the 
regiment joined the forces of General Buell. On 
the northward march in September, 1862, these 
forces engaged in the battles of Perryville and 
Stone’s River; the service of the Fifth Wisconsin 
Battery was of the most active and valuable kind. 
It was commanded by Captain George Q. Gard¬ 
ner, and was assigned to the First Brigade, First 
Division, of the Twentieth Corps. 

The Eighth Wisconsin Battery was mustered 
into the service on January 8, 1862, and moved to 
St. Louis on March 8, 1862. Its first captain 
was Stephen J. Carpenter. It formed a part of 
the force that moved to Forts Leavenworth and 
Riley, Kansas, in April and May, 1862, whence 
it moved to Columbus, Kentucky, and finally 
took part in the campaign at Corinth and Iuka, 
Mississippi. From there it marched to Nash¬ 
ville, and Louisville, engaging in the battles of 
Perryville and Stone’s River. It 
[32] 


was com- 


THE CONFEDERATES 


manded by John D. McLean, lieutenant, and 
was assigned to the Third Brigade, First Division 
of the Twentieth Corps. 

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY 

The Confederate Army which confronted the 
Army of the Cumberland on June 24, 1863, was 
officially called the Army of the Tennessee. It 
was divided into four corps—two of infantry and 
two of cavalry. General Leonidas Polk com¬ 
manded one infantry corps, and General Wil¬ 
liam J. Hardee the other. The cavalry corps 
were commanded by General Joseph Wheeler, 
and General N. B. Forrest. In addition to the 
artillery, attached to the regular corps, there was 
also a reserve artillery. In General Bragg’s return 
of the “aggregate present” of his army in the field 
on June 20, 1863, his figures are 55,070. His re¬ 
serve troops were not included in this statement; 
they were scattered throughout the districts of Ten¬ 
nessee and northern Alabama. 

At this same date the return of the Army of the 
Cumberland was 71,409 of all arms—exclusive 
* [33] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

of the reserve corps—as “aggregate present.” It 
will be noticed later on, that the Confederates 
greatly increased their numbers prior to the battle 
of Chickamauga, but that the Union Army re¬ 
ceived n® reinforcements; on the contrary, it lost 
heavily by sickness as the army advanced. 

General Bragg was at that time forty-six years 
old. He had distinguished himself in the Mexi¬ 
can War. He commanded the Confederate 
Army in both the battles of Perryville and Stone’s 
River. He did not win either of these, having 
in both of them abandoned the field to the Union 
forces. 

Perhaps the most distinguished officer in 
Bragg’s army was Major-General John C. Breck- 
enridge. He was more distinguished, however, 
as a politician, than as a military leader. He 
was forty-two years old. Before the war he had 
been a member of Congress, vice president of the 
United States, and in 1860 the presidential can¬ 
didate of the Southern democrats. At the break¬ 
ing out of the war, he was a United States Sena¬ 
tor from Kentucky. He was a Confederate offi¬ 
cer at Shiloh in April, 1862, and commanded the 
[34] 


CONFEDERATE COMMANDERS 

right wing of the Southern forces at Stone’s River. 

General Leonidas Polk was fifty-seven years 
old in 1863. He was a bishop of the Episcopal 
church. He graduated from West Point in 
1827, but resigned his commission in the army in 
the same year. He entered the Confederate 
Army as a major-general, but was soon promoted 
to lieutenant-general. 

General William J. Hardee was forty-seven 
years old at this time. He graduated from West 
Point in the class of 1838. He served with dis¬ 
tinction in the Mexican War. He entered the 
Confederate service as colonel, commanded a corps 
at Shiloh in 1862; was appointed lieutenant-gen¬ 
eral in October, 1862; and commanded the left 
wing of the Southern Army at Perryville. 

General Simon Bolivar Buckner, another offi¬ 
cer in the Confederate Army, was forty years old* 
and a West Pointer. He surrendered Fort Don- 
elson to General Grant in February, 1862. 

Of the two Confederate cavalry commanders* 
General Nathan B. Forrest was by far the 
greater. He was a rough, uneducated man, but 
of great force as a partisan leader. When Lord 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

Wolseley was at the head of the British Army, he 
said of Forrest that he was the ablest cavalry 
leader that was produced by our War between the 
States. He was personally brave, possessed a 
fine physique, and had sufficient magnetism to in¬ 
spire the soldiers of his command to great activity 
and endurance. During the war twenty-nine 
horses were shot under him, and he took active part 
in thirty-one encounters, it has been stated. He 
was wounded several times. 

The rank and file of the Confederates were 
made up of the citizens of the Southern states, in 
much the same manner that the Union Army was 
composed of Northern citizens. They fought 
with a certain fanaticism, for what they deemed 
their rights. It is singular, that at the beginning 
of the war, so universal a desire to dissolve the 
Union seized the great majority of the white people 
of the South, although they might not be slave 
owners. They made most efficient soldiers and 
suffered many hardships, unknown to the soldiers 
of the Union Army. The martial temperament, in¬ 
herited as well as acquired through personal hab¬ 
its, was more predominant in the South than in 
[36] 


CONFEDERATE RANK AND FILE 

the North. The Southerners lived largely a 
country-life before the war; they rode horseback, 
hunted with hounds, and had become more famil¬ 
iar with firearms than the Northerners. The 
practice of duelling continued longer with them 
than with the men of the North, who were not 
as fiery tempered as those of the South. These 
traits made them soldiers by nature; they liked 
to serve in the field, and were therefore difficult 
to conquer. They seemed more lithe and active, 
than the staid volunteers from the colder North. 
They have claimed, that they were largely out¬ 
numbered; that is true in the aggregate, but not 
so true on the firing line. The battles of Stone’s 
River and Chickamauga illustrate these facts. 
The numbers in both armies were quite evenly 
matched. During the last year of this war 
there was little difference in the fighting qualities 
of the veteran regiments on both sides. The re¬ 
bellion was put down according to the rules of 
warfare, and whatever that result may have cost 
in numbers, it was worth the price. Not every 
revolt against authoritative power has been sup¬ 
pressed by superior numbers, not even that of the 
[37] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

thirteen colonies against England s. At first, the 
power of England seemed so* overwhelming, that 
scarcely any one expected that colonial independ¬ 
ence could be gained. Foreign nations did not 
believe that this rebellion could be suppressed, 
notwithstanding the superiority in numbers of the 
Union Army. 

The wonderful thing about it is, that Lincoln 
coin persevered to the end, against discouragements 
and disasters which seemed, at the time, to be in¬ 
surmountable. Fortunately there was no compro¬ 
mise, the rebellion was simply crushed, no terms 
were made; and no promises given to embarrass the 
reconstruction. Of course, it required large armies 
and grim determination to reach the goal. The 
great fact is, not that the Union armies outnumber¬ 
ed the Confederate forces, but that the Union itself 
was restored. The war was merciless; all wars 
are. Mercy, pity, and the extension of the hand 
of helpfulness came after the war was over, not 
while it was going on. Each side did all it could 
to fight and win its battles. The North had the 
larger number of citizens from which to draw, and 
of course, availed itself of that advantage. The 
[38] 


THE CONFEDERATE FRONT 


South would have put larger armies into the field if 
it could have done so; it did use every available 
man, however, and fought its best. The South 
might have conquered the Union by overwhelm¬ 
ing forces, could such have been secured, but avail¬ 
able men were lacking. At all events, the rebel¬ 
lion was crushed by means of legitimate warfare, 
and the Union was restored. 

THE ADVANCE OF THE UNION ARMY 

The Confederate Army, commanded by Gen¬ 
eral Braxton Bragg, lay in front of Tullahoma, 3 
where Bragg had his headquarters. There was a 
large entrenched camp at the junction of the Nash¬ 
ville & Chattanooga railroad. This camp and 
the McMinnville branch was each a secondary 
depot for commissary stores, while the base of sup¬ 
plies was at Chattanooga. Its front was covered 
by the defiles of the Duck River, a deep narrow 
stream edged by a rough range of hills, which 
divides the “Barrens” from the lower level of 
Middle Tennessee. The Manchester Pike 

3 Forty mile# south of Murfreesboro. 

[39] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

passes through these hills at Hoover s Gap, nine¬ 
teen miles south of Murfreesboro, ascending 
through a long and difficult canon to the Bar¬ 
rens”. The Wartrace road runs through Liberty 
Gap, thirteen miles south of Murfreesboro and 
five miles west of Hoover’s. There were other 
passes through these hills, but the enemy held all 
of them. Bragg’s main position was in front of 
Shelbyville, about twenty-eight miles southwest of 
Murfreesboro, and was strengthened by a redan 
line extending from Horse Mountain, located a 
little to the north of Shelbyville, to Duck River on 
the west, covered by a line of abatis. The road 
from Murfreesboro to Shelbyville was through 
Guy’s Gap, sixteen miles south of Murfreesboro. 
Polk’s corps was at Shelbyville, Hardee’s held 
Hoover’s, Liberty, and Bellbuckle gaps, all in 
the same range of hills. It was not wise to move 
directly against the entrenched line at Shelbyville, 
therefore Rosecrans’s plan was to turn the Con¬ 
federate right and move on to the railroad bridge, 
across Elk River, nine miles southeast of Tulla- 
homa. To accomplish this, it was necessary to 
make Bragg believe that the advance would be 
[40] 


UNION DISPOSITIONS 


by the Shelbyville route. The following dispo¬ 
sitions were therefore made: General Granger’s 
command was at Triune on June 23, fifteen miles 
west of Murfreesboro; some infantry and cavalry 
advanced that same day toward Woodbury 
seventeen miles to the east of Murfreesboro; 
simultaneously Granger sent General Mitchell’s 
cavalry division on the Eaglesville and Shelby¬ 
ville Pike, seventeen miles southwest of Murfrees¬ 
boro, in order to make an attack on the enemy’s 
cavalry, and to drive the enemy’s infantry guards 
on their main line. General Granger, with his 
own infantry troops and Brannan’s division, 
moved—with ten days rations—to Salem. 4 

On June 24, Granger moved to Christiana, a 
small village a few miles southwest of Murfrees¬ 
boro, south of Salem, towards Shelbyville. On 
the same day Palmer’s division, and a brigade of 
cavalry, were ordered to move to the vicinity of 
Bradyville, fourteen miles southeast of Murfrees¬ 
boro ; his advance columns were to seize the head of 
the defile leading up to the “Barrens” by an ob- 


* A small village, but a few miles southwest of Murfreesboro. 
[41] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


scure road to Manchester thirty-five miles south¬ 
east, and by way of Lumley’s Stand seven miles 
east of Hoover s Gap. General Mitchell ac¬ 
complished his work after a sharp and gallant 
fight. McCook s corps advanced on the Shelby- 
ville road, and turning to the left, six miles out, 
moved two divisions via Millersburg, a small vil¬ 
lage eleven miles south of Murfreesboro. By 
advancing on the road to Wartrace 5 he seized and 
held Liberty Gap. 

Five companies of the Thirty-ninth Indiana 
mounted infantry opened the fight for Liberty 
Gap on June 24; they were followed by Wil- 
lich’s brigade. General R. W. Johnson, in his 
report" says: “Here I placed at the disposal of 
General Willich a portion of the Second Brigade, 
Colonel Miller commanding, who sent the 
Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania and the Twenty- 
ninth Indiana to the right of the Fifteenth Ohio, 
then to change direction to the left, sweeping the 
hillside on which the Confederates were posted. 
This movement was handsomely executed. As 

& A village eight miles east of Shelbyville, on the railroad. 

b Rebellion Records, Serial No. 34, p. 483. 

[42 ] 



SUCCESSFUL MOVEMENTS 

soon as the change to the left had been made, 
General Willich ordered his entire line forward. 
Under his own eye and management, the Con¬ 
federates were driven at every point, their camps 
and camp equipages falling into our hands, and 
Liberty Gap was in our possession.” The next 
morning Carlin’s and Post’s brigades of Davis’s 
division came to Johnson’s support. The Con¬ 
federates attacked quite fiercely, but were re¬ 
pulsed, and finally retired. The enemy here was 
Cleburne’s division; he reported a loss of 121. 

General Thomas advanced on the Manchester 
Pike with the Fourteenth Corps in order to make 
an attempt to take possession of Hoover’s Gap. 
Major-General Crittenden was to leave Van 
Cleve’s division of the Twenty-first Corps at 
Murfreesboro, concentrate at Bradyville, fourteen 
miles southeast of Murfreesboro, and there await 
orders. All these movements were executed 
with success in the midst of a continuous rain, 
which so softened the surface of the roads, as to 
render them next to impassable. The advance of 
the Fourteenth Corps on Hoover’s Gap, June 24, 
was Wilder’s brigade of mounted infantry, of 
[43l 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


Reynolds’s division; it was followed by the other 
two brigades of the same division. Wilder struck 
the enemy’s pickets within two miles of his camp 
at Murfreesboro and drove them through Hoov¬ 
er’s Gap to McBride’s Creek. The two rear 
brigades moved up and occupied the Gap. Soon 
afterwards Wilder’s brigade was attacked by a 
portion of Stewart’s division; this brought the rest 
of Reynolds’s division, and eventually the regular 
brigade of Rousseau’s division to his assistance. 

On June 25 and 26, Rousseau’s, Reynolds’s, 
and Brannan’s divisions cooperated in an advance 
on the enemy; after a short resistance the enemy 
fled to Fairfield, five miles southwest of Hoover’s 
Gap, towards which place the Union pickets had 
advanced. 

The First and the Twenty-first Wisconsin in¬ 
fantry were actively engaged at Hoover’s Gap, 
but suffered no casualties. The Seventy-ninth 
Pennsylvania, in the same brigade, lost twelve 
men, one wounded. General John T. Wilder’s 
brigade lost sixty-one men killed and wounded. 

On June 27, Gordon Granger captured Guy’s 
Gap and the same evening took Shelbyville, 
[44] 


RAINY WEATHER 


the main Confederate Army having retreated. 
The Union headquarters reached Manchester 
on June 27. Here the Fourteenth Corps concen¬ 
trated during the night. Part of McCook’s ar¬ 
rived on the 25th; the rest of it did not reach Man¬ 
chester before the night of the 29th. The troops 
and animals were very jaded. Crittenden’s 
Twenty-first Corps was considerably delayed. 
The troops encountered continuous rains and bad 
roads, and the last division did not arrive at Man¬ 
chester before June 29, although an order to march 
there speedily was received on the 26th. On ar¬ 
rival it was badly worn out. 

The forces were at last concentrated on the 
enemy’s right flank, about ten miles northeast 
of Tullahoma. During the incessant rain of 
June 30, an effort was made to form them into 
position in anticipation of an attack by the 
enemy. The wagons and horses could scarcely 
traverse the ground, which was quite swampy. 
Fortunately the enemy’s forces suffered like¬ 
wise. What was trial and hardship to one of 
the armies—on account of the weather—was 
equally detrimental to the other side. That 

[451 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


army which could overcome quickly and victori¬ 
ously the climatic conditions, had the best chances 
to win in the martial contest. In forming a line 
at Manchester to resist an attack, the Fourteenth 
Corps occupied the centre, with one division in 
reserve, the Twentieth Corps on the right and 
the Twenty-first on the left. The last two corps 
had each one division in reserve. The Union 
Army was on the right flank of the Confederate 
line of defense, and of course expected to be at¬ 
tacked. But it was not. 

In the meantime Stanley’s cavalry, supported 
by General Gordon Granger’s infantry and all 
troops under Granger’s direction, had attacked 
the enemy at Guy’s Gap—sixteen miles south of 
Murfreesboro and five miles west of Liberty 
Gap—and had driven the Confederate troops 
back to their entrenchments. Then, finding that 
the enemy’s main army had fallen back, Stanley 
captured the gap by a direct and flank movement 
with only three pieces of artillery. The cavalry 
unexpectedly captuerd Shelbyville with a num¬ 
ber of prisoners, a quantity of arms, and the 
commissary stores. The reports of this cavalry 
[46] 


THE ENEMY RETREATS 


battle show the retreat of the enemy to Tullahoma 
forty miles southeast of Murfreesboro, where it 
was supposed that he intended to make a stand. 
But on July 1, General Thomas ascertained that 
the enemy had retreated during the night from 
Tullahoma. Some Union divisions occupied 
Tullahoma about noon that same day, while 
Rousseau’s and Negley’s divisions pushed on by 
way of Spring Creek overtaking late in the after¬ 
noon the rear guard, with which these divisions 
had a sharp skirmish. 

On July 2, the pursuit was made by the Four¬ 
teenth and Twentieth corps. The bridge over 
the Elk River had been burned by the enemy 
while retreating. The stream had risen and the 
cavalry could barely ford the river. On 
July 3, Sheridan’s and Davis’s divisions of the 
Twentieth Corps, having succeeded in crossing 
the Elk River, pursued the enemy to Cowan, on 
the Cumberland plateau, eighteen miles southeast 
of Tullahoma. Here it was learned that the 
enemy had crossed the mountains; and that only 
cavalry troops covered its retreat. Meanwhile 
the Union Army halted to await needed supplies, 
[47] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


which had to be hauled by wagon from Murfrees 
boro over miserable roads. These supplies had 
to be stored at the railway station, nearest to the 
probable battle field; and before the army could 
advance over the Cumberland plateau—where a 
battle would probably soon ensue—the railway 
had to be repaired. General Rosecrans in his 
official report says: “Thus ended a nine days’ 
campaign, which drove the enemy from two forti¬ 
fied positions and gave us possession of Middle 
Tennessee, conducted in one of the most extra¬ 
ordinary rains ever known in Tennessee at that 
period of the year, over a soil that became almost 
a quicksand.’’ 7 He claims—perhaps justly— 
that it was this extraordinary rain and bad roads, 
which prevented his getting possession of the 
enemy’s communications, and debarred him 
from forcing the Confederate Army to fight a dis¬ 
astrous battle. He speaks very highly of James 
A. Garfield, his chief of staff, saying: “He 
possesses the instincts and energy of a great com¬ 
mander.’’ 

The Union losses during the “Tullahoma 

Rebellion Records , Serial No. 34; p. 408. 

[48] 



bragg's dispatch 


Campaign”—thus named in the official rec¬ 
ord—were as follows: 14 officers killed, and 
26 wounded; 71 non-commissioned officers and 
privates killed, and 436 wounded; 13 missing. 
Total, 85 killed, 462 wounded, and 13 missing. 
1,634 prisoners were taken, some artillery and 
small arms of very little value; 3,500 sacks of 
com and cornmeal were secured. 

On July 3, General Braxton Bragg sent the fol¬ 
lowing dispatch from Bridgeport, Alabama— 
twenty-eight miles directly west from Chatta¬ 
nooga—to Richmond, Virginia: “Unable to ob¬ 
tain a general engagement without sacrificing my 
communications, I have, after a series of skir¬ 
mishes, withdrawn the army to this river. It is 
now coming down the mountains. I hear of no 
formidable pursuit.” 8 The Confederate Army 
crossed the mountains to the Tennessee River 
and on July 7, 1863, encamped near Chat¬ 
tanooga. The Union Army went into camp 
along the northwestern base of the Cumberland 
plateau. The object of the Army of the Cum¬ 
berland for the ensuing campaign was Chatta- 


‘Ibid., p. 584. 


[49] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


nooga; the Tullahoma campaign was only a small 
part of the greater one which had yet to take place. 

In the Tullahoma campaign the Tenth Wis¬ 
consin Infantry lost 3 enlisted men, wounded, 
and the First Wisconsin Cavalry 2 enlisted 
men. All the Wisconsin troops bore their full 
share of the fatigues of the campaign, but only the 
losses mentioned were reported. 

There was one feature of the Tullahoma cam¬ 
paign that was very peculiar. A part of the 
Union Army had the previous year passed over 
this same region, while marching to the relief of 
Grant at Shiloh. Now returning by the way of 
Chattanooga, where Buell had marched on his 
way back to Louisville, they again came to this 
section of the country where the inhabitants mostly 
sympathized with the South. They were sur¬ 
prised and shocked in 1862 when the hated 
Yankees invaded their towns and farms. The 
Confederate authorities told them, that another in¬ 
vasions would never occur, that they could plant 
their crops and pursue their business without fear. 
Therefore, when their country was again overrun 
by the Union Army in 1863, their confidence in 
the Confederate generals was quite shaken. 

[So] 


CHAPTER II 


The Chickamauga Campaign and Battle 

A distinguished Confederate general—speak¬ 
ing of the importance of the city of Chattanooga 
to the Confederacy—said: “As long as we held 
it, it was the closed doorway to the interior of 
our country. When it came into your [the 
Union’s] hands the door stood open, and however 
rough your progress in the interior might be, it still 
left you free to march inside. I tell you that when 
your Dutch general Rosecrans commenced his 
forward movement for the capture of Chatta¬ 
nooga we laughed him to scorn; we believed that 
the black brow of Lookout Mountain would 
frown him out of existence; that he would dash 
himself to pieces against the many and vast natural 
barriers that rise all around Chattanooga; and that 
then the northern people and the government at 
Washington would perceive how hopeless were 
their efforts when they came to attack the real 
[5i] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


South.’’ With regard to the claim that Chicka- 
mauga was a failure for the Union arms, he said: 
“We would gladly have exchanged a dozen of 
our previous victories for that one failure.” It is 
correctly said, that even Richmond was but an 
outpost, until the success of the Union armies—in 
the centre of the Confederacy—left Lee’s legions 
nowhere to go, when they were expelled from 
Richmond . 9 This was accomplished or made pos¬ 
sible only by the operations of the Army of the 
Cumberland in the Chattanooga Campaign of 

1863 . 

After the retreat of the Confederate Army of 
the Tennessee from the region about Tullahoma, 
across the Cumberland Plateau to Chattanooga, 
Rosecrans established his headquarters at Win¬ 
chester, Tennessee . 10 He began the repair of the 
railroad back to Murfreesboro and forward 
to Stevenson, Alabama, ten miles southeast 
of Bridgeport and eight miles north of the Ten¬ 
nessee River. The three corps were put into 

9 The above quotations are taken from some letters of W. S. 
Furay, a former war correspondent, published in the Cincinnati 
Gazette of 1888. 

10 Sixteen miles southeast of Tullahoma, near Decherd. 

[52] 



THE UNION ADVANCE 


camp in their normal order. The Twentieth 
Corps occupied the country adjacent to Win¬ 
chester; the Fourteenth Corps the region near to 
Decherd ; 11 the Twenty-first Corps occupied the 
country near McMinnville . 12 Detachments were 
thrown forward as far as Stevenson. The 
campaign had so far been mere child’s play, 
compared with what lay before the army in the 
next movement against Chattanooga and the Con¬ 
federate Army. The straight line of the plateau 
is thirty miles across from Winchester to the 
Tennessee River; the distance is perhaps forty 
miles by the available roads. The railroad after 
reaching the summit of the plateau followed 
down Big Crow Creek to Stevenson, then turned 
sharply up the valley of the Tennessee, crossing 
the river at Bridgeport to the South side; then 
winding among numerous hills, which constitute 
the south end of the Sand Mountain, continued 
around the northern nose of Lookout Moun¬ 
tain, close to the river bank, into Chattanooga. 

11 Thirteen miles southeast of Tullahoma on railway. 

12 Forty miles southeast of Murfreesboro and thirty-five miles north¬ 
east of Tullahoma. 


[S3] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

Bridgeport is on the Tennessee River twenty-eight 
miles in a straight line west of Chattanooga. 
Just opposite, towards the northern nose of Sand 
Mountain, on the north side of the river, is the 
southern end of Walden s Ridge which extends 
northward from the river, and parallel with the 
plateau, from which it is separated by the Sequat¬ 
chie River and Valley. In short the Cumberland 
Mountains are here a series of ridges and valleys 
which run from northeast to southwest in a 
uniform trend, parallel with each other. The 
Tennessee River rises in southwestern Virginia, 
and runs between the Cumberland Plateau and 
Sand Mountain; but between Chattanooga and 
Bridgeport it cuts a zigzag channel towards the 
west, between Sand Mountain and Walden’s 
Ridge, which is the name given to that portion of 
the ridge lying on the north of the river. What 
the Army of the Cumberland intended to do was 
to cross the ridge, called the Cumberland Plateau, 
then the river, and the Sand Mountain into Look¬ 
out Valley and then the Lookout Ridge, in order 
to reach the Chattanooga Valley south of Chatta¬ 
nooga. Such a movement would force Bragg to 
[54] 


TOPOGRAPHY OF THE REGION 

march out of the city to defend his communica¬ 
tions. These ridges are all linked together at 
different places. Sand and Lookout at Valley 
Head, Alabama; the Cumberland Plateau and 
Walden’s at the head of Sequatchie Valley and 
River. Pigeon Mountain is a spur of Lookout 
Ridge. Chattanooga is located on the south side 
of the river, between the northern nose of Look¬ 
out and Missionary Ridge. The latter is a separ¬ 
ate and low ridge about three miles southeast of 
Chattanooga. Without a map it will be difficult 
for the reader to perceive the rugged and almost 
impassable field of operations, which General 
Rosecrans faced, while his army lay at the north¬ 
western base of the Cumberland Plateau, waiting 
for suitable preparation for the intended cam¬ 
paign. 

There was an alternative line of advance open 
to Rosecrans, namely to cross the plateau into the 
Sequatchie Valley, or to march around the head 
of the valley at Pikeville, then over Walden’s 
Ridge, and thus attack Chattanooga directly 
from the north; or, to cross the river above 
and to the east of Chattanooga, at the north end 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


of Missionary Ridge, that is, at the mouth of 
the Hiawassie River. This last route would have 
exposed his line of retreat or communications, and 
he .therefore chose to operate at his right and enter 
into the valley south of Chattanooga. 

Early in August the railroad was repaired to 
Stevenson and Bridgeport; also the branch to 
Tracy City on the plateau. 

Sheridan’s division of the Twentieth Corps was 
pushed forward to Stevenson and Bridgeport. 
The commissary and quartermaster-stores were ac¬ 
cumulated at Stevenson as rapidly as possible. 
By the 8th of August these supplies were suf¬ 
ficient in quantity to justify a distribution of them 
to the different commands, preparatory to an ad¬ 
vance across the river and over the difficult ridges, 
that lay at almost right angles to the line of move¬ 
ment. The advance of the main army began 
August 16. 

The Fourteenth Corps crossed along the rail¬ 
road line, or near to it. Its advance was soon at 
Stevenson and some of it at Bridgeport. The 
Twenty-first Corps—which formed the left of the 
army at McMinnville—crossed by the way of 
[ 56 ] 


bragg's strategy 


Pelham, a small village on the plateau, to Thur¬ 
man’s in the Sequatchie Valley. Minty’s cavalry 
covered the left flank by way of Pikeville, a village 
at the head of Sequatchie Valley. The Twenti¬ 
eth Corps also came to Stevenson and its vicinity, 
but by another route—to the right—than that taken 
by the Fourteenth, namely, via Beliefont, ten miles 
southwest of Stevenson, and Caperton’s Ferry, 
which is the river point nearest to Stevenson. 

All these crossings of the plateau were made 
without resistance by the enemy, although there 
were small Confederate cavalry outlooks here and 
there, which fell back when the Union troops ap¬ 
peared. It seemed as if Bragg desired to have the 
Union Army advance as far as possible from its 
base of supplies into the mountain gorges and over 
a long and difficult line of communications. That 
course would afford him a better chance, as his 
army being reinforced would be in better condi¬ 
tion to successfully attack and destroy the Union 
Army. 

In order to save the hauling of full forage for 
the animals, General Rosecrans had delayed his 
movement until the com should be sufficiently ripe. 

[ 57 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

No detail seemed wanting in the preparations for 
the difficult campaign. Enough ammunition was 
provided for at least two battles, and twenty-five 
daystations for the troops were hauled in wagons. 

The Tennessee River had to be crossed by the 
different corps; in order to conceal this movement 
and deceive the enemy at Chattanooga, Hagen’s 
brigade of Palmer’s division, and Wagner’s of 
Wood’s of the Twenty-first Corps, accompanied 
by Wilder’s mounted infantry of Reynolds’s divi¬ 
sion, crossed Walden’s Ridge from the Sequat¬ 
chie Valley into the valley of the Tennessee. 
These troops made ostentatious demonstrations 
upon Chattanooga from the north side of the river. 
Wilder—with four guns of Lilly’s battery—ap¬ 
peared suddenly before Chattanooga, threw some 
shells into the city, sunk the steamer “Paint Rock,” 
lying at the city landing, then ascending the river, 
feigned to examine the crossings, making fre¬ 
quent inquiry as to their difficulty and the charac¬ 
ter of the country. On the other side of the river 
east of Chattanooga, General Cleburne was sent 
by Bragg to make preparations for defending the 
crossings against the supposed advance of Rose- 
158 ] 


ROSECRANS’S INTENTIONS 

crans’s army. He fortified the ferry crossings. 
General Buckner—who commanded in East Ten¬ 
nessee against the forces of Burnside—expressed 
as his opinion on August 21, that General Rose- 
crans would cross above the mouth of Hiawassie 
River—a stream flowing northwards—and trans¬ 
fer his forces into Tennessee on its south bank, 
some thirty-five miles northeast of Chattanooga. 
Buckner’s army was at the point mentioned. 

Rosecrans’s intention was, however, to cross at 
Caperton’s Ferry—near Bridgeport and not far 
from Stevenson—and at Shellmound; these places 
are from twenty to forty miles below and to the 
west of Chattanooga. On August 20 at day¬ 
break, Heg’s brigade, of Davis’s division of the 
Twentieth Corps, in which served the Fifteenth 
Wisconsin Infantry, crossed in pontoon boats at 
Caperton’s Ferry, drove away the enemy’s cavalry 
and occupied the southern bank. Here a twelve 
hundred feet pontoon bridge was soon completed, 
and Davis’s divison of the Twentieth Corps, 
crossed and advanced to the foot of Sand Moun¬ 
tain, preceded by cavalry. Johnson’s division 
of the same corps crossed the following day 

[ 59 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

on the same bridge. Sheridan’s division of the 
Twentieth Corps crossed at Bridgeport on a 
bridge constructed by them of pontoons and tres- 
sels^ it was 2,700 feet long. Baird’s—formerly 
Rousseau’s—and Negley’s divisions of the Four¬ 
teenth Corps followed Sheridan’s division. The 
Twenty-first Corps marched down the Sequat¬ 
chie Valley and crossed at Battle Creek, nine 
miles up the river from Bridgeport. Hazen’s, 
Wagner’s, and Wilder’s brigades were, as before 
mentioned, in the Tennessee Valley to the north 
of Chattanooga, and did not cross with their corps. 
The whole movement across the river began on 
August 29 and ended on September 4 . The 
Third brigade of Van Cleve’s division of the 
Twenty-first Corps was left at McMinnville as a 
garrison. The railway was protected by the re¬ 
serve corps; the Fourteenth Corps was ordered to 
concentrate in Lookout Valley and to send imme¬ 
diate detachments to seize Cooper’s and Stevens’s 
gaps of Lookout Mountain, the only passable 
routes to McLemore’s Cove, down which runs the 
west Chickamauga Creek in a northeasterly direc¬ 
tion, towards Chattanooga. The Twentieth 
. [6o] 


SAGACIOUS MOVEMENTS 

Corps was to move to Valley Head at the head of 
Lookout Valley, and seize Winston’s Gap forty 
miles south of Chattanooga. The Twenty-first 
Corps with the exception of Hazen’s and Wag¬ 
ner’s infantry and Minty’s cavalry—which were 
still north and east of Chattanooga—were to 
march to Wauhatchie, at the lower end of Look¬ 
out Valley, near Lookout Mountain, and to com¬ 
municate with the Fourteenth Corps at Trenton 
in the same valley, and threaten Chattanooga by 
way of the Tennessee River via the nose of Look¬ 
out Mountain. The cavalry crossed at Caperton’s 
and at a ford near Island Creek, in Lookout 
Valley, from which point they reconnoitered 
towards Rome, Georgia, fifty-five miles south 
of Chattanooga, via Alpine. This last men¬ 
tioned hamlet is forty-two miles south of 
Chattanooga. In the absence of Major-General 
Stanley—the chief of cavalry—its movements 
were not prompt. If the reader will refer to a 
good topographical map of the region around 
Chattanooga, he will see how sagacious these 
movements were, and what grand strategy they 
displayed. The Army of the Cumberland was 
[61] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

stretched in line through the whole length of Look¬ 
out Valley, between Sand Mountain and Lookout 
Mountain, on the south side of the Tennessee 
River; it faced east towards the Chattanooga 
Valley, with only one range between them and 
the Confederate line of retreat and supplies; while 
on the northeast side of Chattanooga was a Union 
force of several brigades to prevent any counter 
movement by the Confederates upon the Union 
line of supplies. 

After crossing the Tennessee River, Rosecrans 
continued his feints to make Bragg think that the 
real movement was the feigned one. He had sent 
Wagner’s infantry, and Wilder’s and Minty’s 
cavalry brigades to report to Hazen with a force 
amounting to about 7,000. Hazen caused the 
enemy to believe that the whole army was there, 
intending to cross the river above Chattanooga. 
This was done by extensive firings, marchings, 
countermarchings, and by bugle calls, at widely 
separated points; while Wilder moved his artil¬ 
lery continuously across openings in sight from the 
opposite bank. 

The Confederates occupied in force the point 
[62] 


EVACUATION OF CHATTANOOGA 


of Lookout Mountain at Chattanooga. To carry 
this by an attack of the Twenty-first Corps seemed 
too risky; therefore the original movement was 
continued, namely, against the line south of Chat¬ 
tanooga, over Lookout Ridge, south of the point 
where it was held in force. The cavalry was or¬ 
dered to advance on the extreme right to Summer¬ 
ville, in Broomtown Valley, a village eighteen 
miles south of Lafayette, Georgia. McCook 
was to support this movement by a division thrown 
forward to the vicinity of Alpine forty-two miles 
southwest of Chattanooga. These movements 
were made on September 8 and 9. 

General Thomas crossed his corps over Frick’s, 
Cooper’s, and Stevens’s gaps of Lookout Moun¬ 
tain, to McLemore’s Cove. 

These movements forced Bragg to evacuate 
Chattanooga on September 8. Then Crittenden 
with the Twenty-first Corps and its trains marched 
the same day around the point of Lookout and 
camped that night at Rossville, at the gap through 
Missionary Ridge, five miles south of Chatta¬ 
nooga. Through this gap runs the wagon road 
from Lafayette to Chattanooga. 


[ 63 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


General Rosecrans claimed to have evidence 
that Bragg was moving towards Rome, and had 
therefore ordered Crittenden to hold Chattanooga 
with„one brigade, call all the troops of Hazen’s 
command across from the north side of the river, 
an follow the enemy’s retreat vigorously. 

On September 1 1, Crittenden was ordered to 
advance as far as Ringgold, but not farther, arid 
to make a reconnoisance as far as Lee and Gor¬ 
don’s Mill. 13 Crittenden’s report as well as other 
evidence convinced General Rosecrans that Bragg 
had only gone as far as Lafayette—twenty-five 
miles south of Chattanooga—and then halted. 
General Crittenden’s whole corps was therefore 
sent to Lee and Gordon’s Mill, where he found 
Bragg’s rear guard. He was ordered to com¬ 
municate with General Thomas, who by that time 
had reached the eastern foot of Lookout Mountain 
in McLemore’s Cove, at the eastern base of 
Stevens’s gap. Wilder’s mounted brigade fol¬ 
lowed and covered the Twenty-first Corps in its 

18 Lee and Gordon’s Mill is twelve miles south of Chattanooga, 
on the Chickamauga River, where the Lafayette and Chattanooga 
wagon road crosses that stream. Ringgold is fifteen miles southeast 
of Chattanooga, on the east of Chickamauga, and is a railway station 

[64] 



THE ENEMY ADVANCING 


movements to Lee and Gordon’s Mill, and had a 
severe fight with the enemy at Leet’s tan yard, five 
miles to the southeast. Although Bragg made 
his headquarters at Lafayette in his retreat from 
Chattanooga, his rear guard did not get beyond 
Lee and Gordon’s Mill. 

On September 10 Negley’s division of the 
Fourteenth Corps marched—after having crossed 
the ridge—from the foot of Stevens’s Gap, across 
McLemore’s Cove, towards Dug Gap in the 
Pigeon Mountains and then directly towards La¬ 
fayette. Dug Gap is six miles west of Lafayette. 
Negley found this gap heavily obstructed, but 
Baird’s division came to his support on the morning 
of September 11. They became convinced by 
some sharp skirmishing, which occurred on the 
11th, that the enemy’s forces were advancing; 
and therefore fell back from Davis’s cross-roads to 
a good position near the foot of Stevens’s Gap. 
These two officers are entitled to great credit for 
their coolness and skill in withdrawing their divi¬ 
sions from a very perilous trap. The forces of the 
enemy would have been overwhelming in their 
immediate front, if the Confederates had been 
5 [65] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

more expeditious and made the attack on the after¬ 
noon of September 10 or on the morning of the 
11 th. Hindman, Buckner, and Cleburne, with 
several divisions were there, but failed to cooper¬ 
ate in an attack at the right time. The obstruc¬ 
tions placed in the gap by the Confederates fav¬ 
ored Negley and Baird. 

On September 12 Reynolds’s and Brannan’s 
divisions following over the mountain closed up 
to Negley and Baird. Bragg’s army was at 
Lafayette, near Dug Gap, in force. Having of¬ 
ficial information that Longstreet was coming from 
Virginia with large reinforcements, and having 
already received troops from Mississippi and the 
eastern part of Tennessee, Bragg halted in his re¬ 
treat. He was preparing to give battle to the 
Union forces at the first good opportunity. 

Two divisions of Joseph E. Johnston’s troops 
from Mississippi and Buckner’s Corps from Ten¬ 
nessee—where Burnside’s forces were—had join¬ 
ed Bragg before he moved north from Lafayette 
to Chickamauga, where he was joined by three 
divisions of Longstreet’s Corps from Virginia on 
the 18th, if not earlier. At the same time Hal- 
166 ] 


BRAGG IS REINFORCED 


leek, chief of the army at Washington, D. C., 
telegraphed Rosecrans September 11, 1863, as 
follows: “It is reported here by deserters that a 
part of Bragg’s army is reinforcing Lee. It is im¬ 
portant that the truth of this should be ascertained 
as early as possible.” 14 

The fact stands out in bold relief, that the Con¬ 
federate Government at Richmond hastened rein¬ 
forcements to General Bragg; while the Wash¬ 
ington Government sent none to Rosecrans, al¬ 
though Burnside was in the eastern part of Tennes¬ 
see with 16,000 troops, and was at that time at 
leisure. Because the force, lately in his front, had 
reinforced Bragg at Lafayette, Burnside did 
not obey Halleck’s order to join Rosecrans; on the 
contrary, he drove Buckner’s force, which united 
with Bragg; thus Burnside enabled Buckner’s men 
to take part against the Union Army in the battle 
of Chickamauga. 

Bragg in his official report, says: “During the 

14 Rebellion Records , Serial No. 52, p. 530. In Genera 
Halleck’s report (id., Serial No. 50, p. 34), he says, that the 
abandonment of Chattanooga without defense gave plausibility to 
these reports by spies and deserters, that Lee was being reinforced 
from Bragg. 


[6 7 ] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


9th it was ascertained that a column, estimated 
at from 4,000 to 8,000 had crossed Lookout 
Mountain into the cove by way of Cooper’s 
and-Stevens’s gaps. Thrown off his guard by 
our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when 
in reality we had concentrated opposite his center, 
and deceived by the information, by deserters and 
others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his 
columns to intercept us, and thus exposed him¬ 
self in detail.” 15 He says further that he or¬ 
dered Hindman, Cleburne, and Buckner to join 
and attack the forces—Negley and Baird—at 
Davis’s cross roads, near Dug Gap; but because 
Dug Gap was obstructed by felled timber, which 
required twenty-four hours to remove, and because 
Buckner, when he joined Hindman, wanted to 
change the plans, Negley and Baird had been al¬ 
lowed to move back in a position not wise to fol¬ 
low. Bragg drew Buckner, Hindman, and Cle¬ 
burne back to Lafayette and prepared to move in 
order to attack Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s 
Mill. Polk’s and Walker’s corps were moved 
immediately in that direction. 

"Id., Serial No. 51, p. 27. 

[68] 



WISCONSIN TROOPS AT DUG GAP 


The only Wisconsin troops in the affair at Dug 
Gap on September 10 and 11 were the First, 
Tenth, and Twenty-first Infantry. Lieutenant 
Robert J. Nickles of the First Wisconsin Infan¬ 
try, aide to General J. C. Starkweather, command¬ 
ing the brigade, was killed when reconnoitering 
alone the enemy’s skirmishers. This was the 
only casualty to the Wisconsin troops. 

On September 12, General Leonidas Polk was 
ordered to attack Crittenden the next day, at Lee 
and Gordon’s Mill. Polk would not attack 
however, without reinforcements. Bragg spent 
the next five days getting his army in position along 
the west Chickamauga Creek, and on its east side 
from the north end of Pigeon Mountains to Reed’s 
Bridge. Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, who 
had been holding Ringgold on the east side of the 
Chickamauga with one brigade, moved on the 
18th to Reed’s Bridge on the west Chickamauga; 
this caused his force to become the extreme right 
of Bragg’s line. While Forrest’s and Pegram’s 
cavalry covered the extreme right at Reed’s 
Bridge, Walker’s Corps formed on the left of B. 
R. Johnson’s, opposite Alexander’s Bridge; Buck- 
[69] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

ner’s was next to Thedford’s Ford; Polk’s oppo¬ 
site Lee and Gordon’s Mill, and Hill’s Corps was 
on the extreme left, near Glass’s Mill. Wheeler s 
Cavalry protected the left flank, and was ordered 
to annoy the troops in McLemore’s Cove so much 
that Bragg’s movement would not be discovered. 
With B. R. Johnson’s movement from Ringgold 
came two brigades—just arrived from Missis¬ 
sippi—and three of Longstreet’s from Virginia. 
The other two brigades from Virginia came on 
the 19th in time to take active part, the Confed¬ 
erate Army being in position on the east side of 
west Chickamauga Creek; and Crittenden’s Corps 
near Lee and Gordon’s Mill on the west side. 
Bragg was finally ready for attack; and on the 
night of the 17th issued his order of battle, 
namely, that each body of troops should cross the 
creek at the nearest practicable bridge or ford, turn 
to the left, and sweep up the Chickamauga to¬ 
wards Lee and Gordon’s Mill. This would 
bring the troops upon the left flank of Crittenden’s 
forces. Leonidas Polk was to attack in front, 
across the stream, while Hill was ordered to pre¬ 
vent the Union forces in McLemore’s Cove from 
[70] 


HOW BRAGG FAILED 


reinforcing Crittenden. It will be seen how 
Bragg’s plan of attack failed completely. The 
Chickamauga Creek or River rises at the head of 
McLemore’s Cove, and runs northeast, emptying 
into the Tennessee River about five miles above 
Chattanooga. Therefore, to retreat to Chatta¬ 
nooga, or to cut off the Union Army from it, the 
Confederate Army had to cross on the west side 
of Chickamauga. The road from Lafayette 
to Chattanooga—on which the Confederates 
marched—runs on the east side of and parallel 
with Pigeon Mountains and the river, and crosses 
the river at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. The road on 
which the Union troops at Stevens’s gap marched, 
runs down the cove on the west side of the river and 
Pigeon Mountains, past Crawfish Springs, near 
which it branches to McFarland’s Gap and to 
Kelly’s farm on the Lafayette road, three miles 
north of Lee and Gordon’s; this distance is about 
sixteen miles. The Pigeon Mountains dwindle 
away into the level country some miles south of 
Lee and Gordon’s. 

The order of battle issued by Bragg on Sep¬ 
tember 17, was not immediately executed, on ac~ 

[71] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

count of some resistence made by Wilder’s mount¬ 
ed infantry and Minty’s cavalry at Reed’s and 
Alexander’s bridges. 

The activity of Minty and Wilder, and the 
bold front shown by the troops of Crittenden at 
and about Lee and Gordon’s Mill, prevented a 
serious attack by General Leonidas Polk, who was 
in front of that position. These facts together 
with the affair at Dug Gap and the presence 
of McCook’s Corps at Alpine caused the Con¬ 
federate Army to hesitate; thus General Rosecrans 
was given time to concentrate his whole army—not 
Crittenden’s Corps only—at Chickamauga, across 
the Lafayette road, between the Confederate 
Army and Chattanooga. Bragg’s plan was to at¬ 
tack Crittenden’s left and rear, throwing it back 
upon the centre—General Thomas’s—before Crit¬ 
tenden could be reinforced, and then to thrust 
his army between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. 
Rosencrans’s plan was to prevent such a disaster. 
Late in the afternoon of September 18, the first 
Confederate troops crossed the Chickamauga to¬ 
wards the west; this movement was still going on 


[72] 


A DANGEROUS MANEUVER 

on the morning of the 19th, when something unex- 
■ pected happened to Bragg’s Army. 

About two-thirds of the Confederate Army 
had crossed and was facing towards Lee and 
Gordon’s Mill, when at 9 o’clock a brisk engage¬ 
ment commenced with Forrest’s cavalry on the 
right of the Confederate line at Jay’s Mill, near 
Reed’s Bridge. 

While these movements of the Confederate 
Army were being inaugurated from Lafayette 
down on the east side of Chickamauga, the Union 
Army, at the foot of Stevens’s Gap in the cove and 
McCook’s Twentieth Corps, twenty miles away 
near Alpine, had to get together and join Critten¬ 
den’s Twenty-first Corps at Lee and Gordon’s 
Mill. 

While waiting to receive sufficient information 
to convince him that Bragg had halted at Lafay¬ 
ette, Rosecrans had on September 1 1 or 12 greatly 
widened the distance between his corps. It was a 
very dangerous maneuver to face Bragg, and had 
a more enterprising general been in command of 
the Confederate Army, the result would probably 
have been fatal for the Union forces. General D. 


[ 73 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

H. Hill says in a Century Magazine article, that 
Bragg was confused by the rapid movements of 
the Union Corps; the presence of McCook’s 
Corgs, south of Lafayette, at Alpine, held Bragg 
for a while at that place. He was not well in¬ 
formed as to the movements of Rosecrans’s 
Army. 18 

Bragg, by failing to attack the detached Four¬ 
teenth Corps nearest him in McLemore’s Cove, 
and afterwards to march towards the more distant 
detached Twenty-first Corps at Lee and Gordon’s 
gave the Union commander an opportunity to 
concentrate, and place his united army across the 
road from Lafayette to Chattanooga, at Kelly’s 
farm between Rossville and Lee and Gordon’s 
Mill. How was this movement done? 

While it took Bragg five days—from Septem¬ 
ber 12 to 17—to concentrate his army from Lafay¬ 
ette and Ringgold near Lee and Gordon’s, it 
required the same length of time for McCook to 
march his corps from the vicinity of Alpine to con¬ 
nect it with Thomas at the foot of Stevens’s Gap 

' See Robert U. Johnson and C. C. Buel (eds.), Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War (N. Y., 1884-87), vol. 3. 
f74] 



SERIOUS MISTAKES 


in the cove. There was a distance of forty miles 
from flank to flank of the Union Army, that is, 
from Alpine to Lee and Gordon’s. But McCook 
marched fifty-seven miles by the route he took in 
order to connect with Thomas. General Rose- 
crans in his official report says: “He [General 
McCook] had, with great prudence, already 
moved his trains back to the rear of Little River, on 
the mountain, but unfortunately, being ignorant of 
the mountain road, moved down the mountain at 
Winston’s Gap, down Lookout Valley to Cooper’s 
Gap, up the mountain, and down again, closing 
up with General Thomas on the 17th.’’ 17 

Looking back at this scattering of Rosecrans’s 
forces by the sendingof McCook’s Corps to Alpine 
—twenty miles southwest of Lafayette—one can 
understand that such tactics were serious mistakes. 
General Rosecrans thought himself justified for the 
movement upon the supposed correctness of the in¬ 
formation he had received, namely, that Bragg’s 
Army was in full retreat towards Rome, Georgia. 
It is apparent, however, that a reconnoisance of the 
cavalry to Alpine and Summerville would have 

17 Rebellion Records, Serial No. 50, p. 54. 

[75] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


accomplished the same result as the corps of infan¬ 
try which was sent. The alternative before Rose- 
crans, when he discovered the retreat of the Con¬ 
federate Army, was to concentrate the Fourteenth 
and Twentieth corps at Chattanooga, occupy 
Rossville Gap with a strong outpost, well en¬ 
trenched, and Lookout Mountain with another en¬ 
trenched detachment; he could then have waited 
for further developments. It is hardly probable 
that Bragg would have attacked him after having 
received his reinforcements, but would perhaps 
have fallen back on his line of supplies at some 
point in the rear. Before that could have occurred, 
however, the reinforcements that Rosecrans after¬ 
wards received would have been able to protect 
his line of communications. 

By the evening of the 17th the Union troops 
were substantially within supporting distance, but 
not yet in line to resist an attack by the enemy upon 
Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s, but orders were 
immediately given to move the Fourteenth and 
Twentieth corps towards the northeast, down the 
west Chickamauga River, in order to cover the 
Lafayette road, somewhere near Crittenden’s 


[76] 


OCCUPATION OF CHATTANOOGA 


Corps. The position of the troops and narrow¬ 
ness of the roads retarded the march. 

It must be kept in mind, that the movements 
which Rosecrans made after he discovered that 
Bragg had halted at Lafayette, were for the pur¬ 
pose of concentrating upon Chattanooga; and that 
the route Rosecrans took after the junction of the 
Fourteenth and Twentieth corps was perhaps the 
shortest route he could take to Chattanooga, while 
he could at the same time watch the enemy. He 
encountered Bragg’s force at Chickamauga and 
was forced to fight there. This was, therefore, 
the battle for Chattanooga. He gained his point 
—the military occupancy of Chattanooga—but it 
required two battles to win it; those of Chicka¬ 
mauga and the three days fight immediately 
around Chattanooga. 

During the 18th Minty’s cavalry, in position 
east of Reed’s Bridge, was attacked by Bushrod 
Johnson’s troops coming from Ringgold, and 
Wilder’s mounted infantry at Alexander’s, by 
Walker’s Corps. Both were holding bridges, but 
were driven back into the Lafayette road. Gen¬ 
eral Rosecrans’s plan, as given in orders, was that 
[ 77 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

General Thomas on his way down the cove road 
passing Crawfish Springs, near the battle-field, 
should post General Negley’s division there, re¬ 
lieving two divisions of Crittenden’s Corps. With 
the remainder of his corps, he was to march by 
way of Widow Glenn’s house to the Lafayette 
road, and take position at Kelly’s farm, across 
this road. General Crittenden was to move 
Palmer’s and Van Cleve’s divisions, relieved 
by Negley, to the left of his line, and with 
them prolong his left, from the left of Wood’s 
division, so as to cover that part of the Lafayette 
road, near Lee and Gordon’s. McCook’s Corps 
was to follow General Thomas and take tempor¬ 
ary position at Crawfish Springs, protecting the 
right of the Union line, and to keep his corps 
mainly in reserve. 

The cavalry was to close on McCook’s right, 
and to watch the crossings of the Chickamauga in 
that region. 

The Union movements began on the morning of 
the 18th, but were so slow, that McCook’s Corps 
only reached Pond Spring at dark, and bivouaced 
there for the night. Crittenden’s two divisions 

[78] 


UNION MOVEMENTS 


reached their positions on the Lafayette road near 
midnight. In view of the accumulated evidence, 
that the enemy was crossing his forces over the 
Chickamauga below Lee and Gordon’s on the 
18th, General Thomas pushed forward his corps, 
uninterruptedly during the night. He halted his 
leading division—Negley’s—at the assigned posi¬ 
tion near Crawfish Springs, where his corps rested 
for two hours at midnight and made coffee. From 
there on Baird’s division was in the lead, and 
General Thomas and staff rode with General 
Baird at the head of the column. This was a 
weird night-march. The utmost secrecy was 
kept. If the enemy—who was just across the 
river not far away—had discovered the movement, 
he would perhaps also have marched in the night 
and occupied the place for which General Thomas 
was aiming. General Hill’s Corps and Wheel¬ 
er’s Cavalry of the Confederate Army were on 
the east side of the Chickamauga, in order to pre¬ 
vent the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps from 
making this march. To deceive the enemy camp¬ 
fires were left burning in the camps in the early 
evening; in fact all along the road southwest of 
[79l 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

Crawfish Springs, frequent fires were kindled. 
Soon after leaving Crawfish Springs the column 
deflected to the right into an obscure cross-country 
road, which led to Kelly’s farm. Along the 
windings of this road, some of the hardest fights 
of the 19th and 20th took place. A pond after¬ 
wards known as “bloody pond” was passed soon 
after leaving Crawfish Springs; to the left, and 
a short distance from this pond, General William 
H. Lytle was killed September 20. Still further 
on was the place where the fatal blunder of the 
20th occurred—at about 11 a. m.—near Brother- 
ton’s house; General T. J. Wood, obeying his 
interpretation of an order from General Rosecrans, 
having withdrawn from the line, let in Longstreet’s 
troops. 

This road runs almost entirely through thick 
hardwood timber, but about half way between 
Crawfish Springs and Kelly’s farm, there was a 
little dwelling in the midst of a clearing, known 
as Widow Glenn’s. Here the next day, General 
Rosecrans lifted the name of the widow from the 
depths of utter obscurity to the heights of national 
fame, by making her home his headquarters. In 
[8o] 


THE HERO OF THE CONFLICT 


fact, the whole region from Missionary Ridge, on 
the left of the marching column as far as Ross- 
ville Gap (four miles to the northwest) to the 
Chickamauga on the east, was densely wooded 
and covered with heavy undergrowth. A few 
small farms scattered through this woodland were 
tilled by the obscurest of backwoodsmen, who 
lived in small log cabins or small frame buildings. 
Their names would never have been known, even 
in Chattanooga nine miles away, had it not been 
for the accidental fighting there of the greatest 
battle of the west. Widow Glenn’s, Kelly’s 
farm, Snodgrass Hill, McDonald’s, Poe’s, 
Brotherton’s, Dyer’s, Vittetoe’s, and Viniard’s 
were suddenly made historical by the battle of 
Chickamauga. 

General George H. Thomas was a very sedate 
man. There was about him, at all times, the very 
atmosphere of solid merit and reserved strength. 
As he rode beside General Baird, attended by 
the two staff corps, there was no indication 
that he was conscious of his high position. His 
modesty was always conspicuous. No one in 
the long line of troops stretching for miles 
6 [Si ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

behind could see in this unpretentious officer 
the true hero of the coming conflict, who would 
be known in the future as the “Rock of 
Chickamauga.” After Negley’s division was 
left in position near Crawfish, there remained in 
the marching column the three divisions of Baird, 
Brannan, and Reynolds. Baird’s and Brannan’s 
had three brigades each, but Reynolds’s had only 
two; Wilder’s was mounted and operated as cav¬ 
alry, wherefore it was not always with its divi¬ 
sion. 

About daylight on September 19, Baird’s divi¬ 
sion filed across the Lafayette road near Kelly’s 
log house, stacked arms, and commenced to pre¬ 
pare breakfast. Forrest’s Confederate cavalry 
lay at that time in the neighborhood of Jay’s Mill, 
one mile to the east, near Reed’s Bridge; Hood’s 
and Walker’s corps were further up, or west to¬ 
wards Lee’s and Gordon’s and within a mile and 
a half of Crittenden’s left. The stream was in 
many places easily fordable. The whole Con¬ 
federate Army was across the Chickamauga at 
sunrise with the exception of Hindman’s, Brecken- 
ridge’s, and Cleburne’s divisions. Thomas made 
[82] 


North 



Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valky in the Civil War , 

p. 266 































* 












































































































\ 








» 






























granger's movements 

temporary headquarters under a large tree by the 
road side; while waiting for the closing up of the 
rear division, he lay down on some blankets, and 
told his aide not to let him sleep more than an hour. 

General Gordon Granger, who commanded 
the reserve corps, had been ordered by Rosecrans 
on September 13 to bring three brigades of 
this corps—which happened then to be at 
Bridgeport, Alabama, guarding that point of the 
Union line of supplies—to the Rossville Gap. 
His duty was to guard the approaches from the 
south and east and to generally support the main 
army. He moved with his usual energy and ar¬ 
rived at the gap on September 14, although the 
distance is about thirty-five miles. He brought 
with him two brigades of Steedman’s division, 
viz.: Mitchell’s and Whittaker’s, and Daniel Mc¬ 
Cook’s brigades of James D. Morgan’s division. 
Granger’s presence in the front of Rossville Gap at 
McAffee’s Church with Whittaker’s brigade, and 
his sending Daniel McCook’s and Mitchell’s 
brigades towards Jay’s Mill and Reed’s Bridge, 
assisted greatly in postponing the crossing of the 


[ 83 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


Confederate forces until the 18th and thus pre¬ 
venting an attack on Crittenden’s left flank. 

On the morning of the 19th McCook’s brigade 
was bivouacing somewhere near Reed’s Bridge. 
McCook rode over to where Thomas was, and 
said hurriedly he must speak to him. He told 
General Thomas that a Confederate brigade had 
crossed at Reed’s Bridge and that his (own) 
brigade had then burned this bridge, thus this de¬ 
tached brigade could be captured, if General 
Thomas would send forces enough to do it. At 
that moment the head of Brannan’s division was 
approaching in rear of the line of Baird’s division 
to take position on the latter’s left. Thomas or¬ 
dered Brannan to reconnoitre in that direction with 
two brigades and to attack any force met. His 
advance brigade—Croxton’s—encountered very 
soon Forrest’s cavalry, about 7:30 or 8a.m. (some 
reports say 9 a. m.) and drove it more than half 
a mile. “This vigorous movement disconcerted 
the plans of the enemy to move on our left and 
opened the battle of the 19th September,” says 
General Rosecrans in his official report. 18 Forrest 


Rosecrans’s report in Rebellion Records, Serial No. 50, p. 56. 
[841 



brannan's reconnaisance 


was in that place as a defense of Bragg’s right 
flank. The sudden musketry of Croxton’s attack 
on Forrest far to the right of the Confederate 
commanders startled them and gave them the first 
intimation, that Bragg’s order did not meet the 
situation. 

General H. V. Boynton says that, at the time 
the isolated Confederate brigade was reported as 
on the west side of Chickamauga, early in the 
morning of September 19, two-thirds of the Con¬ 
federate Army were on the west side. 

It was 6:30 a. m. when Brannan left Kelly’s 
and moved north; he took the Reed’s Bridge road 
for the capturing of the isolated brigade. It was 
between 8 and 9 a. m., before the enemy was 
struck. 

General Forrest called immediately for assist¬ 
ance. Ector’s and Wilson’s infantry brigades of 
Walker’s Corps returned down the stream and 
drove Croxton. This brought Brannan with his 
two remaining brigades forward; he in turn drove 
back the Confederate force. Brannan in his re¬ 
port 19 says, that his troops came upon a strong force 


Ibid ., P . 400. 


[85] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

of the enemy, consisting of two divisions instead 
of the supposed brigade. Very soon Baird’s divi¬ 
sion was sent in on the right of Brannan; this at first 
drove the Confederate force that was attacking 
Brannan, but in turn it was attacked directly on its 
right flank and rear by Liddell’s division, which 
threw it into temporary confusion. In the mean¬ 
time McCook’s Corps arrived on the field. R. 
W. Johnson’s division of that corps was sent in, 
at noon, on Baird’s right; it struck Cheatham’s 
division on its right flank, driving it back in confu¬ 
sion. Johnson’s was overlapped and in immediate 
danger, when General John M. Palmer’s division 
of Crittenden’s Corps, relieved the right of his divi¬ 
sion; Crittenden had very wisely dispatched Palm¬ 
er’s division toward the sound of the firing and this 
burst upon the enemy. Palmer’s right was soon 
overlapped when Van Cleve from Crittenden’s 
Corps came to the rescue, but later in the day he 
also was beaten back. Then Reynolds’s division 
of Thomas’s corps advanced on the left of Pal¬ 
mer’s division, and two brigades of Van Cleve’s 
division came in on Palmer’s right. Davis’s division 
of McCook’s Corps attacked most opportunely and 
[ 86 ] 


WOUNDING OF HEG 


drove the enemy, but was compelled somewhat 
to give way. In this attack Colonel Hans C. 
Heg of the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was 
mortally wounded. In the meantime Crittenden’s 
remaining division under Wood attacked the 
Confederates and turned the tide. Lee and 
Gordon’s Mill was at that moment uncovered, 
all of Crittenden’s Corps having marched towards 
the left. About 3 o’clock p. m. McCook was or¬ 
dered to send his remaining division (Sheridan’s) 
to support the line near Wood and Davis, and to 
place Lytle’s brigade at Lee and Gordon’s as the 
extreme right. This stayed the Confederate ad¬ 
vance in that section. 

Lytle’s brigade was considered sufficient 
at that time to hold a point against which Bragg 
was, at first, directing his whole force. This 
point—at Lee and Gordon’s—was the left of 
the Union Army on the 18th; at noon on the 19th 
it was the right. 

Negley’s division, which had been posted near 
Crawfish Springs the night before, was then the 
only Union division which did not partake in the 
battle at first, but arrived in accordance with orders 
[871 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


on the field about 4:30 p. m. He was ordered to 
the place, from which VanCleve had been driven, 
in order to attack; he drove the enemy steadily, 
whi^p Thomas was driving him on the Confeder¬ 
ate right; these movements continued until night. 

It can readily be perceived that the battle of the 
19th was more or less a haphazard fight, neither 
side being aware of the position of the other. The 
undergrowth of the woods was so dense in most 
places, that opposed sides could not perceive each 
other until they were within a few yards, except by 
the firing. It was unfortunate that Rosecrans was 
not present with Thomas, when the latter’s corps 
crossed the Lafayette road. Before an attack was 
made, the Twenty-first Corps, being the nearest 
one to the Fourteenth, should have been formed 
on the right of the Fourteenth, both in a com¬ 
pact line, and with a brigade for each division 
in reserve; and the Twentieth Corps—when it 
closed up on the right of the Twenty-first in the 
same compact order—should have advanced 
swiftly upon the Confederates, some of whom 
were still crossing the river, and some with their 
right flanks to the Union line of attack. It is pos- 


A HAND-TO-HAND CONTEST 


sible that such an attack would have driven the 
Confederates into the river in great confusion; but 
an attack by only one division (Brannan’s) on 
Forrest’s cavalry beyond the Confederate right 
flank, simply notified the Confederate command¬ 
ers, and gave them ample time to wheel their divi¬ 
sions into the proper direction, and signalled them 
where to attack. General Rosecrans in his report 
does not mention a night fight that occurred on the 
extreme Union left. In fact, he says, there was 
no firing after dark. Just as it began to grow 
dark, however, Cleburne’s division of Hill’s Corps 
arrived from across the river. He boldly and 
characteristically marched through the defeated 
and prostrated divisions of Walker and Cheatham, 
was joined by two brigades of Cheatham’s divi¬ 
sion, Jackson’s, and Preston Smith’s, and then at¬ 
tacked with great fierceness the Union troops under 
R. W. Johnson and Baird; they covered Johnson’s 
front and lapped over on Baird. It was too dark 
to recognize friend from foe, and it was more or 
less a hand-to-hand contest. Finally the attack 
was repulsed, the Union troops holding the field. 


[ 89 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


The Confederate general, Preston Smith, and two 
of his staff officers were killed. 

Some idea of the severity of the fighting on the 
19th—the charging and falling back of both 
sides; the difficulty in keeping alignments; the im¬ 
possibility of officers identifying friend or foe; the 
losing of artillery batteries and single pieces, their 
recapture; and the awful slaughter in both armies 
—can be obtained only by reading official reports 
in serial numbers 50 and 51 of Rebellion Records . 
Its intensity can be estimated from the follow¬ 
ing data. Breckenridge’s division was not in the 
fight of September 19, but fought on the 20th 
only; his loss in killed and wounded was 1,075. 
Cleburne was in the night fight of the 19th, and 
was as active as Breckenridge on the 20th; his 
loss was 1,743 in killed and wounded. The 
total difference of 668 does not give an accurate 
comparison of the two days’ fighting, but does give 
some idea of the awful slaughter. The battle of 
the 19th was fought without breastworks; it was a 
square stand-up fight; nearly every division en¬ 
gaged on both sides, first attacked, then drove its 
opponent, and after falling back in some disorder, 


[ 90 ] 


kelly's farm 


reformed, and again advanced, until the day and 
part of the night were gone. 

The surgeon-general of the Union Army re¬ 
ported that about 4,500 wounded were treated af¬ 
ter this battle of the 19th. The loss in killed and 
wounded must, therefore, have reached 6,000, but 
the Union reports do not separate the losses of the 
19th from the total. 

Late in the afternoon of the 19th, Brannan’s 
division was withdrawn from the left and placed 
in reserve, or rather in echelon at the right of Rey¬ 
nolds, near Brotherton’s house, at the right of 
Thomas’s line. 

During the night of the 19th the lines of both 
armies were readjusted. That of the Union Army 
was drawn back. Palmer of Crittenden’s Corps 
and Johnson of McCook’s, who had reported to 
General Thomas the day before, were ordered to 
remain under his direction. He placed his troops 
in a compact line—facing east with the Lafayette 
road in his rear—around Kelly’s farm, but some 
distance in the woods. The divisions were in the 
following order from left to right: Baird, Johnson, 
Palmer, Reynolds, and Brannan; Brannan was 
[9i] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


drawn back so far, however, that he could be avail¬ 
able as a reserve and at the same time close enough 
to advance quickly to the front line. The right 
and left were both refused. Baird had no re¬ 
serve; but Johnson and Palmer had each a brigade 
in reserve. Each division was formed in two 
lines, and both were protected by hastily thrown 
up log breastworks. The artillery was in battery 
between brigades; this line was not broken during 
the battle of the 20th. Reynolds’s line crossed the 
Lafayette road at Poe’s house, near Brotherton’s, 
and from there to Lee and Gordon’s neither of the 
armies was in possession of the road. Reynolds 
had Turchin’s brigade in line and King’s in re¬ 
serve. Baird’s left did not reach to the Lafayette 
road. Kelly Field, which was a parallelogram 
about half a mile long and a quarter of a mile wide, 
was the storm centre of battle during September 
20. Besides the immense fighting along the main 
line of log works, there were five different charges, 
in rear of the main line from the south to the north 
side by five different Union brigades. These 
charges were made against the Confederate troops, 
which had turned on the left of Baird’s line and 


THE UNION RIGHT 


gained his rear. The brigades of Stanley, Van 
Derveer, Gross, Willich, and Turchin made these 
charges. 

The right of the Union line on the 20th—from 
Brannan’s right—was neither compact nor pro¬ 
tected. During the night of the 19th, or early 
morning of the 20th, the four divisions of Sheridan, 
Davis, Wood, and Van Cleve had been moved to 
the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge, a mile or 
more from the Lafayette road, in order to cover the 
road leading from Crawfish Springs to McFar¬ 
land’s Gap, west of Rosecrans’s headquarters. 
General Rosecrans says he rode the line about 
daylight, and that he suggested certain changes to 
McCook, especially that he keep close to the left, 
which was not done, however, in time to prevent 
disaster. Negley of the Fourteenth Corps, who 
was in line on the right adjoining Brannan, was or¬ 
dered to proceed to Thomas’s left, but only two 
brigades, John Beatty’s and Stanley’s, arrived, one 
at a time; both were driven away by the enemy. 
John Beatty’s brigade—which at 8:30 a. m. was 
placed on the left of Baird, so as to reach the La¬ 
fayette road—was not fortified; its thin line was 

[93] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

swept away at the first attack by the enemy. 
Negley was expected to fill this gap with his whole 
division, and Thomas sent request after request for 
Negley’s division. There was so much readjust¬ 
ment going on at the wrong time, and much of it 
not going on at any time in the troops under Mc¬ 
Cook and Crittenden on the 20th, that it is difficult 
now to try to place them up to 11 a. m. Wood, 
with his two brigades from the reserve, relieved 
Negley’s two remaining brigades in the front line, 
next to Brannan’s about 9:30 a. m., his brigade be¬ 
ing a little withdrawn in echelon. This was done 
to enable Negley to take position on Baird’s left. 
About 11 a. m. Van Cleve marched to the rear of 
Wood and had his men lie down. All these 
troops on the right—from Reynolds’s right to 
Sheridan’s the extreme right of the Union Army— 
were very thinly drawn out, and did no good in the 
day’s fight, with the exception of one full brigade 
of Wood’s, namely, Harker’s , one regiment of 
Buell’s brigade, and a few regiments from other 
divisions, which will be mentioned further on. 
The troops had done excellent service the day be¬ 
fore; but future events will show that they seemed 

[94] 


THE CONFEDERATE FORMATION 


to be paralyzed, by not having been well fortified 
and compactly placed the night before. This 
mistake had been corrected to some extent, when 
the disaster came. On the 20th the troops faced 
Longstreet, a most sagacious general, who was ex¬ 
ceedingly energetic in taking advantage of every 
defect of his opponent’s line and every blunder in 
his maneuvers. 

McCook had Davis’s and Sheridan’s divisions 
still on his extreme right. Crittenden had Van 
Cleve’s and Wood’s, although the latter was in the 
early morning supposed to be in reserve. Wood 
came into the front line as stated, but Van Cleve 
seems not to have found a place there on the 20th. 

THE CONFEDERATE LINE ON SEPTEMBER 20 

The Confederate line was in admirable forma¬ 
tion on the morning of the 20th, at a distance of 
400 to 1,000 yards east of the Lafayette road. 
From its right to its left it may be described as fol¬ 
lows: General Leonidas Polk commanded the 
right wing which was formed as follows: Forrest’s 
cavalry on the extreme right, 3,500 strong, a large 
[ 95 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

part of it dismounted; and next to him Brecken- 
ridge’s division. The cavalry and two infantry 
brigades of Breckenridge’s extended beyond 
Baird’s left; next in line came Cleburne’s division, 
in reserve behind Breckenridge was Walker’s two 
divisions of five brigades. 

General Longstreet commanded the left wing 
of the Confederate Army. This began at Cle¬ 
burne’s left with Stewart’s division opposite Pal¬ 
mer’s and Reynolds’s; then came B. R. Johnson’s 
opposite Brannan’s and Wood’s; next in line came 
Hindman’s, just opposite to Davis, and Sheridan’s, 
and in reserve behind Hindman’s was Preston’s. 
In reserve behind B. R. Johnson’s were Law’s or 
Hood’s—until Hood was wounded—and Ker¬ 
shaw’s five brigades in both. Cheatham’s five 
brigades were in reserve behind Stewart’s right, but 
fought only the Union left, both on the 19th and 
20th. At 3:30 p. m. Cheatham went to the ex¬ 
treme right of the Confederate Army. The 
strength of the whole Confederate formation lay 
in its reserves; they were used with consummate 
ability. The only reserves on the right wing of 
the Union Army at the time of theConfederate as- 
[96] 


THE CONFEDERATE FORMATION 


sault was Van Cleve’s division—which as an or¬ 
ganized division did not fight on the 20th—and 
Wilder’s mounted brigade. 

Longstreet had brought with him from Virginia 
two divisions of Hood’s Corps—McLaws’s and 
Law’s. Of McLaws’s division only Kershaw’s 
and Humphreys’s brigades arrived in time to take 
part in the battle of Chickamauga. Law had 
three brigades in his division. These were Rob¬ 
ertson’s, Benning’s, and another, later com¬ 
manded by Colonel James L. Sheffield. 

Bushrod R. Johnson’s division belonged to 
Buckner’s Corps from East Tennessee. Buck¬ 
ner’s Corps included also Stewart’s and Preston’s 
divisions. These were not together during the 
battle, but were presumably under direct command 
of General Longstreet. The condition of Leon¬ 
idas Polk’s old corps, was almost similar. Cheat¬ 
ham’s division of five brigades, and Hindman’s of 
three brigades—of Polk’s former corps—were sep¬ 
arated, and operated in different parts of the field. 
Daniel H. Hill’s Corps consisted of Cleburne’s 
and Breckenridge’s divisions; these acted together, 
commanded by Hill in person. General W. H. 
[97] 


7 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


T. Walker’s Corps was composed of his old divi¬ 
sion, commanded by General State Rights Gist, 
and Liddell’s division consisting of two brigades 
—Govan’s and Walthall’s. 

It will be understood that the Confederate forces 
were large, strongly organized, well officered, and 
extremely well placed on the field. Since falling 
back from Tullahoma the following reinforce¬ 
ments had joined Bragg: Walker’s five brigades 
from Mississippi, Buckner’s six brigades from East 
Tennessee, and Hood’s five brigades from Vir¬ 
ginia, besides a large amount of artillery. The 
coming of General Longstreet from Virginia was 
a distinct assistance to the Confederate Army. 
He was a genuine soldier of great ability, and 
capable of commanding his soldiers, clearly shown 
when he handled the left Confederate wing on the 
20th. The contrast between him and Leonidas 
Polk was very much in evidence on the 20th. 
Longstreet was exceedingly strong, while Polk 
was very weak. The Confederate right over¬ 
lapped the Union left and had the Union right 
been as compactly drawn towards its left as it 
should have been, the Confederate left would also 
[98] 


North 



Chick am aug a, morning of September 20, 1863 
Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valldy in the Civil War, 

p. 268 















THE UNION FRONT 

have overlapped that flank. The Confederate 
Army facing the Union forces on the morning 
of the 20th was made up of eleven divisions of 
infantry, and two of cavalry. General Rosecrans 
had no cavalry on his left, and Wheeler’s Confed¬ 
erate cavalry was at first on the east side of the 
Chickamauga and afterwards on the west side, 
watching Mitchell’s Union horsemen near Craw¬ 
fish Springs. 

General Rosecrans had 141 regiments of infan¬ 
try, 18 of cavalry, and 36 batteries. Bragg had 
173 infantry regiments, II of cavalry—which 
were dismounted and fought as infantry—28 cav¬ 
alry regiments, and 50 batteries. 

The Union front of battle on the morning of the 
20th, was about two and a half miles in length. 
Although Bragg had ordered the attack to be 
commenced on his right at daylight, and to be 
continued towards the left, yet it was 9:30 o’clock 
before Breckenridge advanced his three brigades, 
Adams’s, Stovall’s, and Helm’s against the left of 
Baird’s and John Beatty’s thin line beyond. 
Adams’s brigade on the right crossed the Lafay¬ 
ette road, and Stovall struck Beatty. The latter 
l99l 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


had to give way, but inflicted terrible punishment 
on the enemy. 

Part of Stovall’s brigade came against the reg¬ 
ular brigade, but made no impression. Helm, 
the left of Breckenridge’s line, attacked the right 
of the regulars’, Scribner’s line. The Confed¬ 
erate line was shattered and went to pieces. 
Helm, in bravely trying to rally his men was 
killed; two of Helm’s colonels were also killed, 
and two others wounded. 

Adams’s brigade was gaining the rear of 
King, when Stanley’s brigade of Negley’s long 
delayed division came into the Kelly field, and 
formed at right angles with the road and the 
Union line swept to the north, past King’s left, 
charged into the woods upon Adams’s brigade, 
and drove it away. Sometime during their attacks 
Adams was wounded and taken prisoner. Breck¬ 
enridge’s attack was a failure, but the firing by the 
infantry and the artillery was terrific while it 
lasted. Cleburne’s division advanced while 
Breckenridge was still in the fight; his attack cov¬ 
ered part of Baird’s and Johnson’s. Cleburne 
was a very capable officer; brave to the utmost; 
[i°o] 


polk's attack 


still his attack completely failed. Polk’s brigade 
of that division assaulted Starkweather. With re¬ 
gard to this attack Polk states in his official report 20 
“My line from right to left, soon became furiously 
engaged, the enemy pouring a most destructive fire 
of canister and musketry into my advancing line— 
so terrible indeed, that my line could not advance 
in face of it, but lying down, partially protected by 
the crest of the hill, we continued the fight for an 
hour and a half.’’ 

Cleburne states in his report 21 “Polk’s brigade 
and the right of Wood’s encountered the heaviest 
artillery fire I have ever experienced. I was now 
within short canister range of a line of log breast¬ 
works, and a hurricane of shot and shell swept the 
woods from the unseen enemy in my front.’’ This 
charge was also a failure, but most destructive to 
the Confederates. Wood reported 22 a loss in his 
brigade of 96 killed and 680 wounded. The 
great disparity of the wounded, in comparison with 
the killed, showed that the Confederate lines did 

20 Id., Serial No. 5 1, p. 177. 

2 'Ibid. t p. 154. 

”Ibid., P . 162. 


[ IOI ] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

not get very close to the Union boys. The Union 
forces were so pleased with having repulsed so 
forceful an attack, that they sent forward a strong 
skirmish line. General Hill—who was forming 
from the reserves a stronger second attack— 
paused, and concluded he would have to resist an 
attack from the Union line. 

Walker’s reserve corps of two divisions of five 
brigades was therefore moved forward and distrib¬ 
uted along the broken points of the first line. Dur¬ 
ing the day successive charges were made from 
Palmer’s position to the Union left, by ten Confed¬ 
erate brigades along the Union line, which, how¬ 
ever, they could not penetrate, nor could they 
get very close to the breastworks. Colquitt, 
commander of one of these brigades, fell as 
well as several of his officers, and General Desh- 
ler of Cleburne’s division was killed. Govan of 
Walker’s troops gained the rear of Baird’s division 
by marching around Baird’s left and driving away 
the thin unprotected Union line at that point. 
This second advance—which was actually another 
phase of the continuous attack from 9:30 to nearly 
noon—had extended its right much further be- 
[ 102 ] 


THOMAS STANDS FIRM 

yond the Union left, and by a wide left wheel it 
had straddled the Lafayette road. One brigade 
on the right of the road, another on the left, boldly 
threw out skirmishers and advanced towards Gen¬ 
eral Reynolds’s rear, beyond the Kelly house. It 
was a very threatening and dangerous situation. 
The Confederate line in front—from Baird around 
to Brannan—opened a heavy fire upon the barri¬ 
cades. It looked for a while, as if the movement 
would succeed in destroying the heretofore invin¬ 
cible line of General Thomas’s troops; but Thomas 
saw every movement and knew the weakness of 
the left beyond Baird. Brannan had a reserve 
brigade—Fred Van Derveer’s—and this arrived 
just in time to form in front of the Confederate bri¬ 
gades in the Kelly field. It changed front under 
fire, charged the Confederate line, broke it, and 
finally drove it clear of the Union left. Then the 
reserve brigade returned to a point near the Kelly 
house. Van Derveer’s brigade had come, at this 
time, with an order from General Rosecrans to 
Brannan, to report his whole division to Gen¬ 
eral Thomas. It was under the supposition 
that Brannan had done so, that Rosecrans soon af- 
[ 1031 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


ter issued the fatal order to V^ood to close up on 
Reynolds. But the enemy had gained the line, 
where Beatty had before stood. Palmer sent 
his.reserve brigade (Grose’s), in accordance 
with General Thomas’s order; his brigade formed 
double lines, and with cheers they charged into 
the woods and the enemy was driven away. 
Then Barnes, of Van Cleve’s division, was placed 
on or near the left; the Union left was henceforth 
safe. 

THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK UPON THE UNION 
RIGHT 

About 11 o’clock the successive attacks of the 
Confederate divisions from the left to the right 
had reached Longstreet’s wing; they were contin¬ 
ued with a charge by Stewart upon Reynolds’s 
position; it involved Hazen or Palmer, who had 
been transferred to the right of Reynolds and to 
the left of Brannan. This was the beginning of 
the general assault on the Union right, which came 
so near being disastrous to General Rosecrans’s 
army. This attack of Stewart’s took place at the 
time when Adams and Stovall of Breckenridge’s 
[ 104] 


ATTACK ON UNION RIGHT 


division were entering the open Kelly field upon 
the Confederate right. General Stewart acknowl¬ 
edges, in his report, that his charge was repulsed 
with great slaughter. The division next to Stew¬ 
art took up the assault. It was Bushrod R. John¬ 
son’s supported by Law and Kershaw. Just before 
this attack an aide of General Thomas had come to 
General Rosecrans to ask again for support on the 
left. In riding close to the line between General 
Reynolds’s and General Brannan’s divisions he 
observed that the latter—Brannan being in echelon 
with Reynolds—did not make a continuous line, 
but a broken one. The position of General Bran- 
nan was nevertheless just as effective, and perhaps 
more so, than if he had been in the main line. 
General Thomas J. Wood’s division, which had 
just replaced Negley’s division, was next to the 
right of Brannan but in the main line; it joined, 
however, its left to Brannan’s right; wherefore the 
aide reported to General Rosecrans that Reyn¬ 
olds’s right was unprotected. Brannan had been 
ordered to go to General Thomas’s left, but on ac¬ 
count of being threatened with an attack on his 
front he remained with two of his brigades, and 
f 105 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

sent Van Derveer’s, his reserve brigade. Rose- 
crans dictated at once an order to Wood, “to 
close upon Reynolds as fast as possible and support 
hijn.” Thereupon Wood withdrew from the line, 
and marched to the rear of Brannan, just as the 
Confederate charge, under B. R. Johnson, reached 
its old front. Rosecrans issued his order to Wood 
supposing that Brannan had gone with his whole 
division to the Kelly field. Brannan reported what 
action he had taken, and that Reynolds had ap¬ 
proved it. Rosecrans gave his approval instantly; 
but the fatal order had been issued to Wood some 
minutes before, and consequently his division was 
moving out, just as the eight brigades made the at¬ 
tack. Longstreet had massed these brigades op¬ 
posite the Union centre. They were formed in 
three lines, lapped over the right of Brannan and 
the left of Davis—whose division was on the right 
of Wood—and moved close to the gap; they wid¬ 
ened the awful space left by Wood; the attack 
struck Wood’s rear brigade (Buell’s) and shat¬ 
tered it. Brannan who was a very able comman¬ 
der threw back his right, but lost a part of Con¬ 
nell’s brigade in this movement. With great skill 
[106] 


ATTACK ON UNION RIGHT 


and considerable deliberation he reestablished his 
line on the Horse Shoe Ridge, near the Snodgrass 
house, on a line nearly perpendicular to the one 
from which he had retreated. Although Wood’s 
division was subjected to a heavy attack, he—with 
the aid of General Thomas, who had just come 
from the left wing—succeeded in establishing his 
remaining troops in prolongation of Brannan’s new 
line, and in reaching towards, but not entirely, 
Reynolds’s right, which retired slightly. Hazen’s 
brigade of Palmer’s division filled up the gap be¬ 
tween Reynolds and Wood, thus making the 
Union line a nearly continuous one from Snod¬ 
grass Hill to the left of Baird, where Barnes’s bri¬ 
gade had taken position. The shape of the line 
was that of a very flattened crescent, with the con¬ 
vex side towards the enemy; it was greatly short¬ 
ened, however, by the losses of the 19th, and the 
cutting off on the right of two whole divisions, 
Davis’s and Sheridan’s, a part of Wood’s, and 
some of Van Cleve’s. These were now beyond 
the Confederate line and were attacked by heavy 
forces while on the march, driving them from the 
field. Negley with his remaining brigade was 
[107] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

caught in the gap from whence he drifted towards 
Brannan. General H. V. Boynton said about 
this affair on this part of the field: “Negley, 
gathering up much artillery, was ordered by 
General Thomas to post it on the crest over¬ 
looking the field in front of Baird’s left, but 
instead he took it to Brannan’s right. This 
was a good position for it and it could have been 
of great service there later, when the Confederate 
line made an advance to that point, but he retired 
with it in haste toward Rossville, ordering all the 
artillery to follow him, before he was attacked.” 

Jefferson C. Davis was a fine and brave officer. 
He had only two brigades, Carlin’s and Heg’s; 
the latter was commanded by Martin, for Colonel 
Heg had been mortally wounded the day before. 
These brigades had done some wonderful fighting 
on the day before, when they were greatly reduced. 
After the break they could not stand against the 
Confederate charge, wherefore they drifted 
towards Rossville. Davis and Sheridan were 
both on the move by the left flank closing up 
toward the left, when the Confederate charge 
struck them. Van Cleve with his remaining 
DoS] 


ATTACK ON UNION RIGHT 

brigades in motion—Barnes had gone to the 
left—was thrown into disorder by the rapid 
dash of some artillery through the ranks, while 
a portion of them rallied with Wood. Gen¬ 
eral Lytle of the Sheridan brigade was killed 
while trying to rally his troops. These divisions 
and brigades went back, together with Wilder’s 
mounted brigade, carrying with them Generals 
Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden, who at that 
time were to the right of the break. The line of 
their retreat was through McFarland’s Gap in Mis¬ 
sionary Ridge, south of Rossville. These troops 
did not go further back than to Rossville, but 
Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden kept on to 
Chattanooga. Boynton says, that Sheridan’s di¬ 
vision was in good order when it arrived at Ross¬ 
ville. Davis tried his best to reform his troops 
near to McFarland’s Gap; he did march them 
back to the field, but reached it too late in the 
evening. In the neighborhood of the two gaps, 
McFarland’s and Rossville, were some ten thou¬ 
sand fugitive troops; the way was open for them to 
have been led either to the right or to the left of the 
Union line. But who was there who had rank and 
[109] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


authority enough to lead them, while their army 
and corps commanders were still further to the rear? 
James A. Garfield, Gates P. Thruston, chief of 
McCook’s staff, Surgeons Gross and Perkins, 
medical directors of the Fourteenth and Twentieth 
corps, rode back and joined General Thomas. 
Sheridan was requested by Thruston, the adjutant- 
general and chief of staff to General McCook, at 
McFarland’s Gap—by a message from General 
Thomas—to march to the latter’s relief, but he 
insisted on marching back to Rossville and from 
there taking the Lafayette road to the left flank of 
the army. 23 This was a most out of the way road 
to the battlefield. Sheridan wanted to report 
quickly to General Thomas when the break oc¬ 
curred and was doing that by way of Rossville. 
It was dark before he arrived near to the left; the 
Union troops had then begun the backwood move¬ 
ment. 

After the second attack on the left by Walker’s 
and Hill’s corps, Breckenridge again came in be- 

23 See General Thruston’s report in Thomas Budd Van Home, 
History of the Army of the Cumberland (Cincinnati, 1875), 
vol. i,p. 373; also General Negley’s statement, p. 376. 

[no] 



ATTACK ON UNION RIGHT 

hind Baird, but was repulsed by Van Derveer, 
Grose, and Willich. All was quiet on the left, 
while heavy firing continued on the right, when 
General Thomas rode over to the right to look at 
matters there. This occurred during the adjust¬ 
ment after the break, and he placed what remained 
of Wood’s on the left of Brannan, the latter hav¬ 
ing taken his position prior to that on Horse Shoe 
Ridge. General Thomas did not return to the 
left until about 5:30 p. m. 

There had been no intimation to the four com¬ 
manders on the left—Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and 
Reynolds—that everything had not gone well 
with the right. They could get no message 
from Thomas for two or three hours. At this 
juncture, fearing another assault by the Confeder¬ 
ate lines, and supposing that Thomas had been 
cut off from them, Palmer, Johnson, and Reynolds 
consulted with Baird and proposed that General 
Palmer, as the senior and ranking officer, be 
placed in command of their four divisions and 
march them off the field. General Baird refus¬ 
ing to join them, prevented this calamity. Had 
this been done, the Confederate right wing, 
[in] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

confronting them, could have advanced unim¬ 
peded in the rear of the Union troops on Snod¬ 
grass Hill, about three-quarters of a mile directly in 
the rear of the Union left. In view of what hap¬ 
pened later in the evening with regard to the suc¬ 
cessful falling back, it is not necessary to state 
what a probable disaster General Baird prevented. 

Longstreet followed the drawing back of the 
Union right, by a right wheel of his divisions, 
while keeping Preston’s division in reserve, prob¬ 
ably in order to be ready to repel quickly any at¬ 
tack upon his left and rear by Davis, Sheridan, 
Wilder, or R. B. Mitchell. There was no need 
to be alarmed, for no troops approached from that 
quarter. He largely outflanked and outnum¬ 
bered the right wing of Rosecrans. General Gar¬ 
field had brought an order to Thomas from Rose¬ 
crans to take command of the army, which was 
left on the field, and to fall back to Rossville, to 
form a new line, and to hold back the enemy from 
Chattanooga. Thomas made his headquarters 
near the Snodgrass house and directed all the 
movements of the Union forces for the rest of the 
day. He determined to hold the present line at 



Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi VallCy in the Civil War, 

p. 270 







ATTACK ON UNION RIGHT 


least until night, when the retreat could be made 
with less danger. To meet the six triumphant 
divisions of Longstreet, the available troops in line 
were Croxton’s and part only of Connell’s bri¬ 
gades of Brannan’s division; Wood, with only 
Harker’s brigade, and one regiment of Buell’s; 
his other regiments seemed to have faded away, 
or been cut off in the break. With Wood’s line 
were a part of John Beatty’s brigade, a part of 
Stanley’s, and the Twenty-first Ohio of Sirwell’s: 
these were of Negley’s division, but Negley was 
not with them. There were parts of the Ninth 
and Seventeenth Kentucky, Forty-fourth In¬ 
diana, and Thirteenth Ohio of Van Cleve’s divi¬ 
sion, but no division commander with them. 

The Forty-fourth Indiana of Dick’s brigade, 
and the Seventeenth Kentucky of Beatty’s bri¬ 
gade, and both of Van Cleve’s—Barnes’s brigade 
being still on the left—were the only regiments 
which deflected from the fugitives, and fell in 
with Wood’s and Brannan’s line. 

Longstreet’s troops attacked these fragments re¬ 
peatedly with tremendous force, but were repulsed 
with great loss. Finally one of Hindman’s bri- 
8 [II3] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

gades gained a position on Brannan’s right and 
rear, without opposition, for no troops were there to 
oppose them. Negley had held that point earlier 
with ample artillery and infantry supports, but 
he was then in Rossville. Just at this time, 
when disaster again seemed inevitable, General 
Gordon Granger reported to General Thomas; 
having marched his troops with the true instincts of 
a soldier from McAffee’s church, in front of Ross- 
ville Gap facing Ringgold, to the sound of the 
battle. Thomas ordered him to the right of 
Brannan. Two large brigades, Whittaker’s and 
John G. Mitchell’s, were commanded by the gal¬ 
lant General James B. Steedman; these formed 
in line, charged up the hill against that brigade 
which had gained the flank of Croxton, and drove 
it pell-mell back down the hill with great slaugh¬ 
ter. At this time, Van Derveer’s brigade came 
from the Kelly field, where it had done such fine 
service. This brigade formed on Steedman’s 
left and joined in the attack. When this com¬ 
bined force struck the enemy the musketry firing 
was heavier than any before delivered. It lasted 
perhaps twenty minutes. It was immediately in 
[ XI 41 


North 



Chickamauga, evening of September 20, 1863 

Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War, 

p. 274 



























































































ATTACK ON UNION RIGHT 


the rear of Baird’s division, on the left, about three 
fourths of a mile away; could not be seen on ac¬ 
count of the woods, but was heard, and it was ter¬ 
rific. Twice Hindman reformed at a safe dis¬ 
tance, and tried to recapture the hill, but being 
overwhelmed, abandoned any future efforts; 
these brigades formed in prolongation of Bran- 
nan’s right and fought until dark. While Sheri¬ 
dan was marching on the west side of Missionary 
Ridge towards Rossville, Granger was marching 
on the east side of it towards the battle, without 
other orders than a general one, given days before 
to support the army. They both must have 
heard the firing, and should have marched to it; 
if these fugitive troops could have been brought 
on the field with a competent commander, what 
_would the result have been? How could they 
keep away? Would not the Confederate Army 
—which was so nearly used up—have been glad 
to fall back to Rome? 

Hindman, in his report 24 speaks in the follow¬ 
ing words of this desperate contest on the Union 
right lasting over four hours, viz.: “I have 

“ Rebellion Records , Serial No. 51, p. 305. 

[ 115 ] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

never known Federal troops to fight so well.” 
General Daniel H. Hill, who commanded a Con¬ 
federate corps on the army’s right, says in an ar¬ 
ticle on the battle of Chickamauga, that he never 
saw the dead so thick anywhere as he did on the 
slopes of Snodgrass Hill after the attacks by 
Longstreet’s several- divisions. 25 

General Garfield after returning from Rossville 
to the field, rode long the lines of his old brigade, 
now Harker’s of Wood’s division, cheered the men 
with muskets and gave by his presence the evi¬ 
dence that others who did not come back from 
the rear could have done so. Longstreet’s report 
states: “Hood’s column broke the enemy’s line 
near the Brotherton house, and made it wheel to 
the right. In making this movement Major Gen¬ 
eral Hood fell severely and it was feared mor¬ 
tally wounded by a minie ball breaking his 
thigh.” Law succeeded Hood in command. 
Longstreet continues as follows: “About three 
o’clock in the afternoon I asked the commanding 
general for some of the troops of the Right Wing, 
but was informed by him that they had been beaten 

25 See Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 3. 

[116] 



ATTACK ON UNION RIGHT 

back so badly that they could be of no service to 
me ”26 ^he figures of losses on the two wings 
given later on will show that Bragg was right. 

The forces to resist the whole Confederate 
Army were but five divisions in line. The rank 
and file of these divisions did not know of the 
condition on the right, which was very fortunate; 
they stood and fought therefore defensively, and 
with great confidence and bravery. 

The Union line, as now formed, consisted of 
Thomas’s original five divisions and such troops 
as Wood’s one brigade (Harker’s), a fraction 
of another (Buell’s) and fractions of regiments 
which had drifted in, together with Steedman’s 
two brigades. It stood off the Confederate Army 
until dark. An attack on General Thomas’s left 
_—organized about three o’clock—must be men¬ 
tioned, however. It is supposed that this was made 
in order to prevent any of the Union troops at that 
point from being sent to the right. The attack 
was a general one and was easily repulsed. The 
divisions of Breckenridge, Liddell, Armstrong’s 
dismounted cavalry, and Forrest’s artillery across 

“ Rebellion Records, Serial No. 51, p. 289. 

[ii7] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


the Lafayette road, were active. Willich made 
the fourth charge along the length of Kelly’s field 
against these troops across the Lafayette road. At 
ha|f after five o’clock all was quiet on the Union 
left, and confidence filled the hearts of the troops; 
but the attacks by Longstreet on the Union right 
lasted another hour. 

Thomas had orders from Rosecrans to draw 
back to Rossville; Granger wanted him to ignore 
the orders and hold the field; but Thomas would 
not accede to such a request, and began the move¬ 
ment at half past five. His line was solid and 
confident, but had very little ammunition, and no 
rations. He was largely outnumbered and out¬ 
flanked at both right and left; by falling back to 
Rossville he would gain the fugitive troops, whom 
he had been unable to induce to march back to this 
position; he would also gain a stronger defensive 
line, which would better cover the approaches to 
the city. He intended to start the movement so 
early in the evening that he could get the troops 
in the proper roads and directions before night, 
when darkness would protect them from danger 
of attack during the march. Boynton says: “It 


THOMAS WITHDRAWS 


was in no sense a military retreat,” it was done “be¬ 
cause Chattanooga, and not the Chickamauga 
woods, was the objective of the campaign.” Still, 
it may also be said, that the Confederate Army 
was the objective, and that its destruction was of 
more importance than the occupation of the city. 
It is quite certain that General Thomas would 
gladly have remained on the field, if he had been 
confident that he could have destroyed Bragg’s 
army the next day. He did not know at that time 
that it was badly used-up as later events proved 
and the movement backwards in the face of a very 
vigilant foe, who was constantly advancing in al¬ 
most full force, would have been dangerous. 

The dispositions made by General George H. 
Thomas —before and after he discovered the 
break in the Union right — were of the highest 
military character; his plan of withdrawal to 
Rossville was equally scientific. In his report he 
says, that after the arrival of Granger’s forces and 
their effective attack on the enemy’s troops on the 
right of Brannan, every assault of the enemy until 
nightfall was repulsed in the most gallant style by 
the whole line. This was the result of his skill- 

[ 119] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


ful placing of troops," his constant watchfulness 
with regard to the movements of the enemy, and 
the excellent counter movements by the Union 
forces. But the real cause of the preservation of 
the "army was the masterful formation of the five 
divisions remaining under General Thomas’s com¬ 
mand on the morning of the 20th; they were 
formed in compact, double lines, protected by log 
breast-works and had three or four brigades in re¬ 
serve; these lines required no re-adjustment and 
were not penetrated. His watchfulness of the 
troops—of which many formed under his own di¬ 
rection on Snodgrass Hill after the break on the 
right—enabled him to point out instantly where 
they should go, when Granger and Steedman ap¬ 
peared. Let it be remembered that he was at that 
time unaware of the extent of the disaster on the 
right. In his report he states, “General Garfield, 
chief of staff of General Rosecrans, reached this 
position about 4 p. m., in company with Lieutenant- 
Colonel Thruston, of McCook’s staff, and Cap¬ 
tains Gaw and Barker, of my staff, who had been 
sent to the rear to bring back the ammunition, if pos¬ 
sible. General Garfield gave me the first reliable 


[120] 




THOMAS WITHDRAWS 

information that the right and centre of our army 
had been driven, and of its condition at that time. I 
soon after received a dispatch from General Rose- 
crans, directing me to assume command of all the 
forces, and, with Crittenden and McCook, take a 
strong position, and assume a threatening attitude 
at Rossville, sending the unorganized forces to 
Chattanooga for reorganization, stating that he 
would examine the ground at Chattanooga, and 
then join me; also that he had sent out rations and 
ammunition to me at Rossville.” 27 

General Thomas, of course, knew before Gar¬ 
field reached him that disaster of some kind had 
occurred on the right; but he did not know its ex¬ 
tent, neither did he know of the departure of the 
many troops and high officers from the field. 
When he received this dispatch from General 
Rosecrans he determined to fall back and imme¬ 
diately formulated his plans. To enable the 
troops in line to hold the positions they occupied 
until the proper time to fall back, he sent two aides 
to distribute some ammunition—ten rounds to the 
man—which Granger had brought with him. As 

27 Id., Serial No. 50, p. 253. 

[ 121 ] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

soon as this was done he sent Captain Willard, an 
aide, to direct the division commanders to be pre¬ 
pared to withdraw their commands as soon as they 
received orders. At 5:30 p. m. Captain Barker 
carried the order to Reynolds to commence the 
movement. Thomas does not indicate in his re¬ 
port why he wanted Reynolds to commence the 
movement, but it has been shown that his division 
was the one best located for the work. A brigade 
of Confederate troops of Liddell’s division occu¬ 
pied at that time the woods on the west of the La¬ 
fayette road, between the Union right on Snod¬ 
grass Hill and the left around the Kelly field. 
It was in the rear of both Union wings. Rey¬ 
nolds’s position was at the head of these woods, 
and his troops could fire into the Confederate 
lines without danger to the backs of the Union 
soldiers. Under Thomas’s direction, Turchin’s 
brigade moved down the Lafayette road, and 
filed to the left; when his rear had cleared the 
road and faced to the right on the march, he threw 
his brigade upon the Confederate forces and drove 
them in utter defeat entirely beyond Baird’s left. 
This was the fifth charge made during the day in 
[ 1 22 ] 


THOMAS WITHDRAWS 


the same direction along this road, in and adjacent 
to the Kelly field. General Thomas posted Rey¬ 
nolds’s two brigades, Turchin’s and Robinson’s— 
formerly King’s—together with Johnson’s reserve 
brigade and General Willich’s on the ridge road 
west of the Lafayette road, near the Mullis farm, 
in order to cover McFarland’s Gap. Thomas’s re¬ 
port describes best what followed: “These dis¬ 
positions being made, I sent orders to Generals 
Wood, Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from 
their positions. Johnson’s and Baird’s division 
were attacked at the moment of retiring, but, by be¬ 
ing prepared, retired without confusion or any seri¬ 
ous losses. General Palmer was attacked while 
retiring.* * * I then proceeded to Rossville, 

accompanied by Generals Garfield and Gordon 
Granger, and immediately prepared to place the 
troops in position at that point.’’ 28 

During Baird’s withdrawal he was heavily at¬ 
tacked by the enemy, and lost a great many who 
were taken prisoners; some of these remained 
too long behind the breastworks, others took a 
wrong direction in falling back. The troops which 

M Ibid P . 254 . 

[123] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


had retreated to Rossville Gap during the day 
were reorganized by their officers prior to the fall¬ 
ing back of the main army. Negley’s division 
was placed directly across the gap, and the next 
morning Baird’s was placed behind it; the other 
divisions on the right and left (on the crest of 
the ridge) were stationed with Minty’s cavalry 
in front of the gap, about one mile and a half on 
the Ringgold road. General R. B. Mitchell’s 
cavalry was on the Union right covering McFar¬ 
land’s Gap, and extending his right to the Chat¬ 
tanooga Creek. McCook’s Corps was in line 
about a mile behind him. 

On September 21, General N. B. Forrest ad¬ 
vanced at Rossville some Confederate cavalry 
close enough to throw a shell or two into a Union 
wagon train and Minty’s advance Union cavalry 
on the Ringgold road had a little skirmish. But 
the Confederate Army was not advancing; ap¬ 
parently it did not intend to attack the position at 
this point. In fact, General Bragg did not know 
of the retirement of the Union Army until the 21 st, 
and he did not order an advance. The Confed¬ 
erate Army lay still on the field during the 
[124] 


THOMAS WITHDRAWS 


21st, and most of the 22nd. Therefore General 
Thomas advised General Rosecrans to concen¬ 
trate the troops at Chattanooga, and this was done 
on the night of September 21, in a most admirable 
manner under Thomas’s direction. Brannan’s 
division—in order to cover and protect the move¬ 
ment—was posted half way between Rossville 
and Chattanooga. Nearly all the infantry and 
artillery were in or around the city by 7 a. m. of 
the 22nd. The different organizations were 
marched directly to positions previously assigned 
them. 

Baird’s division (now Rousseau’s), with Min¬ 
ty’s cavalry still in rear of it, brought up the 
rear, and did not arrive in the entrenchments 
around the city until late in the evening of the 
22(nd. General Rousseau, who was absent from 
early in August, joined the army again at Rossville 
on September 21, and assumed command of his 
old division. General Baird was later assigned 
to another division at Chattanooga. 

In the forenoon of the 22nd, Cheatham’s Con¬ 
federate division marched to the neighborhood of 
Chickamauga station, and took a road leading 
[125] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


thence to the top of Missionary Ridge; it was fol¬ 
lowed by the rest of Polk’s Corps on the 23rd. On 
the same day, Hill’s and Longstreet’s corps fol¬ 
lowed on different roads and slowly formed their 
line on top of the ridge. Longstreet’s and Hill’s 
was thrown across the valley to the foot of Look¬ 
out; their left was on the top of Lookout Moun¬ 
tain and their right on the northeast nose of Mis¬ 
sionary Ridge, abutting on the Tennessee River, 
but the main line did not reach to the river. Their 
camps were principally located in the Chicka- 
mauga Valley on the east side of the ridge, where 
they were protected from observation by the Union 
forces. 

WISCONSIN TROOPS AT CHICKAMAUGA 

There were five infantry regiments from Wis¬ 
consin in the battle of Chickamauga, viz.: 
the First, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-first, and 
Twenty-fourth. The First and Twenty-first 
were parts of the Second Brigade, commanded by 
General John C. Starkweather—formerly Colonel 
of the First Wisconsin Infantry—of the First Divi¬ 
sion, commanded by General Absalom Baird, of 
[126] 


WISCONSIN AT CH1CKAMAUGA 

the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General 
George H. Thomas. They were actively en¬ 
gaged near the extreme left on both days of the 
battle. When Baird’s division on the morning of 
the 19th advanced from Kelly’s house on the La¬ 
fayette road, Starkweather’s brigade was in re¬ 
serve behind the other two brigades of the divi¬ 
sion. His brigade was formed in two lines, the 
first composed of the First Wisconsin on the right 
and the Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania on the left, 
with the Fourth Indiana Battery between the two 
wings. The Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry 
and Twenty-fourth Illinois Infantry formed the 
rear line. Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Bing¬ 
ham commanded the First, and Lieutenant-Colo¬ 
nel Harrison C. Hobart the Twenty-first. Having 
advanced about a mile through the woods, driv¬ 
ing the enemy’s skirmishers, Starkweather moved 
to Thomas’s left by the order of the General, in 
order to relieve Croxton’s brigade of Brannan’s 
division, reported to be out of ammunition. Gen¬ 
eral Starkweather seems to have no sooner taken 
position here than the enemy attacked in such 
overwhelming numbers as to force him back. He 
[127] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

retreated to a ridge in the rear of his left; leaving 
his battery temporarily in the possession of the en¬ 
emy. Very soon the enemy was struck on his 
flank and rear by General Johnson’s division of 
McCook’s Corps and forced back; the battery was 
then recovered. 

In reforming the lines late in the afternoon, 
Starkweather’s brigade was placed on the left of 
Johnson’s division; it took part in the night attack 
by the Confederate General Cleburne, and was 
under fire during the whole of the battle of the 
19th. On the morning of the 20th it formed the 
right of Baird’s position in the woods east of the 
Kelly field, and was in one of the most exposed 
positions; this brought it again on the left of John¬ 
son’s division. The Fourth Indiana Battery had 
two guns in the centre of the brigade and two 
upon the left. General Starkweather in his offi* 
cial report says: “This position was held and 
retained during the whole day under repeated at¬ 
tacks from the enemy in heavy columns supported 
with batteries, repulsing and driving the enemy 
back from time to time; driving the enemy also 
back from the extreme left with the artillery. 

[128] 


WISCONSIN AT CHICKAMAUGA 

* * * While holding this position the ammu¬ 

nition of my first line was expended, and most of 
the second line, together with all the ammunition 
of the battery, except three rounds of canister.” 29 
He retired with the rest of Baird’s division in the 
evening of the 20th to Rossville, thence to Chatta¬ 
nooga on the 22nd. In the retirement, Lieutenant 
Colonel Hobart, eight other commissioned offi¬ 
cers, and 67 men of the Twenty-first Wisconsin 
were captured by the enemy. The loss of the 
First Wisconsin was 188 killed, wounded, and 
missing; the latter being 77. The officers killed 
were Captains Abner O. Heald, and William S. 
Mitchell; Lieutenants James S. Richardson, and 
Charles A. Searles. Of the Twenty-first the 
loss was 121, of these 76 were missing. The 
First seems to have gone into the battle with 391, 
and the Twenty-first with 369 men. 

The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry—commanded 
by Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Ely—was in 
Scribner’s brigade of Baird’s division. The his¬ 
tory of its fighting is almost identical with that of 
the First and Twenty-first. On the 20th theTenth 

'’Rebellion Records , Serial No. 50, p. 301. 

9 [129] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


Wisconsin Infantry "was immediately on the left 
of Starkweather. Colonel Ely, Major McKer- 
cher and several other officers, together with a 
large number of men were captured in falling 
back (by orders), on the evening of the 20th. 
They, by mistake, took the wrong direction, going 
too far to the right, as they faced the rear, and 
thus ran into the enemy. Its loss was a total 
of 211, but 145 of these were missing. Captain 
J. W. Roby, who made the report says: “Mon¬ 
day morning September 21 st we numbered three 
officers and 26 men.” Lieutenant-Colonel Ely’s 
name appears among those killed; the other offi¬ 
cers killed were Captain George M. West and 
Lieutenant Robert Rennie. 

The Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry served in the 
Third brigade, Davis’s division of the Twentieth 
Corps. This brigade was commanded by Colo¬ 
nel Hans C. Heg until he was killed on the 19th; 
and afterwards by Colonel John A. Martin. 
This regiment fought most gallantly with Davis’s 
division on the 19th, when, according to their offi¬ 
cial report, the loss was 7 officers and 59 enlisted 
men killed, wounded, and missing. It will be re- 
[130] 


WISCONSIN AT CHICKAMAUGA 

membered that on the 20th General Davis’s divis¬ 
ion was cut off on the right by the break at Wood’s 
division, and that it, after some desultory fighting, 
retired to McFarland’s Gap. The total loss of 
the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was 111, of 
which 55 men were captured or missing. The 
officers killed were Colonel Hans C. Heg, Cap¬ 
tains Hans Hanson, Henry Hauff, John M. 
Johnson, and Lieutenant Oliver Thompson. 

The Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Infantry was 
in General Lytle’s brigade of the First Division 
of the Twentieth Corps. This regiment, with 
the brigade to which it was attached, occupied the 
entrenchments at Lee and Gordon’s Mill on the 
afternoon of the 19th, where it relieved General 
Thomas J. Wood’s division; it remained here all 
afternoon under a little artillery fire from the 
enemy, which did no harm, however. At 3 a. m. 
on the 20th it went to a point near General Rose- 
crans’s headquarters, near the Widow Glenn’s 
house; at 10:30 a. m. it double quicked—under a 
terrific fire from the enemy—to the point where 
General Lytle was killed; it fought here for thirty 
minutes driving the enemy, but was soon out- 

[131] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

flanked by Hindman’s troops coming toward its 
left flank from the celebrated break. The offi¬ 
cial report of its commander (Major Carl Von 
Baumbach), from which the foregoing facts are 
gleaned, says further: “We retreated in some 
disorder; but quickly reformed on a hill some 400 
yards to the rear. Our brave and gallant com¬ 
mander, Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. West, being 
among the missing, I assumed command.’’ This 
regiment bivouaced for the night at Rossville; its 
loss was 3 officers and 69 men killed and 
wounded, and 20 missing; Captain Gustavus 
Goldsmith was killed. The Major in his report 
makes especial mention of Lieutenant Thomas E. 
Balding, acting adjutant, for his gallant conduct. 

The First Wisconsin Cavalry—under com¬ 
mand of Colonel Oscar H. LaGrange—was a 
part of the Second Brigade, of Colonel Edward 
M. McCook’s cavalry division. During the cam¬ 
paign, preceding the battle, this regiment per¬ 
formed the usual duties of cavalry in reconnoiter- 
ing; picketing, leading in advance of the marching 
column of infantry, and generally acting with the 
rest of the cavalry, as the eyes of the army. On 
[ 132 ] 


WISCONSIN AT CHICKAMAUGA 

the 19th it was stationed on the right of the army 
to watch the enemy’s cavalry, which kept on the 
east side of the Chickamauga in the movement 
back to Rossville, and thence into Chattanooga, it 
protected the trains and rear of the army. Its loss 
was 2 men wounded and 4 missing. 

There were three Wisconsin light batteries 
with the Army of the Cumberland, in the battle 
of Chickamauga: the Third, Fifth, and Eighth. 
The Third Battery—commanded by Lieutenant 
Courtland Livingston—was attached to Van 
Cleve’s division of Crittenden’s Corps. Captain 
L. H. Drury of this battery, was chief of artillery 
of the division; he was severely wounded in a skir¬ 
mish several days before the battle. This battery 
followed the fortunes of its division; but there 
seems to be no definite report by its commanding 
officer. Its losses were 2 killed, 12 wounded 
and 12 missing, out of an aggregate of 119. 

The Fifth Wisconsin Battery, commanded by 
Captain George Q. Gardner was attached to the 
First Brigade, commanded by Colonel P. Sid¬ 
ney Post of General Jefferson C. Davis’s division 
of the Twentieth Corps. This brigade was 
[i33l 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


guarding the supply train, and was not engaged 
in the battle, and this battery had no losses. The 
brigade commander, in his official report, com¬ 
mands Captain Gardner for great zeal and ability 
in the management of the battery. 

The Eighth, Wisconsin Battery—commanded 
by Lieutenant John D. McLean—was attached 
to Colonel Heg’s brigade of Davis’s division of 
McCook’s Twentieth Corps. The chief of artil¬ 
lery of Davis’s division reports, that the movement 
of the artillery in the Chickamauga woods was not 
deemed practicable; therefore, this battery did 
not become engaged, and had no losses. 

The Chickamauga campaign proper was now 
ended. It formed the second step in the cam¬ 
paign from Murfreesboro to Chattanooga; the 
Tullahoma campaign being the first. It is true, 
the city was now occupied by the Army of the 
Cumberland, but its possession was not secure as 
long as the Confederate Army lay within two or 
three miles, and held the city’s most available lines 
of supply by the river and the river road, between 
Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Therefore, an¬ 
other conflict was necessary, which would consti- 
[i34] 


THE CRACKER LINE 


tute the third step in the great campaign. An ac¬ 
count of that struggle will include the coming of 
reinforcements to the Union Army; the opening of 
what the men in the ranks called, “the cracker 
line;” the reorganization of the Army of the 
Cumberland; and an account of the four battles of 
Wauhatchie, Orchard Knob, Lookout Mountain, 
and Missionary Ridge. But before that is at¬ 
tempted, it will be necessary to make some ob¬ 
servations on the late battle of Chickamauga. 

The Army of the Cumberland—or rather that 
part of it which now occupied the city—was re¬ 
duced by the Chickamauga battle to an estimated 
aggregate of 35,000. This estimate excluded 
perhaps the cavalry. Its total losses, killed, 
wounded, and prisoners, in the Chickamauga cam¬ 
paign reached 13,615. A large number of sick, 
besides the wounded, were in hospitals. But the 
Confederate losses were at least 5,374 more than 
those of the Union Army. General Longstreet, 
in his book, From Manassas to Appomatox, 
claims that the Confederate force at Chickamauga 
was somewhat less than 60,000 men. The Con¬ 
federate records are so defective that it is largely 
[i3S] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

an estimate to give their numbers or losses. Gen¬ 
eral H. V. Boynton estimates the number at 
very much more than 60,000. There is no doubt 
that Bragg actually outnumbered Rosecrans on the 
field by several thousand troops, perhaps in the 
proportion of 60,000 to 50,000. 

The Union Army captured 2,003 prisoners, 
and lost 4,774. Of the latter 2,500 were 
wounded and left on the field when the army fell 
back to Rossville. The terrible fighting which 
took place is shown by the number of killed and 
wounded on each side. Longstreet says in his 
book, that Bragg’s killed and wounded amounted 
to 16,986, but the official returns make them about 

I, 100 less, or 15,881. The official returns of the 
army give the Union losses of killed and wounded 

II, 338. The Confederate loss was greater in 
killed and wounded than at Gettysburg; and the 
largest the enemy had in a single battle. Atten¬ 
tion is called to the fact, that the numbers engaged 
at Gettysburg were about 80,000 on each side; 
and that the battle lasted three days. 

The killed and wounded in some battles of the 
war are shown in the following table: 

[136] 


LOSSES AT CHICKAMAUGA 



Union 

Confederate 

Shiloh, Tenn. 

10,162 

9,735 

Second Bull Run . 

10,199 

9,108 

Fredericksburg, Va. 

10,884 

4,664 

Chancellorsville, Va. 

11,368 

10,746 

Gettysburg, Pa. . 

17,667 

15,298 

Chickamauga, Ga. 

11,409 

15,881 

Stone’s River, 

9,532 

9,239 

Antietam, Md. 

11,657 

11,234 


In every one of these battles the Union loss was 
greater than the Confederate, except at Chicka- 
mauga; yet Shiloh, Gettysburg, and Stone’s River 
are recorded as Union victories. The Confeder¬ 
ate loss at Antietam was much smaller than that 
given above, which includes Harper’s Ferry, South 
Mountain, Crampton’s Gap, and Shepardstown. 
The prisoners captured are excluded from the 
above list, because only the killed and wounded 
indicate the intensity of the fighting. 

The Confederate’s large losses at Chickamauga 
show plainly the active musketry of the Union 
troops, their good marksmanship, and the differ¬ 
ence (in the number of casualties) between mak¬ 
ing and receiving attacks. On the second day the 
Union troops remained in line and received the at¬ 
tacks of the Confederates. At Gettysburg the 
[i37] 




CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

Union forces did the same thing during the last 
two days. Those on the left at Chickamauga 
were protected by breastworks, and suffered 
but little loss on the 20th; while they inflicted very 
heavy punishment on the Confederates; for in¬ 
stance, Hill’s Corps of the Confederate right lost 
2,990 out of 8,894; Jackson’s brigade of Cheat¬ 
ham’s division lost 35 per cent, of his force, and the 
losses in Govan’s brigade exceeded 50 per cent. 
On the Union side Steedman, while attacking the 
Confederate troops—which had gained an enfil¬ 
ading position and were about to attack the right 
flank of Brannan—lost in this assault and in the 
subsequent position which his troops occupied, 
1,787 out of 3,700 in about four hours. The loss 
is fearful, when assaults are made on protected 
lines, or on points held with difficult approaches. 
On the Confederate left Benning’s brigade of 
Hood’s division lost 56.6 per cent.; Gregg’s brig¬ 
ade of B. R. Johnson’s lost 44.4 per cent. Taking 
Longstreet’s estimate of 16,986 killed and wound¬ 
ed, and adding to it the number of prisoners cap¬ 
tured, namely, 2,003, the total Confederate loss 
aggregates 18,989. It is officially established 
[138] 


TIMBER FORTIFICATIONS 

that the Union loss was 11,338 in killed and 
wounded; its loss in prisoners was 4,774; but 2,- 
500 of them were wounded and were left on the 
battlefield. It is reasonable to suppose that these 
wounded left on the field were reported as wound¬ 
ed by their company officers, and are included in 
the official returns of the 11,338. 

The historian will point out sharply the im¬ 
mense benefit to the Union Army derived from 
the log works and the compact lines of the four 
divisions under General Thomas on the 20th. The 
conclusion is a fair one, that the whole line ought 
to have been similarly fortified; there was ample 
supply of timber along the line to provide for such 
protection. Of the five divisions under General 
Thomas’s command on the 19th and on the 20th, 
Brannan’s was the only one which fought both days 
without works; on the 19th none of them fought 
behind any entrenchments, yet they fought against 
six Confederate divisions, viz.: two of Walker’s 
corps, two of Cheatham’s, Cleburne’s, and Stew¬ 
art’s. On the 20th Brannan was on the right and 
did not fight any of the Confederate troops, which 
Baird’s, Johnson’s, Palmer’s, Reynolds’s, and his 
[i39] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


own divisions had fought on the 19th. Van Der- 
veer’s brigade of Brannan’s division made one 
charge, however, along the Kelly field, against 
two brigades of Breckenridge’s; then returned to 
the right. But it must be noticed that Brecken- 
ridge was not in the fight of the 19th. On the 20th 
Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds fought be¬ 
hind breastworks all day the same divisions they 
had fought the day before without breastworks, 
and also Breckenridge’s in addition. It is true 
they were assisted a little by two brigades of Neg- 
ley’s and one of Van Cleve’s on the left of the 
breastworks. In addition to the Confederate in¬ 
fantry divisions mentioned, there was also Forrest’s 
cavalry of 3,500, which would more than offset 
any assistance these four Union divisions had re¬ 
ceived from other troops on the 20th. The fol¬ 
lowing table will show the losses in killed and 
wounded of the divisions on both sides, with the 
exception of prisoners captured during the two 
days of battle in and around the Kelly field. 


[140] 


LOSSES AT CHICKAMAUGA 


The figures are taken from the official returns: 


Union 


Confederate 


Brannan—Three Brigades 

. 1,977 

Walker—Five Brigades . 

2,290 

Baird—Three Brigades . 

. 975 

Cheatham—Five Brigades 

1,843 

Johnson—Three Brigades 

. 1,088 

Cleburne—Three Brigades 

1,743 

Palmer—Three Brigades 

. 1,165 

Stewart—Three Brigades 

1,674 

Reynolds—Two Brigades 

. 778 

Breckenridge—Three Brigades 

1,075 

Total . 

. 5^983 

Total .... 

8^625 


There were 14 Union brigades and 19 Confed¬ 
erate. It will be seen that Brannan, who was not 
protected by works on the 20th, lost about 800 
more than the highest loss of any of the Union di¬ 
visions, which were protected. That is a practical 
illustration of the value of the precautions thus 
taken by the protected troops. Estimating Bran- 
nan’s loss on the 20th at 900, his loss on the 19th 
would be 1,077. This would reduce the total 
loss in the Union column above to 5,083. Con¬ 
sidering that the Confederate divisions mentioned 
above encountered no other Union troops during 
the battle, except those five divisions mentioned, 
it will be understood that the five Union divisions 
by incurring a loss of 5,083 killed and wounded, 
inflicted a loss on the enemy of 8,625. Forrest’s 
loss does not appear but should be added to the lat¬ 
ter ; let this item be offset, however, by the losses to 
[141] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


Beatty s Stanley’s and Barnes’s brigades in their 
assistance on the left of Baird. 

We will make a similar comparison of the losses 
on the right of the Union, and the left of the Con- 


federate Army: 

Union 

Steedman . 

1,174—Two Brigades 

Sheridan 

1,090 

Davis 

944—Two Brigades 

Wood . 

. . 876—Two Brigades 

Van Cleve. 

660 

Negley 

496 

Brannan (estimate) 

900 

Total. 

6,140 


Confederate 


Hood | 

ESuoknw 1 [ Divisions, 6,881 (estimated) 

Preston J 

The estimated Confederate loss given above has 
been made up in the following manner. The offi¬ 
cial Confederate loss is given by Colonel W. F. 
Fox in his Regimental Losses in the Civil War 
as 15,881 killed and wounded at Chickamauga, 
the Confederate loss of the troops opposed to the 
above named Union divisions can be found by 
adding to 8,625—the Confederate losses in the 

[142] 






CONFEDERATE LOSSES 

first table given above—the estimated loss of the 
Confederate cavalry, probably enough to bring the 
figures to 9,000, and deducting that from 15,881, 
the total Confederate loss is secured. The result 
makes 6, 881 killed and wounded—as given in the 
last table—by the seven Union divisions mentioned 
above, at a cost to the latter of 6,140 killed and 
wounded. Longstreet gives in his report his loss 
at 7,594 killed and wounded; deducting Stewart’s 
loss from this sum leaves 5,920 as the loss of the 
above mentioned Confederate forces. This 
makes the contrast between the two tables still 
greater. 

These figures emphasize the deadly fighting in 
that great battle, and they are more eloquent of the 
valor of American soldiers than words of song or 
oratory. They emphasize also the value of de¬ 
fensive breastworks, in comparison with fighting 
unprotected. 

The Union troops expended 2,650,000 musket 
cartridges in hitting the 15,881 Confederate killed 
and wounded; some of them were, however, 
wounded by artillery. It appears as if it took 
about 150 infantry cartridges to hit one man. The 
[i43l 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

expenditure was 650,000 more cartridges than at 
Stone’s River; but then 6,642 more of the Confed¬ 
erates were struck at Chickamauga, which shows 
that the firing was much more destructive. 

General Rosecrans states: 30 “The fight on the 
left after 2 p. m., was that of the army. Never, 
in the history of this war at least have troops fought 
with greater energy and determination. Bayonet 
charges, often heard of but seldom seen, were 
repeatedly made by brigades and regiments in sev¬ 
eral of our divisions.’’ 

At 2 p. m. on September 21, C. A. Dana, As¬ 
sistant Secretary of War, sent a dispatch from 
Chattanooga to the Secretary of War. It con¬ 
tained the following statements: “Thomas, find¬ 
ing himself cut off from Rosecrans and the right, 
at once brought his seven divisions into position for 
independent fighting. Refusing both his right 
and left, his line assumed the form of a horse-shoe 
posted along the slope and crest of a partly wood¬ 
ed ridge. He was soon joined by Granger from 
Rossville, with the brigade of McCook and divi¬ 
sion of Steedman, and with these forces firmly 

30 Ibid. , p. 60. 

[ J 44 ] 



dana’s report 


maintained the fight till after dark. Our troops 
were as immovable as the rocks they stood on. The 
enemy hurled against them repeatedly the dense 
columns which had routed Davis and Sheridan in 
the morning, but every onset was repulsed with 
dreadful slaughter. Falling first on one and then 
another point of our lines, for hours the rebels 
vainly sought to break them. Thomas seemed 
to have filled every soldier with his own uncon¬ 
querable firmness, and Granger, his hat tom by bul¬ 
lets, raged like a lion wherever the contest was hot¬ 
test with the electrical courage of a Ney. * * * 
When night fell this body of heroes stood on the 
same ground they had occupied in the morning 
their spirit unbroken, but their numbers greatly 
diminished. * * * The divisions of Wood, 

Johnson, Brannan, Palmer, Reynolds, and Baird, 
which never broke at all, have lost very 
severely.”* 1 He should have added that they in¬ 
flicted greater loss upon the enemy than any of the 
other divisions. The discouraged spirit of the 
Confederate Army at the close of the battle was 
sufficiently apparent when the forces under 

"Ibid., p. 194. 

10 


[145] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

Thomas’s command were able—after the arrival 
of General Gordon Granger’s troops—to stop the 
enemy’s further successes. It is evident that the 
fighting spirit was gone from Bragg’s army since, 
although they discovered the falling back, they did 
not approach Rossville Gap on the 21st with a 
considerable force, nor seriously interfere in the 
backward movement to Chattanooga, not even try¬ 
ing to capture a wagon, mule, or horse, although 
its great cavalry leader, Forrest and his troopers, 
were in force close to Rossville Gap. It was 
more paralyzed than the Union Army. Gen¬ 
eral Daniel H. Hill, who commanded a Confed¬ 
erate corps on the right in the battle, states in the 
article referred to before: “There was no more 
splendid fighting in ’61, when the flower of the 
Southern youth was in the field, than was dis¬ 
played in those bloody days of September, ’63. 
But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern sol¬ 
dier was never seen after Chickamauga—that bril¬ 
liant dash which had distinguished him was gone 
forever. He was too intelligent not to know 
that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to 
all his hopes. * * * He fought stoutly to the 

[146] 


A CRITICISM 


last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of 
despair and without the enthusiasm of hope. That 
‘barren’ victory sealed the fate of the Southern 
Confederacy.” 32 

If the Army of the Cumberland accomplished 
so much at Chickamauga in spite of certain mis¬ 
takes, after having penetrated to the centre of the 
Confederate territory, what might not have been 
done, if the right of the Union line had been prop¬ 
erly placed and protected during the night of the 
19th, and if the disastrous order to Wood had not 
been issued? The withdrawal of Wood from 
the line—just before Bushrod Johnson advanced 
against the centre—cost the Union fighting line 
10,000 men, and caused the withdrawal, some 
hours later, of the Union Army to Rossville. 
Whether Wood interpreted that order correctly, 
the fact is that the order should never have been is¬ 
sued. The movement of closing in towards the left 
and of throwing the right further back, should have 
been done hours before. One of Mitchell’s cav¬ 
alry division should have been placed on the Union 
left during the night of the 19th. 


See Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 3,p. 662. 
[ 147 ] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

It must be conceded that Brannan’s division was 
the most active in the battle. It was well man¬ 
aged, but its loss in killed and wounded was 
gre&ter than that of any other Union division. 
Brannan lost in killed and wounded 1,977, 
with 214 missing. His division fought bravely 
under his skillful management, yet he was unpro¬ 
tected on both days. Negley’s loss was 496 
killed and wounded, the smallest loss of all. The 
following officers went through the battle with 
great credit, viz.: Generals Thomas, Granger, 
Steedman, Brannan, Baird, Johnson, Palmer, 
Reynolds; and Brigade-Commanders Hazen, 
Harker, Van Derveer, Croxton, Whittaker, John 
C. Mitchell, Willich, and Turchin. 

If a real soldier, like Longstreet, had been in 
command of the Confederate right and had found 
upon advancing against the Union line, that two 
brigades lengths extended beyond the Union left, 
he would certainly have made more out of such a 
condition than did Breckenridge or Leonidas Polk. 

General D. H. Hill, in his report 38 discusses the 
situation as follows: “The important results ef- 

33 Rebellion Records, Serial No. 51, p. 143. 

[I4«] 



Thomas's genius 

fected by two brigades on the flank proved that, 
had our army been moved under cover of the 
woods a mile farther to the right, the whole Yan¬ 
kee position would have been turned and an al¬ 
most bloodless victory gained. A simple recon- 
noissance before the battle would have shown the 
practicability of the movement and the advantage 
to be gained by it.” Hill was in command on that 
flank and should have acted in accordance with his 
understanding of the situation, or at least reported 
the facts to his superior. This was what Rose- 
crans was anxious about when he hastened troops 
from the right to the left. If Sheridan could have 
reached Thomas before Longstreet cut him off in 
the act of double-quicking toward the left flank, 
what would have happened? 

General Thomas’s dispositions to protect his left 
showed military genius of the highest order, and 
General Baird greatly assisted him in this matter. 
This was only one instance, however, of General 
Thomas’s many equally meritorious tactics in this 
great battle. He rose to the highest point in the 
estimation of both officers and men. 

Both days’ fighting illustrates the fact that when 
[i49l 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

troops are outflanked or attacked in the rear, how¬ 
ever brave they may be in other positions relative 
to the enemy, they will as a rule go to pieces. It 
wa& repeatedly shown on both sides, especially on 
the 19th, during the battle, that the veteran troops 
as well as the new regiments, would become dis¬ 
heartened and confused in such a position; many 
of the regiments on the left during the second day, 
who did not flinch when attacked in flank and rear 
on the day before, then went to pieces. 

The protected troops on the Union left fought 
through the entire day of the 20th, entirely uncon¬ 
scious that they were frequently surrounded not 
only in front and rear of their own line, but that the 
two flanks of the army were only about three- 
fourths of a mile apart, although in the morning 
they were two and a half miles apart. At noon 
the Union right was contracted, and thrown back 
against the left. The order to retreat late in 
evening of the 20th came as a surprise and shock to 
these troops, who had been repulsing the enemy all 
day with comparative ease. Thousands of mus¬ 
ket bearers were so stiff and sore from the two 
days’ conflict and the marches over the mountains 


[ 150] 


WEARIED TROOPS 


during the preceding days, that when a regiment 
lying down on the evening of the 20th attempted 
to rise there was a distinct creaking of bones and an 
accompanying groan, slight, but perceptible. 
Many of them while moving back to Rossville at 
night, took the desperate chance of lying down for 
a nap in the woods by the roadside, intending 
to rest for an hour or two and then join their regi¬ 
ments again before daylight; but hundreds of these 
awoke to find it was already daylight and many 
were captured by the enemy’s cavalry. 

The Confederate Army itself did not advance 
from the battlefield until the 23rd; only a small 
part leaving on the 22nd. The fact is that the 
Confederate Army was much more used up than 
the Union Army; General Bragg said to General 
Longstreet on the 20th that his troops upon his right 
were used up. 34 The same Confederate troops 
which had penetrated the line and driven Davis, 
Sheridan, and others from the field, were so rough¬ 
ly handled by Brannan and Granger on Snod¬ 
grass Hill that they could not be brought for¬ 
ward for another attack. The slowness with 

u See General Longstreet’s report in Ibid., p. 287. 

[151] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

which the Confederate Army moved to their posi¬ 
tions around Chattanooga proves that they were 
practically defeated. At the time the orders were 
sent, to the divisions behind the log-works on the 
left to prepare for withdrawal, their commanders 
sent word back to General Thomas that there was 
no reason for them to retreat; they had been, 
and were at that moment repulsing easily every as¬ 
sault. They did not know of the disaster to the 
right, caused by Wood’s withdrawal, nor did 
General Baird and his brigade commanders know 
of the movements of either Union or Confederate 
forces until after the retreat. Many writers have 
expressed the opinion that the Union Army should 
not have retreated. But to a soldier who was 
present on the field and knew the facts—such 
as the absence of the commander of the army; his 
order sent from the far rear to fall back to Ross- 
ville; the absence of ammunition and rations; the 
utterly exhausted condition of the rank and file by 
the superhuman exertions of the two days’ fighting 
and the preceding hard marching; the fear that if 
the Union Army remained, the Confederate Army 
might yet wedge its way between it and Chatta- 
[ 152] 


FORREST'S CAVALRY 


nooga, the Union commander not being aware 
at that time of the exhausted and discouraged con¬ 
dition of the Confederate Army—it seems that the 
falling back in the way and at the time it did was 
the correct thing. At least it seems as if Thomas 
had really nothing else to do than to fall back 
when the order from General Rosecrans was re¬ 
ceived. Had General Thomas been the com¬ 
mander of the army, it might have been different. 

The Union cavalry did not properly cooperate 
with the other arms of the Union forces. Forrest, 
with his large Confederate cavalry force, was close 
to the right of the Confederate Army, and did 
fine service; the force was equal to the infantry 
in number. Forrest should have been opposed by 
a division of the Union cavalry. Only one cav¬ 
alry brigade was needed at Crawfish Springs; 
the other cavalry brigade together with Wilder’s 
mounted infantry which closed up on the right of 
McCook, should have given better service at a time 
when it was most needed. This was not the fault 
of the cavalry commander, for he only obeyed 
orders from his superiors. In a despatch to Gen¬ 
eral R. B. Mitchell, the commander of the cav- 
[i53] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

airy, at 7:15 p. m. September 20, General Rose- 
crans said, “Had you been on our right today you 
could have charged the enemy’s flank, and done 
much incalculable mischief.” Why was not his 
cavalry as close to the Union right flank as For¬ 
rest’s was to the Confederate right flank? Mitch¬ 
ell’s cavalry was too far away to be effective, 
when disaster overtook the wing: it was supposed 
to be protecting, but it was farther away from 
Snodgrass Hill on the right than were the forces 
of Gordon Granger, at McAffee’s church on the 
left. 


[154] 


CHAPTER III 

The Occupation and Battles of Chattanooga 

When the Army of the Cumberland fell back 
from Chickamauga and Rossville to Chattanooga, 
the first and most important thing to do was to 
quickly fortify against attack. The troops marched 
directly to the places assigned them, and when all 
were in place, the lines half encircled the city, 
both flanks terminating at the river. McCook was 
on the right, Thomas next, and Crittenden on the 
left. The troops began at once the work of throw¬ 
ing up the ordinary entrenchments; these were from 
time to time strengthened until satisfactory. Two 
forts had been partially completed by the enemy; 
these were finished and occupied by both artil¬ 
lery and infantry. The army was drawn in close 
around the city; the point of Lookout Mountain 
and its slopes beyond Chattanooga Creek were 
left to the enemy. This gave the Confederate 
Army command of the river, the rail and wagon 
[i55] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

roads (parallel with the river), between Chatta¬ 
nooga, Bridgeport, and Stevenson. The only 
other practicable road to the bases of supplies was 
over Walden’s Ridge on the north side of the 
river, a distance of 60 miles by wagon; thus it be¬ 
came very difficult to furnish more than half or 
three-quarters rations to the men, and only very lit¬ 
tle forage could be furnished to the animals. The 
road mentioned was so steep and bad that a team 
of four or six mules would consume almost the en¬ 
tire load of feed in bringing the load and in return¬ 
ing for another. 

General Bragg deemed the occupancy of his 
main line along Missionary Ridge—across the val¬ 
ley to Lookout Mountain, thence on the south side 
of the river by small detachments at different 
points—to Bridgeport sufficient to starve out the 
army in Chattanooga. Meanwhile he sent 
Wheeler’s cavalry to the north side, in order to 
raid the line of supplies. Wheeler burned 300 
wagons in the Sequatchie Valley and went on 
north doing what damage he could. Fearing 
that Bragg might follow Longstreet’s advice and 
cross the river east of Chattanooga with a large 
[156] 


CHATTANOOGA IN SEMI-SIEGE 

part of his army, Rosecrans soon completed an in¬ 
side works of circumvallation by which ten thou¬ 
sand men might be able to hold the city, while he 
might be obliged to protect his base of supplies 
by marching the rest of his army to meet such a 
situation. That Bragg did not undertake an enter¬ 
prise of this character was further proof of the used- 
up condition of his army, the result of the late bat¬ 
tle of Chickamauga. Bragg’s reasoning regarding 
his ability to starve the forces in the city was good 
only on the supposition that the Government at 
Washington would fail to send sufficient reinforce¬ 
ments to protect the rear, and to raise “The Siege 
of Chattanooga;’’ it was not more than a semi¬ 
siege, however, and has been so called by some 
authors. If Bragg’s army had occupied both 
sides of the river and practically surrounded the 
city, as the German troops surrounded Paris in the 
Franco-German War of 1871, then it could have 
been called a siege. Of course the situation of 
the Union Army was critical, not only here in 
the fortified city, but ever since it crossed the 
Tennessee River during the campaign preced¬ 
ing the battle of Chickamauga. As before men- 
[i57] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


tioned, General Rosecrans estimated on Septem¬ 
ber 23, 1863, that he had about 35,000 troops 
in the entrenchments; the cavalry and Wilder’s 
brigade of mounted infantry were then on the 
north side of the river and guarded the cross¬ 
ings for a considerable distance, both above and 
below. Union reinforcements had been ordered 
both from the east and from the west; but Bum- 
side, who commanded in East Tennessee, was 
asking at the same time for help at Knoxville, 
instead of being able to send any succor to Rose- 
crans. Before the battle of Chickamauga rein¬ 
forcements had been ordered from the Army 
of the Tennessee—at that time on or near the 
Mississippi at Memphis—and from Burnside, 
but none had arrived. After the great battle and 
the falling back of Rosecrans, the commander did 
not need to urge the President and Secretary of 
War to be convinced, that unless they really de¬ 
sired to lose Tennessee and all that had so far been 
gained in the department of the Cumberland, other 
troops must be sent with the greatest celerity. 
Two corps from the Army of the Potomac were 
ordered to the battlefield; the Eleventh com- 


[158] 


CONFEDERATES ACTIVE 

manded by General O. O. Howard, and the 
Twelfth under General H. W. Slocum; both un¬ 
der the command of General Joseph Hooker. 
General W. T. Sherman was also to reinforce the 
Union Army with the Fifteenth Corps, and one 
division of the Seventeenth from the Army of the 
Tennessee. In the meantime every exertion was 
made by the troops present to hold the city at all 
hazards. When Wheeler captured and burned 
the 300 wagons near Anderson’s cross roads, in the 
Sequatchie Valley, Colonel E. M. McCook with 
the First Wisconsin Cavalry, the Second and 
Fourth Indiana cavalry and a section of artillery 
started from Bridgeport up the Sequatchie Valley. 
Retarded by an incessant rain, he was in time to 
see the smoke only of the burning wagons; he made 
a charge and drove a detachment of the enemy’s 
troops past the fire upon their main body. He fol¬ 
lowed this Confederate division—which was com¬ 
manded vigorously by Martin and Wheeler—out 
of the valley, captured a number of soldiers and 
800 mules and saved some of the wagons. 
Wheeler reached McMinnville in time to capture 
the garrison and burn the supplies. He was off 
[159] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


toward Murfreesboro before the arrival of Crook 
and his command, who had taken up the pursuit. 
The Union cavalry corps, commanded by R. B. 
Mitchell, with McCook’s division, joined Crook 
at Murfreesboro and saved that place from cap¬ 
ture. They followed Wheeler so persistently 
and fought him so successfully that theyprevented 
the destruction of the railroad, but were unable to 
save the telegraph lines. Wheeler crossed back at 
Rogersville to the south of the Tennessee; Mitch¬ 
ell followed and captured at that point a large 
amount of Confederate cotton and destroyed it. 
Mitchell prevented the Confederate advance to 
Winchester and Decherd after having heard at 
Huntsville, Alabama, that Roddey’s Confederate 
cavalry was moving towards these cities, having 
been forced to recross the river. Bragg’s inten- 
ton was to destroy Rosecrans’s communications 
and to force him to abandon Chattanooga. The 
maintenance of the railroad back to Nashville 
was of vital importance to the Union Army. 
Wheeler’s loss on this raid was according to 
the estimate of General Crook, 2,000 men and 6 
pieces of artillery. These fatalities made the 


[ 160] 


PROTECTING THE RAILROAD 


Confederate commander more cautions. Crook’s 
loss was only 14 killed and 97 wounded. 
Wheeler’s raid and the Union pursuit, are speci¬ 
mens of the kind of warfare which cavalry are 
expected to make, showing the terrible destruction 
of men and horses, the untiring marches, and 
watchfulness necessary in a field so extensive and 
difficult as that of the department of Cumberland. 
It would have been much more economical and 
effective, if the War Department had previously 
protected the railway with sufficient infantry, as it 
now intended to do, than to protect it by an ordi¬ 
nary force of cavalry. The Department did 
adopt the plan of protecting the railway with in¬ 
fantry, when Hooker came with a division; this 
mode was most effectively used also in 1864. 

Although the railroad from Nashville to Stev¬ 
enson was being maintained and supplies were ac¬ 
cumulated at the latter city, yet the necessity of 
hauling supplies by wagons over such an extended 
and precipitious road as the one over Walden’s 
Ridge, and the destruction of so many wagons by 
Wheeler, told heavily on the devoted troops in the 
entrenched city. The rains were heavy and con- 
[161] 


li 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


tinuous during the early part of October, making 
the roads almost impassable in some places. The 
trips to Bridgeport seemed gradually to lengthen, 
the mules became thinner, and so the rations had to 
be reduced from time to time, until men, horses, 
and mules were in very sore straits. The artil¬ 
lery horses and all extra horses of mounted officers, 
that had not already died from starvation, were 
sent back to Bridgeport or Stevenson to be kept 
there until the strain could be relieved sometime 
in the indefinite future. Yet no thought of retreat 
or surrender entered the minds of the devoted 
soldiers. The fact that the army in the surround¬ 
ing hills was in a worse condition—too weak to 
take any advantage of the situation by aggressive 
movements, except those abortive cavalry raids in 
the rear—undoubtedly saved the Union Army 
from destruction. 

In the early part of October, General Hooker 
arrived at Nashville with the Eleventh and 
Twelfth corps. They were stationed along the 
railroad to Bridgeport. The corps had come to 
Nashville by railroad, but were without trans¬ 
portation, therefore did not supply all the re- 
[ 162] 


PROTECTING THE RAILROAD 

lief needed at Chattanooga. What was abso¬ 
lutely necessary was the restoration of rail trans¬ 
portation from Stevenson to Chattanooga, and not 
exclusively the protection of the railroad from the 
north to Bridgeport. Sufficient reinforcements 
were also needed in order to enable the Union 
Army to attack and destroy or drive back the 
enemy, who was in too close proximity for safety; 
and therefore the first thing to be considered, after 
the Union troops were properly fortified, was to 
plan means by which the cooperation of these 
eastern reinforcements could be made available. 
In preliminary preparation for this, a steamboat 
which had been captured at Chattanooga, had 
been repaired and another was being built at 
Bridgeport. Rosecrans ordered Hooker to bring 
to Bridgeport all his command, with the excep¬ 
tion of what was needed to protect the railroad 
from Nashville to the Tennessee River. He 
started also the construction of pontoons for a 
bridge, at some point over the river below Chat¬ 
tanooga, where his troops might have to cross 
in order to meet Hooker’s forces coming from 
Bridgeport, and also in order to shorten the 
[163] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


road down the river. General W. F. Smith 
(“Baldy Smith”) had lately been appointed 
chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. 
General Rosecrans ordered him to reconnoiter the 
river near Williams’s Island, a few miles below the 
points of Lookout Mountain, expecting to make of 
that island a steamer landing and supply depot. 
This last order was issued October 19, and on that 
same day General Rosecrans was relieved from 
the command of the Army; and General George 
H. Thomas assumed command. 

Prior to this date, on October 9, a complete re¬ 
organization of the Army of the Cumberland had 
been made. Many of the regiments and brigades 
had been so reduced in numbers by the late battle 
and by sickness, that consolidation of brigades be¬ 
came imperative. Besides, in order to maintain 
efficiency in the army and proper discipline, a 
weeding out among the general officers became a 
necessity. Ever since the close of fighting at 
Chickamauga, there had been an undercurrent of 
feeling among the majority of the officers, that cer¬ 
tain ones, who had failed to meet the emergencies 
which arose during that battle, could not continue 


[164] 


THE FOURTH CORPS 


in command, without decided detriment to the fu¬ 
ture operations of the army. In compliance with 
the President’s order of September 28, the Twen¬ 
tieth and Twenty-First corps were consolidated 
and called the Fourth Corps. This new corps 
was placed under the command of General Gor¬ 
don Granger who had particularly distinguished 
himself at Chickamauga. The reserve corps was 
made a part of the Fourteenth Corps. Each corps 
was composed of three divisions and each division 
of three brigades. The following short dispatch 
sent to the Secretary of War by C. A. Dana, gives 
a very concise and interesting statement of what 
was done: 

“Fourth Corps: First Division, Palmer; First 
Brigade,. Cruft, nine regiments, 2,044 men; 
Second Brigade, Whittaker, eight regiments, 
2,035 men; Third Brigade, Colonel Grose, eight 
regiments, 1,968 men. Second Division, Sheri¬ 
dan ; First Brigade, F. T. Sherman, ten regiments, 
2,385 men; Second Brigade, Wagner, eight regi¬ 
ments, 2,188 men; Third Brigade, Harker, 2,026 
men. Third Division, Wood; First Brigade, 
Willich, nine regiments, 2,069 men; Second 


[165] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

Brigade, Hazen, nine regiments, 2,195 men; 
Third Brigade, Samuel Beatty, eight regiments, 
2,222 men. 

•“Fourteenth Corps: First Division, Rousseau; 
First Brigade, Carlin, nine regiments, 2,072 men; 
Second Brigade, King, four regiments of regulars 
and four regiments of volunteers, 2,070 men; 
Third Brigade, Starkweather, eight regiments, 
2,214 men. Second Division, J. C. Davis; First 
Brigade, J. D. Morgan, five regiments, 2,214 
men [this brigade had been in the reserve and 
did not take part in the late battle]; Second 
Brigade, John Beatty, seven regiments, 2,460 
men; Third Brigade, Daniel McCook, six regi¬ 
ments, 2,099 men [this brigade had few losses 
in the late battle]. Third Division, Baird; 
First Brigade, Turchin, seven regiments, 2,175 
men; Second Brigade, Van Derveer, seven regi¬ 
ments, 2,116 men; Third Brigade, Croxton, seven 
regiments, 2,165 men.” 

Those detachments of the reserve corps 
which still remained along the Nashville and 
Chattanooga railroad beyond Bridgeport, were 
not included. The garrison at Stevenson, 


[ *66] 


WISCONSIN TROOPS 


Bridgeport, and Battle Creek, under General J. D. 
Morgan, as above stated, were however included. 
The State of Tennessee was divided into two dis¬ 
tricts, the northern, commanded by General Rob¬ 
ert S. Granger with headquarters at Nashville, and 
the southern under General R. W. Johnson with 
headquarters at Stevenson. 

General L. H. Rousseau superseded General 
R. S. Granger at Nashville, in November, prior to 
the battles. General Starkweather relieved 
Johnson at Stevenson after the battle, the latter 
having been assigned in Rousseau’s place, as com¬ 
mander of the First Division of the Fourteenth 
Corps. 

In the reorganization of the army the Wiscon¬ 
sin troops were distributed as follows: The First 
and Twenty-First Infantry remained in Stark¬ 
weather’s Third Brigade of the First Division of 
the Fourteenth Corps; the Tenth Infantry in the 
First Brigade of the same division which was 
commanded by General W. P. Carlin. The 
Twenty-fourth Infantry was in the First Brigade 
of Sheridan’s Division, commanded by Colonel 
F. T. Sherman; the Fifteenth Infantry in Wil- 


[167] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

lich’s Brigade of Wood’s Division, of the Fourth 
Corps. The Fifth Battery was attached to 
Davis’s Division of the Fourteenth Corps; the 
TJhird, Eighth and Tenth, and Company A of the 
First Wisconsin Heavy Artillery were assigned 
to the Second Division of the Artillery Reserve. 
The Eleventh and Twelfth corps were not re¬ 
organized prior to the battles; the Third and 
Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry remained in the 
same organization in which they were in the Army 
of the Potomac—viz.: the Third in Ruger’s 
Third Brigade of the First Division (Williams’s) 
of the Twelfth Corps; the Twenty-sixth in the 
Second Brigade of the Third Division of the 
Eleventh Corps. 

When General Thomas became commander of 
the Army of the Cumberland, General John M. 
Palmer was made commander in his place of the 
Fourteenth Corps, and General Charles Cruft 
was assigned to the command of the First Division 
of the Fourth Corps, in place of Palmer. 

General James A. Garfield, chief of staff, had 
been elected member of Congress from his district 
in Ohio; he left in order to assume his duties and 


[ 168 ] 


GRANT TAKES COMMAND 

General J. J. Reynolds had been appointed chief 
of staff in his place. General John M. Brannan 
was made chief of artillery. These, with Gen¬ 
eral W. F. Smith as chief engineer, greatly added 
to the strength of the headquarters staff. 

This order of the President—which affected 
these local changes in the Army of the Cumber¬ 
land—was followed by a much greater consolida¬ 
tion on a very much broader scale. The Army of 
the Tennessee—then in western Tennessee and 
northern Mississippi—was placed under command 
of General W. T. Sherman, who was on his way 
with a portion of it to Chattanooga in order to 
reinforce the Army of the Cumberland. The 
Army of the Ohio, under General A. E. 
Burnside, was at Knoxville. These three ar¬ 
mies had not before had a commander in 
common under whose orders they could be made 
to co-operate. A commander-in-chief at Wash¬ 
ington had so far been unable to accomplish 
this very necessary co-operation. The Tennessee 
River ran through the fields of operations of all the 
three armies—less directly in the field of the Army 
of the Tennessee—and the preceding lack of unity 


[169] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

in movements jeopardized the ultimate object of 
all their campaigns, namely: the re-establishment 
of the former relation between the states in rebel¬ 
lion and the general government. On this ac¬ 
count the President established the Military Divi¬ 
sion of the Mississippi, with Lieutenant-General 
U. S. Grant in command. This was a virtual 
consolidation of the three armies; their co-opera¬ 
tion in that wide field was henceforth perfect. 
Subsequent events showed the wisdom of this or¬ 
der. The Confederates never won another battle 
in this department; and in fourteen months after 
the organization of one command there existed no 
organized Confederate force in this field, worthy 
of notice. There were only detachments here 
and there, like Forrest’s rangers in the early spring 
of 1865, until General James H. Wilson’s cavalry 
raid put an end to all resistance. 

After its reorganization, the Army of the 
Cumberland was composed of the Fourth, 
Eleventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth corps, and 
three divisions of cavalry. Had General Sheri¬ 
dan been placed in command of the combined 
cavalry, his subsequent career shows that its effi- 


[170] 


ARRIVAL OF GRANT 


ciency would have been greatly improved; 
but all the changes, that might have been benefi¬ 
cial, could not be thought of at once. The 
pending events in this department developed some 
pre-eminent officers, who were indeed very much 
needed; they became masterful factors in the 
early downfall of the rebellion, both in the east 
and in the west; Sheridan was one of these; others 
were Grant, Thomas, and Sherman. 

Grant reached his new command by way of 
Louisville, Kentucky, where he met the Secretary 
of War, Edwin M. Stanton, who brought with 
him the order of October 18, as well as General 
Grant’s commission. Grant sent from Louisville 
the following telegram to Thomas, “Hold Chat¬ 
tanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as 
possible. Please inform me how long your 
present supplies will last, and the prospect for 
keeping them up.” General Thomas answered: 
“Two hundred and four thousand four hundred 
and sixty-two rations in storehouses; ninety thous¬ 
and to arrive tomorrow, and all the trains were 
loaded which had arrived at Bridgeport up to the 


[ 1711 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


16th—probably three hundred wagons. / will 
hold the town till We starve ” 

On October 19, Thomas ordered General 
Hooker to carry out the former orders of General 
Rosecrans, namely to concentrate his forces at 
Bridgeport, in order to move them to Chatta¬ 
nooga. 

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the 
evening of October 23, one month after the Union 
troops had taken possession of the city. On the 
24th he went to Brown’s Ferry in company with 
Thomas and W. F. Smith, the chief engineer; 
at once he recognized the necessity and possibility 
of the scheme, initiated by General Roscrans, but 
conceived and planned by W. F. Smith, of plac¬ 
ing a pontoon bridge there and of obtaining a hold 
on the south side of the river at that point, and he 
ordered its execution; much had already been 
done toward preparing for it. General Smith 
was given full power to complete the plan. The 
river at Chattanooga runs almost directly west op¬ 
posite the city, but soon it curves to the north and 
then it turns to the south with quite a sharp bend 
at the foot of Lookout Mountain, from where the 


[ 172] 


MOCCASIN POINT 


river runs directly north, forming a narrow and 
perfect peninsula directly opposite or west of the 
city. This peninsula widens slightly at its south¬ 
ern end and forms a perfect shape of a human 
foot; hence it is called “Moccasin Point.” 
Brown’s Ferry is directly west of the city, on the 
western point of the neck of this peninsula, some 
miles below Lookout. It is only about a mile in 
direct line to Brown’s Ferry from the northern end 
of the bridge, at the foot of Cameron Hill in the 
western outskirts of the city. From Brown’s 
Ferry the river continues north, and passes Wil¬ 
liams Island; five or more miles from the ferry, 
it makes another sharp turn to the south at the foot 
of Walden’s Ridge; in the course of six or seven 
miles from this northern bend it flows tortuously 
past Kelly’s Ferry. The peninsula thus formed, 
is the northern nose of Raccoon Mountain. From 
Brown’s to Kelly’s Ferry is about five miles in di¬ 
rect line somewhat to the southwest, and, as said 
before, it is one mile across to Chattanooga. It is 
about five miles from Cameron Hill bridge to 
Brown’s Ferry, but from where the boats for the 
Brown’s Ferry bridge subsequently started, it is 


[173] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

about nine miles, and to Kelly’s Ferry more than 
fifteen, perhaps twenty miles. These figures 
show the value to the transportation, of obtaining 
unobstructed access to Kelly’s Ferry as a landing 
for steamboats bringing supplies from Bridgeport 
across Brown’s Ferry, when it should come into 
possession of the Union Army by the advance of 
Hooker, until the railroad could be repaired or 
put into working order from Bridgeport to Chatta¬ 
nooga. The movement of troops which accom¬ 
plished this, also, gave the army a lodgment on 
the south side of the river, to meet, and assist, 
Hooker’s forces coming from Bridgeport, thus 
breaking the Confederate hold upon the river road 
to Bridgeport. Under General Smith’s orders 
and supervision, the plans were successfully car¬ 
ried out. Two flatboats and fifty pontoons, with 
cars, were prepared. In these, 1,500 men under 
Hazen passed down the river nine miles, and close 
to the Confederate pickets. They were to land 
at different points in sections, the places having 
been pointed out previously to the officers in com¬ 
mand. On account of the darkness fires were 
kept burning opposite these places, so that the dif- 
[ 174] 


CROSSING THE RIVER 


ferent sections could land at the proper points. 
The remainder of Turchin’s and Hazen’s 
brigades—from which the men in the boats were 
taken—and their batteries, were marched across 
the peninsula, and posted out of sight in the 
woods, near Brown’s Ferry on the north side of 
the river. 

The infantry troops were to cross in the boats, 
as soon as the men under Hazen landed on the 
south side, and recross to the north side. The ar¬ 
tillery was to move into position as soon as the 
boats landed, in order to cover a retreat in case of 
disaster. The equipment for the pontoon bridge 
was also in place and ready for use. The boats 
commenced to float at 3 a. m. October 27, and 
they were not discovered by the enemy until 3 
a. m., when the first section had landed; a portion 
of the second section, which did not land in the 
proper place, was fired on by the enemy’s picket, 
calling forth an attack by the picket-reserve of the 
enemy. But the Union troops on the north side 
of the ferry crossed rapidly in the boats, pushed 
forward to the top of the ridge, and in two hours 
they protected themselves sufficiently with timber 

[ 175 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

and abatis to hold the tete de pont. On the 27th 
the bridge was completed at 4:30 p. m.; the work 
was done under some shelling from Lookout 
Point. Captain P. V. Fox of the First Michi¬ 
gan Engineers was the skillful superintendent of 
the bridge building. Twenty beeves, six pon¬ 
toons, a barge and about 2,000 bushels of corn fell 
into the hands of the Union troops. The Union 
loss was 6 killed, 23 wounded, and 9 missing. 
Six prisoners were taken from the Confederates 
and 6 were killed; how many were wounded is 
not known. While the bridge was being laid, 
General Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport on 
a pontoon bridge, and was marching up towards 
Chattanooga. At 3 p. m. on the 28th, his head 
of column reached Wauhatchie, in Lookout Val¬ 
ley, at the junction of the railroad from Bridge¬ 
port, with the branch from Trenton up the val¬ 
ley. The wagon road from here to Brown’s 
Ferry runs about four miles, along the western 
base of a ridge, which here and there has deep 
depressions; through one of these the railroad 
continued to Chattanooga, around the nose of 
Lookout, close to the river; through another the 
[176] 


WISCONSIN REGIMENTS 


wagon road runs. General Hooker had with him 
Howard’s Eleventh Corps, and Geary’s division 
of the Twelfth, with the exception of one regi¬ 
ment left at the bridge at Bridgeport, one at White¬ 
side’s and one at Shellmound; the latter two 
places being on the railroad between Bridgeport 
and Chattanooga. 

The First Division of the Twelfth Corps, 
(Williams), had been left to guard the railroad 
from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport. In Ruger’s 
brigade of this division was the Third Wisconsin 
Infantry, commanded by Colonel William Haw¬ 
ley. This regiment had been mustered into the 
service on June 29, 1861, and had been serving 
with the Army of the Potomac since that date 
until now, when it became a part of the Army of 
the Cumberland. In the Second Brigade of the 
Third Division, (Schurz) of the Eleventh Corps 
was the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry, com¬ 
manded by Captain Frederick C. Winkler, who 
was appointed Major November 17, 1863. It 
was exclusively a German regiment, and was 
mustered in at Milwaukee on August 17, 1862. 
On the following October 6, it left Wisconsin for 


12 


[i77] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

the Army of the Potomac, in which it served until 
it became a part of the Eleventh Corps under 
Howard and Hooker of the Army of the Cumber¬ 
land. 

Hooker’s advance troops, under General How¬ 
ard, camped that night within a mile or so of 
Brown’s Ferry, where they opened communication 
with the troops there. Geary’s division was 
in the rear and camped near Wauhatchie, three 
miles from Howard’s troops; thus the road 
from Wauhatchie to Kelly’s Ferry—-three miles 
to the northwest of Wauhatchie—was con¬ 
trolled. About 1 a. m. on the 29th, Geary was 
heavily attacked by a part of Longstreet’s troops, 
but not before he had his division in line for de¬ 
fense. Howard was ordered to double quick his 
nearest division, under command of General Carl 
Schurz, to Geary’s relief. Before proceeding far, 
it was fired upon from the near hills on the divi¬ 
sion’s left, but at long range. The firing pro¬ 
duced no great injury to Schurz’s troops. How¬ 
ard detached one brigade to deploy on these hills, 
and pushed on with the other; in the meantime 
Steinwehr’s division, also of Howard’s, came up. 


[178] 


LOOKOUT VALLEY SECURED 


Then it was discovered that another hill, in the 
rear of Schurz was also occupied by the enemy. 
Smith’s brigade charged it and carried it with the 
bayonet against three times its number. 

Hooker says, “No troops ever rendered more 
brilliant service. The name of their valiant com¬ 
mander is Colonel Orlando Smith of the Seventy- 
third Ohio Infantry. * * * For almost 

three hours, without assistance Geary repelled the 
repeated attacks of vastly superior numbers, and in 
the end drove them ingloriously from the field.’’ 
Thus the Lookout Valley was secured, and 
new communications were opened. The loss to 
General Hooker’s command was 416. Long- 
street practically conceded that the Union com¬ 
mander had succeeded in opening this new line of 
communication, but spoke lightly of it. Whit¬ 
taker’s and John G. Mitchell’s brigades were sub¬ 
sequently moved over to this region. The steam¬ 
boat at Chattanooga passed down on the night of 
the 28th; thereafter two steamboats (one had been 
built at Bridgeport), made regular trips with sup¬ 
plies from Bridgeport to Kelly’s Ferry. Good 
roads were made from Chattanooga via Brown’s 


[179] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

to Kelly’s Ferry and the railroad from Bridgeport 
towards the east was being repaired. There was 
no shortage of rations or forage after these rapid 
preparations were commenced to attack the enemy 
in his strong positions around the city. Hope and 
confidence had always inspired the Army of the 
Cumberland; the rank and file had never 
despaired; now, they took the lead in anticipating 
that the end was in sight; success in battle depends 
very much on the conditiqn of the human body and 
the enthusiasm of the spirit. 

The feeble and ineffectual efforts of Long- 
street to prevent the opening of the river, and the 
advance of Hooker’s troops, opened the eyes of 
all the general officers of the Army of the Cumber¬ 
land to the weakness of the Confederate Army, 
both in the ranks and among the officers. Gen¬ 
eral Longstreet, in his official report of the battle 
of Wauhatchie, attributes his defeat to the jeal¬ 
ousy of brigade officers. 85 The Confederate 
troops, making the attack on General Geary, were 
withdrawn from the east side of Lookout, but 
they returned immediately before daylight on the 

85 Rebellion Records, Serial No. 51, p. 287. 

[180] 



LONGSTREET WITHDRAWS 


night of the attack. General Longstreet gave 
reasons for this action; he showed that it was not 
good military tactics to keep a large force on that 
side of the mountain, where its only line of retreat 
was around the slope of Lookout; if it were de¬ 
feated, it would be exposed to the fire of the 
Union troops at and opposite Chattanooga. 
These reasons were sound and foreshadowed the 
ease with which Hooker’s forces, on November 
24, drove the enemy so easily and captured Look¬ 
out Mountain. It was after this defeat, that 
Bragg (for reasons unknown), sent Longstreet’s 
Corps toward Knoxville to assist in defeating 
Burnside. Bragg hoped that it could be returned 
in time to assist in the battle, that he knew must be 
fought at Chattanooga. Longstreet took with 
him the two divisions of McLaws and Hood, and 
Alexander’s cavalry. Wheeler’s cavalry passed 
him on the road; it was supposed to do certain 
things that it failed to do. Longstreet recom¬ 
mended that Bragg’s army should be drawn back 
in a strong position behind the Chickamauga, after 
the departure of Longstreet’s troops in November; 
his reason for this recommendation was, that in its 


[181] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

present position it could be reached in twenty min¬ 
utes by the Union Army. Bragg seemed to be 
blind, however, to the events so rapidly transpiring 
in Chattanooga; he did not seem to realize that 
the troops Longstreet had fought at Wauhatchie, 
were reinforcements from the East to the Union 
Army. 

In the meantime the Confederate batteries on 
Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge sent an 
occasional artillery shot into the Union lines. 
The pickets of the two armies held their lines 
close to each other in the valley and watched each 
other’s movements, firing whenever a soldier on 
his beat became visible. There being no good 
reason for this desultory and ineffectual warfare, 
an agreement was finally reached, that the pickets 
should fire only when advances of troops became 
apparent; henceforth, an officer could with im¬ 
punity ride along the picket line in plain view of 
the opposite pickets. 

As soon as Grant became aware of Longstreet’s 
departure for East Tennessee, he prepared for an 
attack on Bragg’s army in order to keep him from 
detaching more troops against Burnside and to 
[182] 


AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS 


compel him to return those already sent. He or¬ 
dered General Thomas to assault the north end of 
Missionary Ridge; the order was given Novem¬ 
ber 7; but on account of the utter lack of animals 
—caused not only by the great loss in the recent 
battles, but also by the death of a large number 
from starvation since the occupation of the city— 
it was finally decided by Grant, Thomas, and 
Smith, that nothing but a defensive attitude would 
be feasible until General Sherman’s forces could 
arrive. The necessity for aggressive operations, 
on account of Bragg’s boldness in taking such a 
desperate chance as to send a large force com¬ 
manded by his ablest general away from his weak 
little army, increased the activity of the Union 
Army in its preparation for battle, and thus was 
opened a way for the relief of Burnside; the 
hope was that he could hold out until help ar¬ 
rived. 

It is to be presumed, that Bragg had implicit 
confidence that the Union Army would not dare 
to attack such a strong position as Bragg’s army 
then held. General Grant at once wrote the 
facts of the situation to Burnside and urged him 
[iS3l 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

to maintain his attitude at Knoxville, until a 
battle could be fought at Chattanooga and a de¬ 
tachment sent to his assistance. Not waiting for 
Sherman, he formulated his plans; and thus knew 
before the latter’s arrival, just where he should 
place Sherman, what his part of the attack should 
be, and that he should march immediately on his 
approach directly to the north end of Missionary 
Ridge. Grant planned furthermore that Hooker 
should attack Lookout Mountain from his position 
in Lookout Valley; the one should attack the right 
of the Confederate Army and the other the left. 
Sherman arrived at Bridgeport, with his leading 
division, on November 15. Arriving at Chatta¬ 
nooga ahead of his troops, he with Grant, Thomas, 
and Smith, looked over the entire situation and 
learned how, and by what route, he could reach his 
point of attack. It had become apparent to the 
Union commanders, that Bragg’s line did not reach 
the immediate river hills, at the north end of Mis¬ 
sionary Ridge, but was deflected to the east, along 
the third hill to the south of the river, with a deep 
depression between it and the next hill to the 
north. This made necessary a much stronger 
[184] 


SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS 

position than the supposed location at Bragg’s right 
flank, and stronger forces and dispositions were 
needed. Grant announced his plan to his gener¬ 
als on the 18th and expected the attacks could be 
made on the 21st; a rain storm delayed, however, 
the arrival of Sherman’s troops. When they did 
arrive at Brown’s Ferry the high water had broken 
the bridge, which delayed the crossing. When the 
bridge was repaired, Sherman crossed it in plain 
view of the enemy’s signal station on the point of 
Lookout Mountain; he marched into the woods 
behind a series of hills on the north side of the 
river; these hills concealed his march all the 
way to the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, where 
Davis’s division of the Fourteenth Corps had been 
placed to cover his movement, and to protect the 
bridge there, after Sherman’s troops had again 
crossed to the south side. The crossing at the 
Chickamauga was also protected by artillery, 
placed on the heights north of the river. After 
crossing at the mouth of the Chickamauga, Sher¬ 
man was to follow Missionary Ridge as far as the 
railroad tunnel. This seemed to be the principal 
point of attack; the plan further contemplated 
[ 185 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


that all the force's available should be converged 
toward General Sherman’s position. Therefore 
Howard’s Eleventh Corps was taken from Hook¬ 
er’s position and replaced by Whittaker’s and 
Grose’s brigades of the Fourth Corps; the Elev¬ 
enth Corps was placed on the left of the Army of 
the Cumber hind south of the river, looking to¬ 
wards Sherman’s position perhaps four miles fur¬ 
ther east. Thomas was to co-operate by moving 
his troops to his left, so that he could join 
with Sherman’s right, when the latter should push 
the Confederate forces back to the tunnel. The 
combined forces should then advance against the 
enemy, with the object in view of sweeping the 
Confederate Army into the south Chickamauga 
Creek, which runs on the opposite side of Mis¬ 
sionary Ridge. General Hooker was to hold 
Lookout Valley with Geary’s division and the two 
brigades of Whittaker and Grose, and Howard’s 
corps was to be in readiness to act with either Sher¬ 
man or Thomas, as circumstances should dictate. 
The plan was a fine one, because, if that flank 
could be defeated, the Confederate line of retreat 
could be easily cut off. 


[186] 


SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS 


Colonel Long with his brigade of cavalry 
moved to Sherman’s left. When Sherman should 
sweep the ridge, he was ordered to cross the Chick - 
amauga and raid the rear of the Confederate 
Army. This attack was to begin on the 22nd, but 
was postponed on account of the fact that two of 
Sherman’s divisions had not been able to cross 
Brown’s Ferry bridge, on account of a break. To 
avoid any further delay, Thomas suggested that 
Howard’s Corps be sent to General Sherman in 
place of the two delayed divisions, and that the 
latter be ordered to report to General Hooker, 
whose combined forces should immediately attack 
Lookout Mountain in order to divert the attention 
of the enemy from Sherman’s contemplated at¬ 
tack; this^uggestion was in part approved by Gen¬ 
eral Grant. 

A singular thing happened on November 22. 
General Ewing’s division of Sherman’s troops had 
come into Lookout Valley at Trenton from 
Bridgeport; Bragg’s rear was thus threatened. 
The movement of some of Bragg’s troops to 
avert this calamity together with the former with¬ 
drawal of Longstreet’s Corps for Knoxville, pro- 
[187] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

duced the impression in the Confederate Army, 
that the whole was going to fall back. De¬ 
serters who came into the Union line reported 
this impression. Bragg also notified the Union 
commander to remove all non-combatants from 
the city; this was on the 20th. General Grant 
ordered ThcJmas to make a reconnoisance in 
front of Chattanooga in order to test the truth 
of this report, and to find out whether Bragg 
was really falling back, and if so, Thomas 
should prevent him from doing it undisturbed. 
The Army of the Cumberland was nearest to 
the enemy and in readiness to do this with the 
most celerity. It seems that General Bragg had 
such confidence in the strength of his position 
on the top of Missionary Ridge, about 500 feet 
high, that he was willing not only to send 
away Longstreet, but actually started other forces 
to follow him. The latter he recalled, however, 
in time to take part in the battle. He supposed, 
and with good reason, that Missionary Ridge 
could not be taken by assault; and even if Look¬ 
out should become untenable on account of the 
capture of the valley of Chattanooga, he would 
[188] 


bragg's mistakes 


be safe in his entrenchments on Missionary Ridge. 
This must have been his conclusion, and he must 
have known that the Army of the Cumber¬ 
land was receiving considerable reinforcements. 
Bragg’s lines were altogether too long. When 
the object of holding Lookout Mountain no 
longer existed, after the reopening of the river and 
railroad route to Bridgeport, he should have with¬ 
drawn from there and from Chattanooga Valley; 
he should either have concentrated on Missionary 
Ridge or taken Longstreet’s advice and fallen 
back to Dalton, behind the second ridge, southeast 
of Chattanooga, where he was finally driven. 

Fortunately for the success of the Union move¬ 
ments, Bragg did not do the things that an abler 
general would have done. He stood stolidly in 
his original line along its whole length until the op¬ 
ening of the battle of Missionary Ridge. It has 
been stated, that Bragg expected Grant when 
he discovered the departure of Longstreet for East 
Tennessee, would send forces to support Burnside. 

In pursuance of the order to make a reconnois- 
ance, Thomas ordered Granger, who commanded 
the Fourth Corps, to advance a division of his 


[189] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


corps towards Orchard Knob November 23, about 
noon. This elevation of land is located about 
half way between the city and Missionary Ridge, 
at the left of Thomas’s line. Between the Union 
line and this knob was a growth of trees and 
bushes. These concealed the formation of the 
troops for a white only from the enemy. Wood’s 
division was deployed in front of Fort Wood. 
Sheridan’s division formed next on the right and 
rear of Wood. Howard’s Corps was massed in the 
rear of these two divisions. General Baird’s divi¬ 
sion fell, in echelon, at the right of Sheridan. 
General Johnson’s division (formerly Rousseau’s) 
of the Fourteenth Corps stood with arms in the 
entrenchments, ready to move in any direction. 
This really placed the latter in echelon with Baird. 
It is said the enemy looked upon these movements 
as a parade for display or to obtain wood for fires, 
when seeing them from the top of Missionary 
Ridge. The Confederates had a line of rifle-pits 
along the base of Orchard Knob, following Citico 
Creek for a mile or more. 

With Willich’s and Hazen’s brigades in front 
and Beatty’s in reserve, General Wood moved 
[190I 


TAKING OF ORCHARD KNOB 


forward about 2 p. m. His troops pushed back 
easily whatever was in their front. Willich struck 
Orchard Knob squarely on his front, and soon cap¬ 
tured it, clearing it of the enemy’s lines. Hazen 
met more resistance from the Confederates who 
were perhaps more numerous or better fighters, al¬ 
though the hill he attacked was not so high as Or¬ 
chard Knob. He carried the hill, however, and 
captured the Twenty-eighth Alabama Regiment 
and its flag. This advanced line gave a good 
position for further advances, and was held; 
the rest of the troops on the right moving up 
to and extending the line far to the right. General 
Wood fortified his line over Orchard Knob, and 
General Howard formed his corps on its left. 
The summit of this Knob gave a splendid outlook 
over the field between it and Missionary Ridge, 
and gave a fine view of the ridge itself. It af¬ 
forded an opportunity for Grant and Thomas to 
view later on the whole subsequent movements 
against the enemy. General Wood lost 125 men 
killed and wounded in this battle of Orchard 
Knob. The Fifteenth Wisconsin of Willich’s 
brigade took part in this engagement; its losses 
[191 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

were not reported until after the battle of the 25th, 
when its commander reported 6 men slightly 
wounded in both engagements. Wood occupied 
this position until 3:15 p. m. on the 25th, when he 
moved forward with the rest of the army to the 
assault on Missionary Ridge. Bridge’s Illinois 
Battery occupied an epaulment in Wood’s line on 
Orchard Knob. 

The taking of Orchard Knob had a most im¬ 
portant bearing on the attack that General Hooker 
made on Lookout Mountain the next day. It 
caused Bragg to withdraw Walker’s division from 
that point to strengthen his right, which Bragg 
thought to be menaced by this advance to Orchard 
Knob. These troops prolonged Bragg’s line to¬ 
wards Sherman’s front but did not reach it. The 
Confederate general, Stevenson, signalled from 
the top of Lookout to Bragg that night that if an at¬ 
tack was intended by Grant, it would be delivered 
on Lookout Mountain. This is what actually oc¬ 
curred. Another of Sherman’s divisions crossed 
Brown’s Ferry on the 23rd; the bridge was again 
broken, however, leaving Osterhaus’s division still 
on the left bank. This gave General Sherman 


[ 192] 


SAGACITY OF THOMAS 


only three divisions besides General Davis’s of the 
Fourteenth Corps, with which to operate at the 
designated place on Missionary Ridge. General 
Thomas informed General Hooker of the proxim¬ 
ity of Osterhaus’s troops and directed, that if they 
did not get over to Sherman, he should have them 
join him and “take the point of Lookout Moun¬ 
tain.” This division was at that time in command 
of General Charles R. Woods, one of its brigade 
commanders. How sagacious was General 
Thomas in seeing immediately the advantage that 
should be taken of a mere accident, like the 
breaking of a pontoon bridge! It looks as though 
Thomas had made this suggestion to Hooker, 
without having beforehand a distinct under¬ 
standing with General Grant; for he told General 
Hooker later, that Grant still hoped Woods’s (Os¬ 
terhaus’s) division could cross in time to partici¬ 
pate in Sherman’s movement, but if it could not 
the mountain should be taken if practicable. 
Hooker, finding that there was little possibility of 
the bridge being quickly repaired, made prepara¬ 
tions for the advance against the mountain. It will 
be observed further on, that this accident resulted 


13 


[i93] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

in modifying the original plans very materially, as 
the taking of Orchard Knob had already done. 
The left of Bragg’s line was turned, but not his 
right; this movement was a result of the accidents 
to the Brown’s Ferry pontoon-bridge. General 
Grant showed his broad mind in this affair as well 
as in other changes he made in his original plan, 
at a later date. 

THE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN 

At 4 p. m. on November 24, 1863,- one of the 
most spectacular battles of the war commenced. 
General Hooker’s force consisted of the follow¬ 
ing: Osterhaus’s division of the Fifteenth Corps, 
Cruft’s (formerly Palmer’s) of the Fourth; 
Geary’s of the Twelfth—with the exception 
of such regiments from the last two divisions 
as were required to protect the communications 
with Bridgeport and Kelly’s Ferry; battery K of 
the First Ohio, and battery I of the First New 
York of the Eleventh Corps, having sufficient 
horses for but one battery; a part of the Second 
Kentucky Cavalry, and Company K of the Fif¬ 
teenth Illinois Cavalry. The aggregate number 
1194] 


Chattanooga and Vicinity, November, 1863 
Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War, p. 2SS 









North 























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* 







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.. 

, 























* 

— 




























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V 


■*4 



















£ 














BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN 


of this force was 9,681. The foregoing statement 
of the forces is taken from General Hooker’s offi¬ 
cial report 36 , which is remarkably well written, 
clear in statement and full of essential facts. “At 
this time the enemy’s pickets formed a continuous 
line along the right bank of Lookout Creek, with 
the reserves in the valley, while his main force was 
encamped in a hollow half way up the slope of 
the mountain. The summit itself was held by 
three brigades of Stevenson’s division, and those 
were comparatively safe, as the only means of ac¬ 
cess from the next [that is, from the valley in 
which Hooker’s troops were located] for a dis¬ 
tance of 20 miles up the valley was by two or 
three trails, admitting to the passage of but 1 
man at a time; and even these trails were held at 
the top by rebel pickets.’’ 

The top of Lookout Mountain at this point con¬ 
sists of a perpendicular crest, or palisade of rocks 
which rises out of the main body of the mountain 
about a hundred feet. From the foot of this crest 
the mountain slopes by a gradual descent but with 
a very broken surface on all sides to the valleys on 


x Id., Serial No. 55, p. 315. 

[195] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

the east, west, and to the river on the north. An 
army could operate on this slope only below 
the crest, from the west to the east, or on the side 
of Chattanooga, around the northern slope, under 
the crest. Hooker’s army did not cross the top of 
the crest; but by taking the slope, the Confederate 
troops occupying the top, were forced to retreat 
by the only wagon road reaching to the top on the 
Chattanooga side. The slope on that side 
is less precipitous than on the west side where 
Hooker was. At the foot of the slope on 
the Chattanooga side flows the Chattanooga Creek 
and on the west side Lookout Creek, both flowing 
north, practically parallel with the trend of the 
mountain, and emptying into the Tennessee River, 
which runs west at the foot of the northern slope. 
Hooker continues his report as follows: “On the 
northern slope midway between the summit and 
the Tennessee, a plateau or belt of arable land, 
encircles the crest. There, a continuous line of 
earth-works had been thrown up, while redoubts, 
redans, and pits appeared lower down the slope 
to repel an assault from the direction of the river.’’ 

Geary commenced his movements as instructed, 
[196] 


BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN 


crossed the creek at 8 o’clock a. m., “captured the 
entire picket of 42 men posted to defend it, march¬ 
ed directly up the mountain until his right rested 
on the palisades, and headed down the valley.’’ 
The Confederate Walthall was in command of 
the troops immediately opposed to Geary, and 
Moore’s brigade near the Craven house on the east¬ 
ern, or northeastern slope. General Stevenson was 
there in command of all the Confederate troops on 
the mountain. He placed sharpshooters along 
the western edge of the crest, and wherever there 
was depression enough, the artillery by raising the 
trails of the gun carriages did some execution 
until Geary’s troops reached the foot of the 
palisades. The Confederate troops located on 
the western slope, moved into position, facing 
Lookout Creek, in order to prevent the Union 
troops crossing at the bridge; but this disposition 
subjected them to a flank enfilading fire from 
Geary’s troops. The other Union troops moved 
up the Creek, crossed behind Geary’s line, and 
joined on his left. The batteries had been 
placed on elevated points, so as to enfilade the 
route by which the enemy had to march down 
[i97] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

the slope, and on other points, by which the Con 
federates had to retreat if they were driven back. 
The Union line advanced, the artillery opened. 
The rout of the enemy was complete, many pris¬ 
oners were taken, and many were killed and 
wounded. At noon when Geary’s advance 
rounded the northern slope, his flags were plainly 
visible from Chattanooga. There had been a fog 
all morning, which greatly favored Hooker’s 
movements, preventing the Confederates on top of 
the crest from directing their shots satisfactorily. 
As the Union flags appeared on the sky line of the 
northern slope, and were visible at Chattanooga, 
this fog settled down upon the lower stretches 
of the slope and revealed the Confederate lines 
badly broken and in flight with the compact 
ranks of the Union soldiers triumphantly ad¬ 
vancing with flags flying and muskets glistening 
in the sun. It was a glorious sight to the Union 
troops, then in line in front of the works at Chat¬ 
tanooga. The picture presented was a “battle 
above the clouds,” for the fog obscured all that 
part of the mountain which was below the con¬ 
quering lines of Hooker. General Stevenson says 
[198] 


BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN 

in his report, with regard to this affair: “Finding 
that the fog was becoming so dense that the troops 
on the northern part of the mountain [meaning 
Pettus’s brigade on the crest] could not see the 
enemy moving upon Walthall, I gave orders for 
Pettus with my only disposable force to move 
down and report to Brigadier-General Jackson. 
He started at 12:30 o’clock and reached the 
scene of action a little past 1 o’clock. * * * 

This position was held by Moore, Walthall, and 
Pettus until about 8 p. m.’’ 87 

Stevenson had six brigades in his command; 
four of these took part in the fight on the mountain, 
the other two were placed between Chattanooga 
Creek and the road up the slope, in order to guard 
the line of retreat on the east side of the mountain 
against any advance from Chattanooga. Steven¬ 
son reports, that he lost only 380 in his three 
brigades; he does not state the number of troops 
he had on the mountain. Hooker rested at 
2 o’clock p. m. after passing the point. The 
settling down of the fog shut off his view of the 
Chattanooga Valley and prevented his seeing 


7 Ibid ., p. 720. 


[ 199] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

sufficiently the topography to justify him in ad¬ 
vancing down into the valley that same evening. 
He formed his lines on the eastern slope; his right 
was at the palisades, and his left was near the 
mouth of Chattanooga Creek. This line he 
fortified, and reported the fact to the department 
commander. In this position he enfiladed the 
enemy’s line in the Chattanooga Valley, and also 
had communication across the mouth of the creek 
with the Union forces in the city. At 5:15 p. m. 
General Carlin’s brigade of Johnson’s division of 
the Fourteenth Corps, reported to General Hooker 
after having crossed the mouth of the creek by 
ferry; he was placed on the right of the line re¬ 
lieving Geary’s troops, which were almost ex¬ 
hausted with fatigue. During the night the 
enemy withdrew entirely, leaving behind 20,000 
rations, and the camp and garrison equipage of 
three brigades. General Thomas reported, that 
Hooker captured 500 or 600 prisoners. The 
Eighth Kentucky Infantry scaled the crest about 
daylight on the 25th and hoisted the United States 
flag amid wild and prolonged cheers from the 
whole army. 


[200] 


ADVANCE ON MISSIONARY RIDGE 

At ten o’clock a. m. on the 25th, leaving two 
regiments to hold the mountain, Hooker started 
towards Rossville, across Chattanooga Creek and 
the valley, with Osterhaus’s division of the Fif¬ 
teenth Corps in the lead. Thus the left of the 
Confederate Army was completely turned, while 
the right still held its own. Hooker was too far 
from the Confederate line of retreat to menace it. 
To have turned the right first would have been 
better. Hooker was delayed four hours by a de¬ 
stroyed bridge in crossing Chattanooga Creek. 
The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry of Carlin’s 
brigade of Johnson’s division of the Fourteenth 
Corps participated in this engagement; it was 
detached from the brigade, and held a fort south 
of the Crutchfield house on the east side of the 
mountain; its losses were not reported. 

While these operations were occurring on Look¬ 
out Mountain under the command of Hooker, 
Sherman advanced across the Tennessee River 
at the mouth of the Chickamauga with three 
divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, and 
one division (Davis’s) of the Army of the Cum¬ 
berland, on the morning of the 24th, against the 
[ 201 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


other or extreme right wing of the Confederate 
line on Missionary Ridge. He advanced and 
formed his lines on the north end of the ridge; a 
brigade of Howard’s Corps moved to the left at 9 
a. m. on the same day and communicated with 
Sherman about noon. Later Howard joined 
Sherman with his two divisions and formed on his 
right. Carlin’s brigade rejoined his division on 
the 25th, which was then in the valley half way to 
Missionary Ridge and on the right of Thomas’s 
line. Palmer’s and Granger’s corps were held in 
readiness by Thomas to advance to the foot of the 
ridge, as soon as Hooker should get into position 
at Rossville. It was after 2 p. m. that General 
Hooker effected a crossing of Chattanooga Creek 
and advanced as above stated. At noon General 
Sherman was heavily engaged with the enemy in 
his position, and finding it to be very strong was 
not making any headway against it. General 
Baird was, therefore, ordered to march his division 
within supporting distance of Sherman, and to 
move promptly. 

He reported to Sherman, but the latter told 
him he could not find room for him and could not 

[ 202 ] 


BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE 


make use of his troops. General Baird marched 
back a distance of about two miles, and arrived 
at the left of General Thomas’s line at 2:30 p. m.; 
he was ordered to fall in on the left of Wood, the 
left division of Granger’s Fourth Corps. 

It will be well at this time to take a rapid view 
of the entire lines of the Union and the Confeder¬ 
ate armies, as they stood facing each other, arms 
in hand, at 3 o’clock p. m. on November 23, 1863, 
just before they grappled in a struggle for 
life and death, and for the permanent possession 
of the stronghold of the Middle West. So many 
changes having occurred in the previous three or 
four days in the Union Army, and equally as 
many and more important changes occurring on the 
Confederate side, makes it necessary to pause, just 
before describing the great spectacular battle of 
Missionary Ridge, and try to get at least a bird’s- 
eye view of the position of the numerous divisions 
and corps. 

General Osterhaus had again taken command 
of his own division, relieving General Charles R. 
Woods; General Cruft, and General Geary 
were near enough with their troops to the ridge at 

[203] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


Rossville to form the extreme right of the Union 
line. There was an interval between Geary’s left 
and Johnson’s right, where Carlin stood after 
coming from Lookout. Johnson had only two 
brigades, Carlin on the right, and Stoughton 
(John H. King’s successor) on the left; Stark¬ 
weather had been left in the works around the 
city. Hooker’s and Thomas’s troops were without 
reserves. Sheridan’s three brigades, F. T. Sher¬ 
man’s, Harkers’s and Wagner’s were next to the 
left of Johnson; then Wood’s three brigades, Ha- 
zen’s, Willich’s, and Beatty’s; the latter ap¬ 
peared in two lines, being the last in Thomas’s 
section, and forming the left flank of the line; and 
then Baird’s three brigades, Turchin’s, Van Der- 
veer’s and Phelps’s. 

A mile and a half to the left of General 
Thomas’s line lay Sherman’s right flank, with no 
troops in the interval. The latter’s line was com¬ 
posed from right to left of the following brigades, 
viz.: Buschbeck’s, Ewing’s Matthies’s, Corse’s 
and A. Smith’s; Raum, was behind Matthies, 
and two brigades of J. E. Smith’s were in reserve 
behind the centre. Behind this line, a half mile 
[204] 


BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE 

in the fortified line lay from left to right the 
brigades of Loomis, Cockerell, Alexander, and 
Lightbum, and Schurz’s division. Sherman thus 
had six divisions. The Confederate line from 
its right, which faced Sherman, was as follows 
by divisions: Cleburne, Stevenson, Gist, Cheat¬ 
ham, Anderson, Bate, and Stewart. Stewart 
held the left of Bragg’s line, and his troops were 
the first to encounter those of Hooker on their way 
to Rossville from Lookout Mountain. General 
Hardee commanded the right wing, consisting of 
the following four divisions: Cheatham, Cle¬ 
burne, Stevenson, and Walker; General Brecken- 
ridge was in charge of the left wing, which 
was composed of Bate, Stewart, and Ander¬ 
son. Cheatham’s division faced Baird, Ander¬ 
son’s Wood; Bate’s Sheridan, and Stewart’s 
Johnson. Cleburne’s division reached the front 
of Sherman’s line on the afternoon of the 24th 
while marching from the Confederates’ left 
Before the fight of the 25th occurred, Cheatham’s, 
Stevenson’s, and Walker’s divisions had pro¬ 
longed Bragg’s line to within three-quarters of a 
mile of the tunnel; Smith’s brigade of Cle- 
[ 205,] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

burne’s division held Tunnel Hill on the 25th 
against Sherman; the rest of the division was not 
heavily engaged, but it had the assistance of 
Brown’s and Cumming’s brigades of Stevenson’s 
division, and Maney’s of Walker’s. Tunnel 
Hill was not captured by Sherman’s troops until 
after the retreat of these Confederate forces on the 
evening of the 25th, the result of the successful as¬ 
sault in the centre by Thomas. 

The whole Confederate line on the left across 
the Chattanooga Valley was abandoned; Stew¬ 
art withdrew to the top of the ridge before 
Hooker reached Rossville. It must be noticed, 
that General Thomas’s line in the centre, con¬ 
tained only four divisions of the Army of the 
Cumberland, namely two of the Fourth Corps, 
and two of the Fourteenth; one division (Davis’s) 
of the Fourteenth Corps was with Sherman on 
the left, and one (Cruft’s) was with Hooker on 
the right. Hooker had three divisions and Sher¬ 
man six. 

Starkweather’s brigade of Johnson’s division 
was left to hold the original works around Chatta¬ 
nooga; and did so during the assault of the rest of 
the troops upon Missionary Ridge. 

[206] 


BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE 

At I p. m. on the 12th, C. A. Dana, Assistant 
Secretary of War, who was in Chattanooga, sent 
this dispatch to the Secretary of War at Wash¬ 
ington, “In our front here [meaning Thomas’s 
front], Confederate rifle pits are fully manned, 
preventing Thomas gaining ridge.’’ At 4:30 
p. m. he sent another dispatch showing how mis¬ 
leading the former dispatch was: “Glory to 
God. The day is decisively ours. Missionary 
Ridge has just been carried by a magnificent 
charge of Thomas’s troops, and rebels routed.” 
The reader must not lay much stress on the time 
given, at which the various movements were made; 
this is a mere guess in most instances. Seldom 
did an officer think of looking at his watch, at the 
moment any orders were given to make an impor¬ 
tant movement. The original Army of the Cum¬ 
berland, referred to by Dana, were the troops 
General Grant thought would not fight, because 
they had been so roughly handled at Chicka- 
mauga. 38 It was quite a natural conclusion. 
The entire Union Army was in line at about 

58 Memoirs of General William T. Sherman , by himself 

(N. Y.. 1875), vol I, P . 362. 

[207] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

3:30 p. m., ready for any commands which 
might be given by Grant, Thomas, Sherman and 
Hooker. The array of soldiers in the Union 
ranks from the three armies, those of the Potomac, 
the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, was for¬ 
midable, commanded by such heroes as Grant, 
Thomas, Sherman, Hooker, Sheridan, and How¬ 
ard. Thomas’s four divisions had about 18,000 
in rank and file, Hooker’s about 9,000, and Sher¬ 
man’s about 24,000. 

It is not likely that Bragg had more than 
30,000; but his position was sufficiently strong to 
almost equal Grant’s advantage in numbers. The 
Confederate Army was concentrated on a 500 feet 
ridge, which had a very steep and rough sur- 
fact, sloping towards the Union lines at an angle of 
about forty-five degrees. This ridge had a 
fortified line on the top, manned by veteran in¬ 
fantry and artillery, and a thinner line of infan¬ 
try at its foot in a series of deep rifle-pits; in 
front of the latter was a swarm of skirmishers. 
The army was still in command of Braxton 
Bragg, a commander of great experience; and of 
two wing commanders, Hardee a veteran of the 
[208] 


BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE 

old regular army, and Breckenridge a former vice- 
president of the United States. Its division- 
commanders were, as a rule, soldiers of the old 
regular United States Army, and were very 
capable officers. That army had two months be¬ 
fore (or thought it had) won the battle of Chick- 
amauga, and it was now fighting—at least in the 
centre where Thomas’s troops faced them—the 
same troops they claimed to have defeated a short 
time ago. It had every advantage of position 
at this time, and it had success in the past to fire the 
hearts of its soldiers, and arouse in them confi¬ 
dence in their ability to hurl back their old foe, 
who had the audacity to assault so formidable a 
stronghold. 

Standing on any of the Union forts at Chatta¬ 
nooga, especially on Fort Negley or Fort Wood, 
or better still on Orchard Knob, where Grant and 
Thomas remained during the 25th, one would 
have not only a rear view of the Union Army as it 
stood, but also a front view of most of the Con¬ 
federate force. From the top of Missionary 
Ridge, where Bragg had his headquarters, the 
whole panorama was magnificent. The lines of 
14 [ 209 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


blue, and their array of glittering muskets, could 
be seen from there in front. The backs of the 
troops were turned on Chattanooga. “Their 
faces were to the foe.” Bragg had a view of 
them which Grant and Thomas missed, and if 
he could have had an hour undisturbed by 
the conflicting emotions aroused in him by the 
pending conflict, if he could have watched 
through his field-glass the valorous mein, the 
confident air, and the evident determination of 
these veteran soldiers, to “feed fat the ancient 
grudge” against the old foes they had met at 
Mill Springs, Perryville, Stone’s River, and 
Chickamauga, he would surely have read in these 
characteristics the doom of the defeat which 
an hour later overwhelmed him and his little army, 
and from which it never sufficiently recovered to 
win another battle. Had he been half as much of 
a philosopher, as he was a soldier, he would have 
foreseen, what afterwards was expressed by one of 
his ablest generals (D. H. Hill), that the holding 
of Chattanooga “sealed the fate of the confeder¬ 
acy.” 

The living, moving lines of soldiers, presented 

[ 210 T 


BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE 

to the view of the two opposing commanders, sta¬ 
tioned at vantage points above the valley in which 
the Union Army was then formed, although a 
most interesting picture, was more impressive be¬ 
cause of its background of magnificent mountains, 
rivers, and hills. On the west rose great Lookout 
Mountain, 1,500 feet above the level of the val¬ 
ley; while across the valley, east of Lookout, 
Missionary Ridge stretched from the north to the 
South, rising 500 feet and crowned by the lines 
of grey soldiers, every movement of whom could 
be seen from Orchard Knob. 

General Grant’s most excellent plan on the 24th 
was that Thomas’s troops should bear to the left, 
join with the right of Sherman after his forces 
had advanced to the tunnel, through which the 
railroad from Chattanooga to East Tennessee 
ran, and together they should make an assault with 
the whole union line. Thomas’s troops were in 
line until 3:30 p. m. on the 25th, waiting for 
Sherman to capture the hill over the tunnel. 
General Sherman had begun the fight early in the 
morning of the 25th by advancing Corse’s brigade; 
the latter moved down the southern slope of the 
[ 211 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


second hill which had been gained the day before, 
and under a galling fire advanced against Cle¬ 
burne’s fortified position. This position was very 
strong, however, and Corse could not drive the 
enemy from the hill. Then other brigades were 
brought up, but they did not succeed in loosening 
Cleburne’s firm hold. General Grant observing 
this from Orchard Knob sent the rest of Howard’s 
Corps to Sherman’s aid at 10 a. m. How¬ 
ard had two divisions, Steinwehr’s and Schurz’s. 
It was evident, that Bragg endeavored most 
vigorously to keep Sherman from turning his right. 
Had Sherman succeeded in his effort, he 
would have been in Bragg’s rear and able to 
menace his line of retreat at Chickamauga sta¬ 
tion, which was immediately in the rear of the 
right flank. There was no evidence, however, 
that Bragg was weakening his lines in front 
of Thomas; although he had already sent 
the forces, which Hooker had defeated the day 
before on Lookout, to his right wing; and these 
proved to be amply able to hold so strong a na¬ 
tural fortress without any further reinforcements. 
When General Sherman received Howard’s two 


[212] 


BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE 


divisions, he renewed his efforts to take Tun¬ 
nel Hill; he made a charge and received one in 
return, which broke some of John E. Smith’s 
brigades. 

It appears that Grant did not contemplate any 
attack by Thomas on the centre, when he at noon 
ordered Baird to report to Sherman; for with 
Baird’s he had already detached nearly half of 
Thomas’s troops to Sherman and Hooker. With 
Baird gone, Thomas had only eight brigades to 
Sherman s seven divisions; General Hooker had 
seven brigades as far from General Thomas’s 
right, as General Sherman’s were from the latter’s 
left. 

General Grant and General Thomas were to¬ 
gether when these orders were given on the 25th; 
they were in accordance with Grant’s original 
plan, that Bragg’s defeat should be accomplished 
by Sherman’s turning the enemy’s right. Grant 
must therefore have consulted with Thomas con¬ 
cerning this maneuver. Whether General Thomas 
expressed his opinion on the 25th with re¬ 
gard to making the attack in some other 
place than at Sherman’s line, is not known; 
[213] ' 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


but it will be seen, that the success of the day 
pivoted around Thomas, because of the invincible 
position of the enemy at Tunnel Hill, and the 
valor of the old Army of the Cumberland. This 
is no disparagement to General Grant’s original 
idea; his plans were generally correct and success¬ 
ful, and this one was fine in conception, but it 
shows definitely, that the “best laid schemes, 
o’mice and men, gang aft a’gley.” 

General Grant boldly made his third deviation 
from his original outline planned for the battle. 
Seeing the improbability of Sherman advancing 
his present line to join with Thomas’s left, as con¬ 
templated, he ordered an independent assault by 
Thomas’s troops alone; this order was given at 3 
p. m. This section of the Union line was covered 
by two lines of skirmishers; and was confronted by 
something less than four divisions of the enemy, 
namely, a part of Stewart’s on the Confederate 
left, which was facing Hooker’s line under Gen¬ 
eral Breckenridge’s personal direction. The signal 
for the advance was to be six shots from a battery 
(perhaps Bridge’s), on Orchard Knob. General 
Grant’s report will best tell what occurred, viz.: 

[ 214 ] 


BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE 


“Thomas was accordingly directed to move for¬ 
ward his troops, constituting our center, * * * 

with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, fol¬ 
lowed in easy supporting distance by the whole 
force, and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Mis¬ 
sionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his 
lines, on the rifle-pits with a view to carry the top 
of the ridge. These troops moved forward, 
drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of 
the ridge like bees from a hive—stopped but a 
moment until the whole were in line—and com¬ 
menced the ascent of the mountain from right to 
left almost simultaneously, following closely the 
retreating enemy, without further orders. They 
encountered a fearful volley of grape and canister 
from near thirty pieces of artillery and musketry 
from still well-filled rifle-pits on the summit of the 
ridge. Not a waver, however, was seen in all 
that long line of brave men. Their progress was 
steadily onward until the summit was in their pos- 

• *»39 

session. 

When the summit was reached by the Union 
troops, the scene of confusion and flight of the 

”Rebellion Records, Serial No. 55, p. 34. 

[ 215 ] 



CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


Confederate forces, down the eastern slope of the 
ridge, was wonderful to behold. 

General Thomas in his report, 40 says: “Our 
troops advancing steadily in a continuous line, the 
enemy, seized with panic, abandoned the works 
at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to 
the crest, where they were closely followed by our 
troops, who, apparently inspired by the impulse of 
victory, carried the hill simultaneously at six dif¬ 
ferent points, and so closely upon the heels of 
the enemy, that many of them were taken prisoners 
in the trenches. We captured all their cannon 
and ammunition before they could be removed or 
destroyed.” 

In the meantime Hooker was advancing to¬ 
ward Thomas’s right with his line stretched across 
the ridge, at right angles to it. Stewart’s troops, 
seeing their left threatened by Hooker, tried to es¬ 
cape down the eastern slope toward Ringgold, but 
encountering there Osterhaus’s troops, moved 
northward along the base; here they ran into John¬ 
son s division, and more than a thousand were cap¬ 
tured. After General Baird’s division had gained 

40 Ibid. 9 p. 96. 

[ 216 ] 



BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE 

the summit, Stewart wheeled his division to the 
left, across the crest, and advanced toward the 
troops, resisting General Sherman. He had not ad¬ 
vanced far before he met Cheatham’s forces in line 
across the crest; the contest here lasted until after 
dark. During the night all the Confederate 
forces retreated across the Chickamauga, burned 
the bridges, and continued their flight to Taylor’s 
Ridge, near Ringgold, the nearest heights across 
the Chickamauga Valley, sixteen miles in a 
straight line southeast. General Sheridan, after 
halting a few moments on top of the ridge to re¬ 
form his troops, pushed on to Chickamauga Creek; 
he captured 300 prisoners, 13 cannon, and a train 
of 12 wagons. 

Mr. C. A. Dana sent a dispatch to the Secre¬ 
tary of War at 10 a. m. November 26, which con¬ 
tained the following paragraph: “The storming 
of the ridge by our troops was one of the greatest 
miracles in military history. No man who climbs 
the ascent by any of the roads that wind along its 
front can believe that 18,000 men were moved up 
its broken and crumbling face unless it was his 
fortune to witness the deed. It seems as awful as a 


[217] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


visible interposition of God. Neither Grant, nor 
Thomas intended it. Their orders were to carry 
the rifle-pits along the base of the ridge, and cap¬ 
ture their occupants; but when this was accom¬ 
plished, the unaccountable spirit of the troops bore 
them bodily up those impracticable steeps, over the 
bristling rifle-pits on the crest, and the thirty can¬ 
non enfilading every gully.” 

General Grant says in his report that he in¬ 
tended the lines should be readjusted and ascend 
the ridge if they were successful at the base. The 
reports of the corps and division commanders indi¬ 
cate that some of them misunderstood the orders. 
The men advanced without special orders, how¬ 
ever, when they found the position at the foot of 
the ridge too much exposed to the plunging fire of 
the enemy. In some instances they were even 
called back to the foot after proceeding part way 
up the hill. The assault was made, however, and 
was so successful, that no one was court-martialed; 
no one was bold enough to repudiate the respon¬ 
sibility for its initiation. General Grant did not 
hesitate to modify his original plans from time to 
time, when inevitable circumstances showed him 


BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE 


lhat some other movement than the one laid down 
was essential to success. This characteristic 
is the quality of a great general. 

The artillery also under command of General 
Brannan did fine service during the assault. The 
large guns in Forts Wood, Sherman, Cheatham, 
and battery Rosseau directed their fire first upon 
the Confederate line at the foot of the ridge, as 
did four light batteries in front of Chattanooga. 
When the Union line was ascending the ridge, 
this artillery turned their shots to the entrenched 
Confederate line on top. The enemy’s artillery 
and musketry seemed largely to have over-shot 
the Union lines; the records do not show that 
the Union troops suffered as heavy losses during 
the time they were under fire, as the enemy’s ap¬ 
parently advantageous position would warrant. 
It is also probable that the audacity of the blue 
coats in assaulting the top of the ridge surprised the 
Confederates and induced nervousness, wild 
shooting, terror, confusion, and flight. 

The Union troops did not advance up the ridge 
as if on parade; but conformed more or less to the 
contour of the ground; the line appeared to an on- 
[219] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


looker as a zigzag one; but the standards were al¬ 
ways where they ought to be, and there were no 
stragglers. They did not fire their muskets to any 
extent while advancing, although they received 
a constant wild fire from the enemy. It was an 
assault by the musket bearers, and it is not likely 
they received many orders from their officers. As 
soon as the Union troops gained the crest at one 
point, although it appeared as if the six different 
points were gained simultaneously, it greatly 
assisted the rest of the troops, who were so near the 
crest. The Confederates began to fall back as soon 
as the first Union troops gained the top. General 
Bragg tried to send his troops from a less threat¬ 
ened point to one more in danger, but his attempt 
failed, because his men saw better than he seemed 
to do that all was lost when one point was carried. 
This observation applies only of course to the iso¬ 
lated line on the right and left of Bragg’s 
headquarters, which was attacked by General 
Thomas’s troops. His troops further to the right, 
beyond an unoccupied space—such as Cheatham’s 
division—were not affected that way, because 


[ 220 ] 


BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE 


they turned on left wheel, and attacked Baird’s 
division on the crest. 

The Union troops, which were called back to 
the foot of the ridge by those officers who thought 
their orders carried them only thus far, caused 
Bragg to believe that they had been repulsed 
by the fire of his troops; he rode along his 
line congratulating them, when he was in¬ 
formed that his line was broken further to the 
right, and the Union forces had crowned the 
ridge. The victory was gained too late in the 
evening to ensure an effective pursuit. The enemy 
had all night, after crossing the Chickamauga, in 
which to move undisturbed his troops and wagon 
trains; he made the distance between himself and 
the pursuing force as great as possible before morn¬ 
ing. General Grant was apparently justified in 
waiting for Hooker to arrive at Rossville before 
he ordered Thomas’s advance, but he was not jus¬ 
tified in waiting so long as he did for Sherman’s 
expected capture of Tunnel Hill. Yet who 
could hope or believe that Thomas’s troops could 
successfully assault so formidable a position as 
they did? Hooker was delayed four hours in 
[ 221 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

crossing Chattanooga Creek. If Grant had sent 
Howard’s Corps at 10 a. m. on the 25th to Ross- 
ville in Hooker’s place, instead of sending it to 
Sherman, and as soon as it was in position, ordered 
Thomas, Howard, and Sherman to advance in 
unison, the same result would have occurred at 
one or two o’clock as was secured much later, 
and then the four and a half or five hours 
of daylight would have been sufficient to in¬ 
jure the Confederate Army very greatly before it 
could have crossed the Chickamauga. But it is 
very easy to look back and criticise. On the bat¬ 
tlefield there may be reasons, apparent to a com¬ 
mander, why these supposable movements could 
not be made that are not so palpable to a historian, 
who may lose sight of all the complex situations, 
the inside knowledge of the commander, and his 
fearful responsibility to the country. 

The pursuit was taken up on the morning of the 
26th by General Hooker’s troops and Palmer’s 
Fourteenth Corps. Hooker attacked the enemy 
in a strong position at Ringgold Gap on Taylor’s 
Ridge; he lost heavily without inflicting corres¬ 
ponding injury on the enemy. The Fourth Corps 
-[ 222 ] 


PURSUING THE ENEMY 


was marched back to the city on the morning of 
the 26th to make preparations for the relief of 
Burnside at Knoxville. 

On the 27th, the pursuit was abandoned at 
Ringgold, twenty-three miles by rail south of 
Chattanooga. General Grant telegraphed from 
that place at 2 p. m. to General Halleck at Wash¬ 
ington, D. C.: “I am not prepared to continue 
pursuit further.” The official reports neither 
give the strength of the Union Army nor of the 
Confederate Army. At the time of the attack 
on Missionary Ridge the Union Army outnum¬ 
bered largely the Confederate Army. A large 
part of this disparity in numbers was offset by 
the extraordinarily strong position of the Con¬ 
federate forces, and the fact that the Union 
Army was the aggressor. Could Bragg have 
commanded the resources that Grant did, he 
would have gladly availed himself of them in 
order to outnumber the Union Army; no false 
notions of chivalry prevented either army from 
availing itself of any great advantage in battle, 
which is habitually taken where war is waged. 
The Confederate boast at the beginning of the 
[223] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

war that one Confederate could out-fight five 
Yankees—as all northern troops were called by 
the Confederates—was rather incompatible with 
their complaint after the war, that they were 
crushed only by weight of numbers. 

Military skill will sometimes win battles against 
numbers; this was not the case in the battles 
around Chattanooga, however. Bragg does not 
give his losses in his official report; but he lost to 
the Union Army "in prisoners 6,142 men, 42 
pieces of artillery, 69 gun carriages, and 7,000 
stands of small arms. He destroyed much other 
material before and during his flight. 

The Union loss was 5,286 killed and wounded, 
and 330 missing. These losses seem small com¬ 
pared with other battles of less importance— 
Chickamauga for instance; but it must be re¬ 
membered that the sacrifice for the continued pos¬ 
session of Chattanooga by the Union Army in¬ 
cludes also all the losses of the conflicts of the Tul- 
lahoma campaign, of Chickamauga, Wauhatchie, 
Lookout Mountain, Orchard Knob, and Mission¬ 
ary Ridge. When it is considered how much 
these battles meant, in their causal effect on the 


[ 224 ] 


WISCONSIN AT MISSIONARY RIDGE 


final suppression of the rebellion itself, their value 
becomes apparent. 

WISCONSIN TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF MISSION¬ 
ARY RIDGE 

Wisconsin’s part in the battle of Missionary 
Ridge was important and honorable. The First 
and Twenty-first Infantry were in Starkweather’s 
brigade of Johnson’s division. This brigade had 
lost heavily at Chickamauga; it was assigned to 
remain in Chattanooga in order to hold the works, 
while the army was assaulting the ridge. This 
duty was cheerfully and thoroughly done, al¬ 
though it deprived the brigade of the glory of 
charging up the ridge. 

The Tenth Infantry remained on detached duty 
holding a fort south of the Crutchfield house, on 
the side of Lookout Mountain, and did not ascend 
the ridge. 

The Fifteenth Infantry was attached to Wil- 
lich’s brigade of Wood’s division of Granger’s 
fourth corps; it was commanded by Captain John 
A. Gordon. In the ascent of the ridge it was in 
the reserve line of the brigade, therefore its loss 
15 [225] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


was nominal; the,entire loss during the battles was 
6 men wounded. General Willich speaks of 
the regiment in high terms in his report. It con¬ 
sisted only of 130 men. 

Before coming to the Army of the Cumberland 
the Fifteenth Infantry had distinguished itself. 
On October 19, 1862, Major Quincy McNeill 
of the Second Illinois Cavalry wrote to the Gov¬ 
ernor of Wisconsin, from Island Number Ten, that 
there was no braver man in the service than Cap¬ 
tain John A. Gordon. 

The Eighteenth Infantry came with Sherman’s 
troops of the Army of the Tennessee; it was com¬ 
manded by Colonel Gabriel Bouck and attached 
to the First Brigade (Alexander’s), of the Second 
Division (General John E. Smith’s), of the Sev¬ 
enteenth Corps. This infantry regiment was en¬ 
gaged with Sherman’s troops on the extreme left; 
its losses are not reported. It was organized at 
Milwaukee in February, 1862, and was mus¬ 
tered in March. It proceeded to Pittsburg Land¬ 
ing, Tennessee, and became a part of the Army 
of the Tennessee on April 5, 1862. This regiment 
was heavily engaged in the battle at that place on 
[226] 


WISCONSIN AT MISSIONARY RIDGE 

April 6; also in the battle of Corinth and other 
engagements prior to its coming to Chattanooga. 
The Eighteenth Infantry was noted for the size of 
its men; it was said that Company G of this regi¬ 
ment averaged by actual weight 160 pounds to the 
man. At the battle of Pittsburg Landing on 
April 6, 1862, this regiment was in the left bri¬ 
gade of General Prentiss’s division; it was then 
commanded by its first colonel, J. S. Alban. It 
formed for battle only thirty rods from its 
tents, and fifteen minutes later the Confederate line 
was upon it. The enemy outflanked and overpow¬ 
ered it; Alban was wounded, and carried from 
the field, dying soon afterwards; the Lieutenant- 
Colonel was also wounded and Major Crane was 
killed. All this occurred one week after the regi¬ 
ment left its camp of organization in Wisconsin. 
Captain Gabriel Bouck, Company E, Second 
Wisconsin Infantry was made Colonel of the 
Eighteenth on April 22, 1862. 

The Twenty-fourth Infantry was attached to 
Francis T. Sherman’s Brigade of Sheridan’s divi¬ 
sion of the Fourth Corps, and was commanded 
by Major Carl Von Baumbach. His official re- 
[227] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


port is a vivid account of how the top of the ridge 
was gained, “My regiment advanced in admirable 
line of battle up to the first pits of the enemy. Up¬ 
on reaching the first line, the men were pretty much 
exhausted, and unable to move for some time. In 
about five minutes, however, we moved over the 
first pits of the enemy, but after advancing beyond 
the first line, the line of battle was not regular. 
The men took advantage of all obstacles, in the 
way, for shelter, and thus advanced toward the 
top of the ridge. The fighting was fierce and se¬ 
vere, but owing to the formation of the ground 
my men were able to screen themselves partially, 
from the deadly volleys, that were being hurled 
at us, at every step of our advance. In the course 
of the ascent my men had to rest several times on 
account of exhaustion. But at length we succeed¬ 
ed in gaining the crest of the ridge, after two hours 
steady fighting * * * I would most respect¬ 

fully mention Adjutant Arthur McArthur, Jr., 
for his bravery. When the color sergeant was 
exhausted he carried the flag in front of the regi¬ 
ment, cheering the men to follow him up the 
ridge.” 


[228] 


WISCONSIN AT MISSIONARY RIDGE 

The loss of the Twenty-fourth is given as 31 
killed and wounded. Captain Howard Greene 
and Lieutenant Robert J. Chivas were killed. 
Captain Richard H. Austin and Lieutenant 
Thomas E. Balding were wounded. Major Von 
Baumbach commended especially the bravery of 
the latter two. 

The Twenty-sixth Infantry, still in the second 
brigade of Schurz’s division of the Eleventh 
Corps, was commanded by Major F. C. Wink¬ 
ler; this regiment followed the movements of its 
brigade and 6n November 25, was with Sherman 
on the extreme left. Its losses are not reported. 

The Third, Eighth, and Tenth light batteries 
were in the Fifst Brigade of the Second Division 
of the artillery reserve. Company C of the first 
heavy artillery was in the Second Brigade of the 
same division. 

The Eighth Battery did excellent service on the 
evening of the 24th, when Carlin’s brigade crossed 
Chattanooga Creek at its mouth and joined 
Hooker. Lieutenant O. German, commanding 
the battery, placed two sections near the mouth of 
the creek on its right bank, and shelled the Con- 
[229] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

federate position and the road up the east of the 
mountain. On the 25th, after the infantry had 
taken Missionary Ridge it ascended to the crest. 
Losses, none. 

The Fifth Battery was part of the artillery 
which was so placed as to cover the pontoon 
bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, where 
Sherman’s troops crossed on the 24th. 

The Twelfth Battery was placed on a hill near 
the location of the Fifth Battery. 

The Sixth and Twelfth batteries were attached 
officially to the Second Division of the Seven¬ 
teenth Corps; therefore they were on the left with 
Sherman during the 25th. Their losses are not 
reported. 

There is no report from the Tenth Battery, 
which was stationed at Harrison’s Landing, about 
twelve miles up the river, east of Chattanooga; a 
section of this battery reported to Colonel Eli 
Long (of the cavalry) at Calhoun, Tennessee. 

Battery C of the First Regiment of Wisconsin 
Heavy Artillery was mustered in October 1, 
1863; it was sent directly to Chattanooga and as¬ 
signed to Fort Wood. 


[230} 


WISCONSIN AT MISSIONARY RIDGE 

The Sixth Wisconsin Battery was mustered 
into service at Racine, Wisconsin, October 2, 

1861. It did not leave the State until March 15, 

1862, when it went to St. Louis. It took part in 
the siege of Island Number Ten, the siege and bat¬ 
tle of Corinth, and the siege of Vicksburg. This 
battery came to Chattanooga with the Fifteenth 
Corps under Sherman. 

The Tenth Wisconsin Light Battery was mus¬ 
tered into the service at Milwaukee on February 
10, 1862, with Captain Yates V. Beebe as com¬ 
mander. It left the State March 18 and went to 
St. Louis. From there it joined the Army of the 
Tennessee and took part in the battle of Corinth. 
On September 14, 1862, it arrived at Nashville, 
and took part in the battle of Stone’s River. It 
did active duty in various locations until the date 
of the battles around Chattanooga. 

The Twelfth Wisconsin Battery was organized 
and equipped at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. It 
did service in both Tennessee and Mississippi un¬ 
til coming to Chattanooga with General Sherman. 
The Army of the Cumberland—as reorganized 

prior to the battles around Chattanooga—with 

[ 231 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 

General Thomas in command, was now in perma¬ 
nent possession of Chattanooga. The Confeder¬ 
ate Army took up its winter quarters at Dalton, 
Georgia, on the railway twenty-eight miles south¬ 
east of Chattanooga, across two mountain ranges. 
The assignment of General Grant as commander 
of the Division of the Mississippi—giving him 
command of all the forces, operating in the States 
of Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and 
Mississippi—which so greatly contributed to the 
victories in the battles around Chattanooga, in¬ 
sured also the permanent holding of that city. 

Whatever was accomplished by Rosecrans 
during the four months of the campaign, begin¬ 
ning on June 23 at Murfreesboro, and ending on 
October 19, 1863 at Chattanooga, was done by 
him and his Army of the Cumberland alone. He 
could not get any cooperation from the East or 
West. The President and General Halleck at 
Washington, seemed to be in earnest by the word¬ 
ing of their dispatches, as published in the Re¬ 
bellion Record, in urging and commanding Burn¬ 
side in east Tennessee and the Army of the Ten¬ 
nessee on the Mississippi to join with Rosecrans 
[232] 


CONCLUSIONS 


prior to the battle of Chickamauga; for reasons 
not apparent to the reader of present history, no 
reinforcements came. It is pathetic to read the 
official record of those days, which gives an ac¬ 
count of the struggles, the marches, the battles, the 
sacrifices, the patient endurance by the musket 
bearers of extreme fatigue, and the cheerful¬ 
ness with which the soldiers endured all. They 
faced death without a thought of their real 
heroism. To one who went through the cam¬ 
paign and came out alive and unwounded it is in¬ 
comprehensible, that all did not die. 

It is true other armies, such as those of the Poto¬ 
mac, the Tennessee, and the one in Missouri had 
campaigns at the same time and were equally 
exposed to the hazards of war; but none of 
them marched over a territory so mountainous 
and so difficult; none of them fought battles 
in so perilous a region or with more deadly 
effect, than the soldiers in the battle of Chicka¬ 
mauga. Had the Union Army been really de¬ 
feated and had it lost Chattanooga, the army 
could hardly have recovered from the disaster, 
without the quick aid of large reinforcements, 
[ 233 ] 


CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN 


which were too far away at that time to be 
available in an emergency. Burnside was be¬ 
sieged at Knoxville, and the Army of the Ten¬ 
nessee so far away, that it took weeks to get it 
to Chattanooga. It will be of great interest to 
the future student of the military history of the 
War between the States to follow the subsequent 
campaigns of the Western armies after Grant be¬ 
came commander-in-chief, and Sherman was as¬ 
signed to the command in the West, with head¬ 
quarters at Chattanooga. He will apprehend how 
all the armies worked together, and how soon the 
rebellion itself was crushed, although its soldiers 
fought to the bitter end. 


I234] 







\ 


I 














INDEX 


[Armies, Battles, Corps, Creeks, Forts, Gaps, Islands, Losses, 
Mountains, Rivers, and Wars are grouped under those respective 
heads; Regiments are grouped under the caption of their respec¬ 
tive States.] 


Adams, Gen. Daniel W. t at Chickamauga, 99, 100, 104. 

Alabama, 8-10; troops in, 33, 232; 28th Infantry, 191. 

Alexander, Col. E. Porter, at Knoxville, 181. 

Alexander, Col. Jesse I., at Missionary Ridge, 205, 226. 

Alexander’s Bridge, near Chickamauga, 69, 72, 77. 

Alpine (Ga.), 61, 63, 72-75. 

Anderson, Gen. Patlon, at Missionary Ridge, 205. 

Anderson, Gen. Robert, in Kentucky, 15. 

Anderson’s Cross Roads (Tenn.), 159. 

Armies — f/ 

Cumberland, 1, 3, 5, 8, 13, 15, 164, 177, 178, 201, 206-208, 
226, 232; organization, 12, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28; commander, 16; re¬ 
organized, 164, 169, 170, 231; reinforced, 135, 189; retreats, 
155; at Murfreesboro, 4, 5, 11; in Chickamauga campaign, 52- 
154; at Chattanooga, 186; courage of, 22, 180, 214; personnel* 
25-27, 33. 

Mississippi, 12. 

Ohio, 15, 169. 

Potomac, 4, 158, 177,178, 208, 233. 

Tennessee (Confederate), 1, 33; organized, 33-39; in Chicka¬ 
mauga campaign, 52-154; on Missionary Ridge, 202-222. 

Tennessee (Union), 4, 5, 158, 159, 169, 201, 208, 226, 231-233. 

Armstrong, Gen. Frank C., at Chickamauga, 117. 

Atlanta (Ga.), capture, 3, 5, 10. 

Austin, Capt. Richard H., wounded, 229. 

[235] 



INDEX 


Baird, Gen. Absalom, of regular army, 23; commands division, 
19, 21, 160; in Chickamauga campaign, 60, 65, 66, 68; at battle 
of Chickamauga, 79, 81-103, 107, 108, 111, 112, 115, 122, 126- 
129, 139-142, 145, 152; withdraws, 123, 125, 129; at Rossville, 
124; Orchard Knob, 190; Missionary Ridge, 202-205, 213, 216, 
221; commended, 148, 149. 

Balding, Lieut. Thomas E., 132; wounded, 229. 

Barker, Capt. John D., aide to Thomas, 120, 122. 

Barnes, Gen. Sidney M., at Chickamauga, 104, 107, 109, 113, 142. 
Bate, Gen. William B., at Missionary Ridge, 205. 

Battle'Creek (Tenn.), 60, 167. 

Battles— 

Antietam, 137. 

Bull Run, *15, 137. 

Oarnifex Ferry, 12. 

Chancellorsville, 4, 137. 

Chickamauga, mentioned, 14, 17, 19-21, 30, 34,37, 81, 126,157, 
207, 224, 233; not a failure, 52; described, 67-124; criticized, 
13, 135-150. 

Corinth, 12, 32, 227, 231. 

Crampton’s Gap, 137. 

Dug Gap, 65-69. 

Fredericksburg, 137. 

Gettysburg, 4, 136-138. 

Guy’s Gap, 44, 46. 

Harper’s Ferry, 137. 

Hoover’s Gap, 2, 43, 44. 

Island Number Ten, 29, 32. 

Iuka, 12. 

Leet’s Tanyard, 65. 

Liberty Gap, 2, 42, 43. 

Lookout Mountain, mentioned, 135, 181, 212, 224; described, 
192-201. 

Middle Creek, 14. 

Mill Springs, 15, 16, 210. 

Missionary Ridge, mentioned, 2, 135, 189, 192, 193; described, 
201 - 222 . 

Orchard Knob, mentioned, 135, 224; described, 189-194. 
Perryville, 3, 16, 20, 22, 28-35, 210. 

[236] 



INDEX 


Battles— Continued. 

Pittsburg Landing, 220, 227. 

Rich Mountain, 12. 

Ringgold Gap, 222, 223. 

Shepardstown, 137. 

Shiloh, 31, 34, 35, 50, 137. 

South Mountain, 137. 

Stone’s River, 1, 2, 11, 13, 16, 22, 28-37, 137, 144, 210, 231. 
Vicksburg, 5. 

Tunnel Hill, 185, 186, 206, 211-214, 221. 

Wauhatchie, mentioned, 135, 224; described, 176-182. 
Baumbach. See Von Baumbach. 

Beatty, Gen, John, at Chickamauga, 93, 99,104,113,142; at Chat¬ 
tanooga, 166. 

Beatty, Gen. Samuel, at Chattanooga, 166; at Orchard Knob, 
190; at Missionary Ridge, 204. 

Beebe, Capt. Yates V., commands battery, 231. 

Bellefont (Ala.), 57. 

Benning, Gen. Henry L., at Chickamauga, 97, 138. 

Benton Barracks (Mo.), 30. 

Bingham, Col. George B., in Tullahoma campaign, 28; at Chick¬ 
amauga, 127. 

Bloody Pond, at Chickamauga, 80. 

Bouck, Col. Gabriel, commands regiment, 226, 227. 

Bowling Green (Ky.), 2, 3, 6, 11, 16. 

Boynton, Gen. H. V., cited, 85, 108, 109, 118, 136. 

Bradyville (Tenn.), 41, 43. 

Bragg, Gen. Braxton, Confederate commander, 2, 33, 34; at Tul. 
lahoma, 39, 40; at Chattanooga, 54, 55; plans, 57, 183, 189: 
evacuates Chattanooga, 63, 64, 67; at Lafayette, 65, 66, 68; 
reinforced, 66, 67, 76, 98; at Chickamauga, 58, 62, 69-80, 85, 
87, 99, 116, 117, 119; size of army, 136; after Chickamauga, 
124, 146, 151, 156-161; line near Chattanooga, 181-194; at 
Missionary Ridge, 205-213, 220-224; reports, 49, 67. 

Brannan, Gen. John M., of regular army, 23; commands division, 
17, 24, 66; in Tullahoma campaign, 41; at Chickamauga, 82- 
96, 103-115, 119, 127, 138-142, 151; withdraws, 123, 125; chief 
of artillery, 169; at Missionary Ridge, 219; commended, 148; 
reports, 85, 86. 


[237] 




INDEX 


Breckenridge, Gen. John C., at Chickamanga, 82, 90, 96-100, 104, 
110, 117, 140, 141, 148; Missionary Ridge, 205, 209, 214; char¬ 
acterized, 34, 35. 

Bridge, Lyman, commands Illinois battery, 192, 214. 

Bridgeport (Ala.), railway junction, 6, 7, 28, 52-54, 56, 59, 60, 
159, 162, 163, 166, 171-174, 176, 177, 180, 184, 187, 189, 194; 
supply station, 134; road to, 156; steamboat at, 179; Bragg at, 
19, 49; Gordon, 83; garrisoned, 167; troops cross at, 176. 

Broomtown Valley (Ala.), 63. 

Brotherton, -, house near Chickamauga, 80, 81, 91, 92, 116. 

Brown, Gen. John C., at Missionary Ridge, 206. 

Brown’s Ferry (Tenn.), fortified, 172-176; captured, 178; bridge 
at, 179, 185, 187, 192, 194. 

Buckner, Gen. Simon B., in East Tennessee, 59; reinforces 
Bragg, 60, 67, 70; in Chickamauga campaign, 66, 68; at 
Chickamauga, 97, 98, 142; characterized, 35. 

Buel, C. C., and Johnson, Robert U., Battles and Leaders of Civil 
War, 74, 116, 147. 

Buell, Gen. D. C., Confederate officer, 2, 3, 11, 16, 28, 31, 32; at 
Chattanooga, 50. 

Buell, Gen. George P., at Chickamauga, 106, 113, 117. 

Burnside, Gen. Ambrose E., in East Tennessee, 59, 66, 67, 158, 
232, 234; at Knoxville, 169, 181-184, 189, 223. 

Buschbeck, Col. Adolphus, at Missionary Ridge, 204. 

Calhoun (Tenn.), 230. 

Cameron Hill, at Chattanooga, 173. 

Camp Dick Robinson (Ky.), 15. 

Caperton’s Ferry (Ala.), location, 57, 59; crossed, 60, 61. 

Carlin, Gen. William P., commands brigade, 43, 201; at Chicka¬ 
mauga, 108; Chattanooga, 166, 167; Lookout Mountain, 200; 
Missionary Ridge, 202, 204. 

Carpenter, Capt. Stephen J., commands battery, 32. 

Century Magazine , cited, 74. 

Chapin, Col. Alfred R., commands regiment, 28. 

Chattanooga (Tenn.), location, 55; importance of, 3, 7-9, 39,51, 
71, 119, 134; railway terminus, 6, 177; in 1862, 50; held by 
Confederates, 49, 52-54, 58, 63; evacuated, 63; Union army 

[238] 


INDEX 


Chattanooga (Tenn.)—Continued. 

enters, 64; Union troops at, 72, 76, 77, 109, 112, 135, 181, 188, 
200, 210, 219, 225, 227, 230, 231, 234; troops withdraw to, 125, 
129, 133, 146, 152;siegeof, 156-163; steamboat built, 179; Union 
forts at, 209; battles near, 2, 5, 31, 155-234; permanently occu¬ 
pied, 232: Rosecrans retires to, 121; reports from, 144, 210. 
Chattanooga Valley, 54, 188, 189, 199-201, 206. 

Cheatham, Gen. Benjamin F., at Chickamauga, 86, 89, 96, 97, 
138, 139, 141; advances 125; at Missionary Ridge, 205, 217, 
220 . 

Chickamauga campaign, 51-154. See also Battles: Chickamauga. 
Chickamauga Station, 125, 212. 

Chickamauga Valley, topography, 11, 126, 217. See also Creeks: 
Chickamauga. 

Chivas, Lieut. Robert J., killed, 229. 

Christiana (Tenn.), 41. 

Cincinnati Gazette , cited, 52. 

Clarksville (Tenn.), 20. 

Cleburne, Gen. Patrick R., commands division, 43; in Chick¬ 
amauga campaign, 58, 66, 68; at battle of Chickamauga, 82, 
89, 90, 96, 97, 100-102, 128, 139, 141; at Missionary Ridge, 
205, 212: report, 101; characterized, 100. 

Cockerill, Col^ Joseph R., at Missionary Ridge, 205. 

Columbus (Ky.), 32. 

Connell, Col. JohnM., at Chickamauga, 106, 113. 

Colquitt, Gen. Peyton H., killed, 102. 

Corps— 

4th, formation, 165, 170; officers, 168; at Missionary Ridge, 
186, 203, 206; Orchard Knob, 189, 190; Lookout Mountain, 194; 
Chattanooga, 222; Wisconsin troops in, 168, 225, 227. 

11th, comes to Chattanooga, 159, 170: at Nashville, 162: 
Wauhatchie, 177, 178; Orchard Knob, 190, 191; Missionary 
Ridge, 186, 187; Wisconsin troops in, 168, 177, 178, 229. 

12th, reinforces Chattanooga, 159, 170; at Nashville, 162; 
Wauhatchie, 177, 178; Lookout Mountain, 194; Wisconsin 
troops in, 168, 177. 

14th, formation, 12, 17, 19; commanders, 12, 168; officers of, 
21, 24; medical director, 110; in Tullahoma campaign, 43-47; 

[239] 




INDEX 


Corps Q4th)—Continued. 

at Decherd, 53; advances, 56, 57, 60, 65, 76; at Chickamauga, 
76-79, 86, 88; reorganized, 165, 166, 170; at Orchard Knob, 190, 
191; Lookout Mountain, 200; Missionary Ridge, 185, 193, 206: 
pursues enemy, 222; Wisconsin troops in, 28, 30, 127, 167, 168, 
201 . 

15th, reinforces Chattanooga. 159; at Lookout Mountain, 194, 
201; Wisconsin troops in, 231. 

17th, portion sent to Chattanooga, 159; Wisconsin troops in, 
226, 230. 

20th, formation, 12, 18; commander, 17, 23; medical director, 
110; in Tullahoma campaign, 46, 47; at Winchester, 53: Alpine, 
74, 75; advances, 56-61, 76; at Chickamauga, 73, 76-79, 86-88; 
Wisconsin troops in, 29, 30, 32, 33, 59, 130, 131, 133, 134; merged 
in 4th Corps, 165. 

21st, formation, 12, 18; commander, 17; in Tullahoma cam¬ 
paign, 43, 45, 46; at McMinnville, 53; advances, 56,-64; at 
Chickamauga, 70, 73, 74, 78, 86-88; Wisconsin troops in, 31, 
133; merged in 4th Corps, 165. 

Cavalry, 18, 31. 

Reserve, 19, 83, 165. 

For Confederate Corps, see names of commanders. 

Corse, Col. John M., at Missionary Ridge, 204, 211, 212. 

Cowan (Tenn.), 47. 

Crane, Maj. Josiah W., killed, 227. 

Craven, -, house on Lookout Mountain, 197. 

Crawfish Springs (Ga.), 71, 78-80, 82, 87, 93, 99, 153. 

Creeks— 

Big Crow, 53, 

Chattanooga, 124, 155, 196, 199-202, 222, 229. 

Chickamauga, 60, 64, 66, 69, 70, 73, 76, 81, 82, 119, 133, 181, 
185, 201; described, 71; crossed, 72, 78, 79, 85, 99, 187, 230; re¬ 
treat across, 217, 221, 222. 

Citico, 190. 

Island, 261. 

Lookout, 195-197. 

McBride’s, 44. 

South Chickamauga, 186. 

[ 240] 


INDEX 


Crittenden, Senator John, son of, 17. 

Crittenden, Gen. Thomas L., commands division, 12; at Hoover's 
Gap, 43; in Tullahoma campaign, 45; Chickamauga cam¬ 
paign, 63, 64, 68, 69; at battle of Chickamauga, 70, 72, 73, 76, 
78, 82, 84, 86, 87, 91, 94, 95, 109, 121, 133; at Chatta¬ 
nooga, 155; characterized, 17. 

Crook, Gen. George, cavalry raid, 160, 161. 

Croxton, Gen. John T., at Chickamauga, 84, 85, 113, 114, 127; at 
Chattanooga, 166; commended, 148. 

Cruft, Gen. Charles, at Chattanooga, 165, 168; Lookout Moun¬ 
tain, 194; Missionary Ridge, 201, 203, 206. 

Crutchfield,-, house on Lookout Mountain, 201, 225. 

Cumming, Gen. Alfred, at Missionary Ridge, 206. 


Dalton (Ga.), Confederates at, 189, 232. 

Dana, C. A., assistant secretary of war, reports, 144, 145, 165, 
207, 217. 

Daniels, Col. Edward, cavalry officer, 30. 

Danville (Ky.), 15. 

Davis, Gen. Jefferson C., of regular army, 23; commands divi¬ 
sion, 18; in/Tullahoma campaign, 43, 47; Chickamauga cam¬ 
paign, 59; battle of Chickamauga, 86, 87, 93, 95, 96, 106, 107, 
109, 111, 130-134, 142, 145, 151; at Chattanooga, 166, 168; 
Missionary Ridge, 185, 193, 201, 206; characterized, 108. 

Davis’s Cross Roads (Ga.), 65, 68. 

Decherd (Tenn.), 52, 53, 160. 

Deshler, Gen. James, killed, 102. 

Dick, Gen. George F., at Chickamauga, 113. 

Drury, Capt Lucius H., chief of artillery, 20, 31; wounded, 133. 

Dyer, -, house near Chickamauga, 81. 


Eaglesville (Tenn.), 41. 

Ector, Gen. Matthew D., at Chickamauga, 85. 

Ely, Col. John H., at Chickamauga, 129; captured, 130. 
Ewing, Gen. Hugh, at Trenton, 187; Missionary Ridge, 204. 


16 


[241] 


INDEX 


Fairfield (Term.), 44. 

Forrest, Gen. Nathan B., cavalry commander, 33; raiding, 69, 
146, 170; in Chickamauga campaign, 69; at battle of Chicka- 
mauga, 73, 82-85, 89, 95, 117, 140, ;i41, 153, 154; Rossville, 
124; characterized, 35, 36. 

Forts: Cheatham, 219; Donelson, 16, 20, 35; Henry, 16; Leaven¬ 
worth, 32; Negley, 209; Riley, 32; Rosecrans, 6; Sherman, 
219; Sumter, 15; Wood, 190, 209, 219, 230. 

Fox, Capt. P. V., builds bridge, 176. 

Fox, Col. W. F., Regimental Losses in Civil War , 142. 

Frankfort (Ky.), 2. 

Franklin (Tenn.), 6. 

Furay, W. S., war correspondent, 51, 52. 

Gallatin (Tenn.), 20. 

Gaps: 

Bellbuckle, 40. 

Cooper’s, 60, 63, 68, 75. 

Crampton’s, 137. 

Dug, 65, 66, 68, 72. See also Battles: Dug Gap. 

Frick’s, 63. 

Guy’s, 40, 44, 46. 

Hoover’s, 2, 40, 42, 43. 

Liberty, 2, 40, 42, 46. 

McFarland’s, 71, 93, 109, 110, 123, 124, 131. 

Rossville, 19, 76, 81, 83, 109, 114, 124, 146. 

Ringgold, 222. 

Stevens’s, 60, 63-65, 68, 71-74. 

Winston’s, 61, 75. 

Gardner, Capt. George Q., commands Wisconsin battery, 32, 133, 
134. 

Garfield, Gen. James A., at Chickamauga, 110, 112, 115, 120, 
123; leaves army, 168, 169; commended, 48; characterized, 
13, 14. 

Gaw, Capt. W. B., at Chickamauga, 120. 

Geary, Gen. John W., at Wauhatchie, 177, 178, 180; Lookout 
Mountain, 186, 194, 196-198, 200; Missionary Ridge, 201- 
204. 


[ 242 ] 


INDEX 


Georgia, boundary, 9; soldiers from, 10; Union troops in, 146, 
232. 

German, Lieut. Obadiah, at Missionary Ridge, 229. 

Gist, Gen. State Rights, at Chickamauga, 98; Missionary Ridge, 
205. 

Glass’s Mill (Ga.), 70. 

Glenn, Widow-, house near Chickamauga, 78-81, 131. 

Goldsmith, Capt. Gustavus, killed, 132. 

Gordon. See Lee and Gordon’s Mill. 

Gordon, Capt. John A., 225, 226. 

Govan, Gen. Daniel C., at Chickamauga, 98, 102, 138. 

Granger, Gen. Gordon, commands reserve, 19; in Tullahoma 
campaign, 41, 44, 46; at Chickamauga, 83, 114, 115, 118, 119, 
121, 144, 151, 154; withdraws, 123; commended, 145, 148; 
commands corps, 165: at Orchard Knob, 189, 190; Mission¬ 
ary Ridge, 202, 203, 225; characterized, 21, 22. 

Granger, Gen. Robert S., commands brigade, 19; at Nashville, 167. 

Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., at Vicksburg, 4, 5; Shiloh, 31, 50; captures 
Fort Donelson, 16, 35; takes command at Chattanooga, 170- 
172, 207, 232;plans, 182, 183, 185-189, 193, 194, 211-214, 218, 
221, 222: watches battle, 191; at Missionary Ridge, 208-212; 
reports, 215, 22^; commander-in-chief, 234; genius of, 219. 

Greene, Capt. Howard, killed, 229. 

Gregg, Gen. David M., at Chickamauga, 138. 

Grose, Col. William, at Chickamauga, 93, 104, 111: Chattanooga, 
165; Lookout Mountain, 186. 

Gross, Surgeon Ferdinand H., at Chickamauga, 110. 


Halleck, Gen. H. W., commander-in-chief, 66, 67, 223, 232. 
Hanson, Capt. Hans, killed, 131. 

Hardee, Gen. William J., before the war, 15; commands corps, 
34, 40; at Missionary Ridge. 205, 208; characterized, 35. 
Harker, Gen. Charles G., at Chickamauga, 94. 113, 116. 117; 

Chattanooga, 165; Missionary Ridge, 204; commended, 148. 
Harrison’s Landing (Tenn.), 230. 

Hauflf, Capt. Henry, killed, 131. 

Hawley, Col. William, of Third Wisconsin, 177- 

[ 243 ] 



INDEX 


Hazen, Gen. William B., in Chickamauga campaign, 58, 60, 61, 
62, 64; at battle of Chickamauga, 104, 107; at Chattanooga, 
166; Brown’s Ferry, 174, 175; Orchard Knob, 190,191; Mis¬ 
sionary Ridge, 204; commended, 148. 

Heald, Capt. Abner O., killed, 129. 

Heg, Col. Hans C., brigade commander, 29; at Chickamauga, 
59, 134; killed, 87,. 108, 130, 131. 

Helm, Gen. Ben Hardin, at Chickamauga, 99; killed, 100. 

Hill, Gen. Daniel H., at Chickamauga, 70, 79, 89, 97, 102, 110, 
116, 126, 138; cited, 73, 74, 146-149, 210. 

Hindman, Gen. Thomas C., in Chickamauga campaign, 66, 68; at 
Chickamauga battle, 82, 96, 97, 113, 115, 132, 142; report, 115, 
116. 

Hiram College (Ohio), instructor, 14. 

Hobart, Col. Harrison C., commands regiment, 30; at Chicka¬ 
mauga, 127; captured, 129. 

Hood, Gen. John B., Confederate officer, 6; at Chickamauga, 82, 
96-98, 116, 138, 142; wounded, 116; at Knoxville, 181. 

Hooker, Gen. Joseph, at Chancellorsville, 4; reinforces Chatta¬ 
nooga, 159, 161-163; brings troops, 172, 174, 176; at Wauhat- 
chie, 177-180; Lookout Mountain, 181, 184, 186, 187, 192-200, 
212; pursues Confederates, 201-208, 222; at Missionary Ridge, 
213, 214; report, 186, 187, 

Howard, Gen. O. O., reinforces Chattanooga, 159; at Wauhatchie, 
177, 178; Orchard Knob, 190, 191; Missionary Ridge, 186, 187, 
202, 208, 212, 222. 

Humphreys, Gen. Benjamin, at Chickamauga, 97. 

Huntsville (Ala.), 28, 160. 


Illinois, troops from, 25; 24th Infantry, 127; 2nd Cavalry, 226; 
15th Cavalry, 194. 

Indiana, troops from, 25; 29th Infantry, 42; 39th Infantry, 42; 44th 
Infantry, 114; 2nd Cavalry, 159; 4th Cavalry, 159; 4th Bat¬ 
tery, 127, 128. 

Islands: Number Ten, 29, 32, 226, 231; Williams, 164, 173. 

Iuka (Miss.), 32. 





[244] 


INDEX 


Jackson, Gen. John K., at Chickamauga, 89, 138; Lookout 
Mountain, 199. 

Jay’s Mill (Ga.), 73, 82, 83. 

Jefferson Barracks (Mo.), 231. 

Johnson, Gen. Bushrod R., Confederate officer, 69, 70; at Chick¬ 
amauga, 96, 97, 105, 106, 138, 147. 

Johnson, Capt. John M., killed, 131. 

Johnson, Gen. Richard W., commands division, 18, 43, 59, 201, 
206, 225; of regular army, 23; at Chickamauga, 86, 89, 91, 92, 
100, 111, 128, 139-141, 145; withdraws, 123; at Stevenson, 167; 
Orchard Knob, 190; Lookout Mountain, 200; Missionary Ridge, 
204, 205; commended, 148; report, 42. 

Johnson, Robert U. See Buel and Johnson. 

Johnston, Gen. Albert S., Confederate officer, 15. 

Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., reinforces Bragg, 66. 


Kansas, forts in, 32; troops from, 25. 

Kelly’s farm, at Chickamauga, 71, 74, 78, 80-82, 85, 91, 92, 100, 
103, 105, 106, 114, 118, 122, 127, 128, 140; charges at, 93, 122, 
123. 

Kelly’s Ferry (Tenm), 173, 174, 178-180, 194. 

Kenosha, troops from, 30. 

Kentucky, troops in, 15, 232; troops from, 3, 25; 8th Infantry, 
200; 9th Infantry, 113; 17th Infantry, 113; 2nd cavalry, 194; 
senator, 34; railroad through, 6; Confederates evacuate, 16. 
Kershaw, Gen. Joseph B., at Chickamauga, 96, 97, 105. 

King, Gen. John H., brigade commander, 24; at Chickamauga, 
92, 100, 123; Chattanooga, 166; successor, 204. 

Knoxville (Tenn.), operations at, 158, 169, 184, 187, 189, 234; 
Burnside at, 223. 


Lafayette (Ga.), 63; Bragg retreats to, 64-67, 71-74, 77; road 
from, 72, 76, 78, 79, 82, 88, 91-95, 99, 103, 110, 118, 122, 123, 
127. 

LaGrange, Col. Oscar H., commands cavalry, 20, 31; at Chicka- 
maug&, 132. 

Law, Gen. Evander M., at Chickamauga, 96, 97, 105, 116. 

[245] 


INDEX 


Lee, Gen. Robert E., 4; before the war, 15; in Virginia, 67; 
surrenders, 10, 52. 

Lee and Gordon’s Mill, at Chickamauga, 64, 65, 68-79, 82, 87, 
92, 131. 

Leet’s Tanyard (Tenn.), skirmish at, 65. 

Lexington (Ky.), 15. 

Liddell, Gen. St. John R., at Chickamauga, 86, 98, 117, 122. 

Lightburn, Gen. Joseph A. J., at Missionary Ridge, 205. 

Lilly, Capt. Eli, artillery officer, 58. 

Lincoln, President Abraham, call for troops, 27; orders, 165, 
169, 170, 232; persistence, 38. 

Livingston, Lieut. Courtland, commands battery, 31; at Chicka¬ 
mauga, 133. 

Long, Col. Eli, cavalry officer, 187, 230. 

Longstreet, Gen. James, reinforces Bragg, 66, 70, 80; advances, 
126; at Chickamagua, 95-98, 104, 106, 112, 113, 116, 118, 143, 
148, 149; Wauhatchie, 178-182; advises Bragg, 156, 189; 

goes to Knoxville, 181, 182, 187, 189; estimates losses, 138; 
reports, 116, 151, 180, 181; From Manassas to Appomatox, 
135, 136. 

Lookout Valley, Union army in, 54, 60-62, 75, 176; opened, 179, 
184, 186, 187; Confederates in, 195. 

Loomis, Col. John M., at. Missionary Ridge, 205. 

Losses: in Tullahoma campaign, 48, 49; at Chickamauga, 135-137, 
141-144, 148; at Missionary Ridge, 224. 

Louisville (Ky.), Union troops at, 2,3,6,8,16,27-29,31,50; Grant 
at, 171. 

Louisville and Chattanooga Railroad, 20. 

Lumley’s Stand (Tenn.), 42. 

Lyon, Col. William P., commands regiment, 20. 

Lytle, Gen. William H., at Chickamauga, 87; killed, 80, 109, 
131. 

McAffee’s Church, at Chickamauga, 83, 114, 154. 

McArthur, Adj. Arthur Jr., commended, 228. 

McCook, Gen. Alexander D., commands division, 12,45,63,72, 
74; in Tullahoma campaign, 42; at Chickamauga, 73-75, 78, 
86, 87, 91-95, 109,110,121,128,153; Rossville, 124; Chatta¬ 
nooga, 155; staff-officer of, 120; characterized, 17, 23. 

[246] 



INDEX 


McCook, Gen. Daniel, at Chickamauga, 83,84,144; Chattanooga, 
144. 

McCook, Col. Edward M., at Chickamauga, 132; cavalry raid, 
159, 160. 

McDonald,-, house near Chickamauga, 81. 

McKercher, Maj. Duncan, captured, 130. 

McLaws, Gen. Lafayette, at Chickamauga, 97; Knoxville, 181. 
McLean, Lieut. John D., artillery officer, 33; at Chickamauga, 134. 
McLemore’s Cove, near Chickamauga, 60, 63-65, 68, 70-75, 78. 
McMinnville (Tenn.), railroad junction, 39, 53, 56, 60; captured, 
159. 

McNeill, Maj. Quincy, at Island Number Ten, 226. 

Manchester (Tenn.), pikeroad to, 39; operations near, 42-46. 
Maney, Gen. George, at Missionary Ridge, 206. 

Marshall, Gen. Humphrey, Confederate officer, 14. 

Martin, Gen. John A., replaces Heg, 108, 130. 

Martin, Gen. William T., cavalry officer, 159. 

Maryland, Confederates invade, 4. 

Matthies, Gen. Charles L., at Missionary Ridge, 204. 

Meade, Gen. George C., at Gettysburg, 4. 

Memphis (Tenn.), troops from, 158. 

Michigan, troops from, 25; 1st Engineers, 176. 

Mill Springs (Ky.), 15, 16. 

Miller, Col. J. McClelland, at Liberty Gap, 42. 

Millersburg (Tenn.), 42. 

Milwaukee, troops muster at, 27, 28, 30, 177, 231, 226. 

Minnesota, troops from, 25. 

Minty, Gen. Robert H. G., in Chickamauga campaign, 57, 61, 62; 
at battle of Chickamauga, 72, 77; withdraws, 125; at Ross- 
ville, 124. 

Mississippi, troops from, 66, 70, 98; troops in, 169, 231; Union 
troops, 232. 

Missouri, troops from, 25; Wisconsin troops in, 30; Union army, 
233. 

Mitchell, Gen. John G., at Chickamauga, 114; Wauhatchie, 179;. 
commended, 148. 

Mitchell, Gen. O. M., in Alabama, 28. 

[247] 


INDEX 


Mitchell, Gen. Robert B., cavalry officer, 18, 41, 42; at Chick¬ 
amauga, 83, 99, 112, 147, 153, 154; Rossville, 124; raiding, 
160. 

Mitchell, Capt. William S., killed, 129. 

Moccasin Point, fortified, 173. 

Moore, Gen. John C., at Lookout Mountain, 197, 199. 

Morgan, Gen. James D., commands division, 19; at Chickamauga, 
83; Chattanooga, 166, 167. 

Mountains— 

Cumberland, 7-9, 47-49, 52-55. 

Hopse, 40. 

Horseshoe Ridge, 107, 111. 

Lookout, 51-55, 60, 62, 76, 155, 156, 172, 173, 176, 204, 205, 
211, 225; crossed, 63, 64, 68; Confederates on, 63, 126, 180-185, 
187-189, 192-194; described, 195, 196. See also Battles: Look¬ 
out Mountain. 

Missionary Ridge, 55, 56, 63, 81, 93, 109, 115, 126, 156, 182- 
186, 190, 209, 211, 230; Confederates on, 188-191. See also 
Battles: Missionary Ridge. 

Pigeon, 55, 65, 69, 71. 

Raccoon, 173. 

Sand, 53-55, 59, 62. 

Taylor’s Ridge, 217, 222. 

Walden’s Ridge, 54, 55, 58, 156, 161, 173. 

Mullis,-, farm near Chickamauga, 123. 

Murfreesboro (Tenn.), Union troops at, 1, 2, 4-8, 11, 14, 28-30, 39, 
44, 232; advance from, 46-48, 134; railroad centre, 6, 52, 160. 


Nashville (Tenn.), troops at, 20, 30-32, 231; railroad terminus, 
3, 6, 9, 160-163. 

Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, 3, 9, 166. 

Negley, Gen. James S., takes command, 17; in Tullahoma cam¬ 
paign, 47; Chickamauga, 60, 65, 66, 68; at battle of Chicka¬ 
mauga, 78, 79, 82, 87, 93, 94, 100, 105, 107, 108, 113, 114, 140, 
142, 148; Rossville, 124; report, 110. 

New Madrid (Mo.), 31. 

New York, 1st Infantry, 194. 

.[248] 


INDEX 


Nickles, Lieut. Robert J., killed, 69. 
North Carolina, invaded, 10. 
Northwest Territory, troops from, 25. 


Ohio, troops from, 14, 25; 1st Infantry, 194; 13th Infantry, 113; 
15th Infantry, 42; 21st Infantry, 113; 73d Infantry, 179; repre¬ 
sentative in Congress, 168. 

Orchard Knob, captured 190, 192, 194; vantage point, 209, 211, 
212; battery on, 214. See also Battles: Orchard Knob. 

Oshkosh, troops from, 29. 

Osterhaus, Gen. Peter J., crosses the Tennessee, 192, 193; at 
Lookout Mountain, 194; Missionary Ridge, 203, 216; pur¬ 
sues enemy, 201. 

Paducah (Ky.), 16. 

"‘Paint Rock,” steamboat, 58. 

Palmer, Gen. John M., commands division, 18, 58, 194; in Tulla- 
homa campaign, 41; at Chickamauga, 78, 86, 91, 92, 96, 102, 
104, 107, 111, 139-141, 145; withdraws, 123; commended, 148; 
promoted, 168; at Chattanooga, 165; Missionary Ridge, 202; 
pursues enemy, 222; characterized, 21. 

Patterson, Gen. Robert, 15. 

Pegram, Gen. John, in Chickamauga campaign, 69. 

Pelham (Tenn.), 57. 

Pennsylvania, Confederates invade, 4; troops from, 25; 77th In¬ 
fantry, 42; 79th Infantry, 44, 127. 

Perkins, Surgeon Jabez, at Chickamauga, 110. 

Pettus, Gen. Edmund W., at Lookout Mountain, 199. 

Phelps, Col. Edward H., at Missionary Ridge, 204. 

Pikeville (Tenn.), 55. 

Pinney, Capt. Oscar F., 31. 

Pittsburg Landing, 226. 

Poe,-, house near Chickamauga, 81, 92. 

Polk, Gen. Leonidas, commands corps, 33, 40, 68, 69; at Chicka¬ 
mauga, 70, 72, 95, 97-100, 148; advances, 126; characterized, 
35. 

Pond Spring (Ga.), 78. 


[ 249 J 


INDEX 


Pope, Gen. John, at Island Number Ten, 32. 

Post, Col. Philip Sidney, in Tullahoma campaign, 43; at Chicka- 
mauga, 133. 

Prentiss, Gen. B. M., 227. 

Preston, Gen. William, at Chickamauga, 96, 97, 112, 142. 


Racine, troops from, 31, 231. 

Raum, Col. Green B., at Missionary Ridge, 204. 

Rebellion Records , cited, 42, 48, 49, 67, 75, 84, 85, 90, 101, 115, 117, 
121, 123, 129, 144, 145, 148, 151, 180, 195, 215, 216, 232. 

Reed’s Bridge, near Chickamauga, 69, 72, 73, 76, 82-85. 

Rennie, Lieut. Robert, killed, 130. 

Reynolds, Gen. Joseph J., commands division, 17, 44; in Tulla¬ 
homa campaign, 44; Chickamauga campaign, 58, 66; at battle 
of Chickamauga, 82, 86, 91-96, 103-107, 111, 139-141, 145; 
withdraws, 122, 123; made chief of staff, 166; commended, 
148. 

Richardson, Lieut. James S., killed, 129. 

Richmond (Va.), 4, 10, 49, 52, 67. 

Ringgold (Ga.), 64, 69, 70, 74, 77, 114, 216, 217, 223; road from, 
124. 

Rivers— 

Cumberland, 7, 15.' 

Duck, 7, 39, 40. 

Elk, 7, 40, 47. 

Hiawassie, 56, 59. 

Little, 75. 

Mississippi, 4, 31, 158, 232. 

Ohio, 25. 

Sequatchie, 54, 55. 

Tennessee, 7-9, 52-54, 71, 126, 196; described,54; valley of, 
58; bends, 172; bridged, 163; crossed, 19, 59-62, 157, 160, 176, 
201; Confederates command, 155, 156: armies on, 169. 
Robertson, Gen. Jerome B., at Chickamauga, 97. 

Robinson, Col. Milton S., at Chickamauga, 123. 

Roby, Capt. J. W., at Chickamauga, 130. 

Roddey, Gen. Philip D., cavalry leader, 160. 

[250] 


INDEX 


Rogersville (Ala.), 160. 

Rome (Ga.), 61, 64, 75, 115. 

Rosecrans, Gen. William S., commands army, 1-3, 14, 16; charac¬ 
terized, 12, 13; plans, 11, 13, 40, 51, 57; at Winchester, 52; 
in Chickamauga campaign, 55, 58, 59,62, 64, 67; orders, 83, 
103, 104, 106,118,152, 153, 172; at battle of Chickamauga, 72- 
80, 88, 93, 99, 104, 109, 112, 120, 121, 131, 136, 144, 149,154; 
retreats to Chattanooga, 125; defends Chattanooga, 157, 158, 
160: reinforced, 158, 159; relieved, 164; results, 232; reports, 
48, 84, 89, 144. 

Rossville (Ga.), Union troops at, 19, 63, 76; during battle of 
Chickamauga, 108, 109, 112, 114-116, 118, withdrawal to, 119, 
121, 123, 129, 132, 133, 136, 147, 151, 152, 155; abandoned, 125; 
advance from, 144; in Chattanooga campaign, 201-206; Hooker 
at, 221, 222. See also Gaps; Rossville. 

Rousseau, Gen. Lovell H., commands division 17, 28, 44, 47, 190; 
on furlough, 21; rejoins army, 125; at Chattanooga, 166; 
Nashville, 167. 

Rousseau Battery, 219. 

Ruger, Gen. Thomas H., at Chattanooga, 168; guarding railway, 
177. 

ii 

St. Louis, Wisconsin troops at, 31, 32, 231. 

Salem (Tenn.), 41. 

Scandinavians, as Wisconsin soldiers, 29. 

Schurz, Gen. Carl, at Wauhatchie, 177, 178; Missionary Ridge< 
205, 212, 229. 

Scribner, Gen. Benjamin F., commands brigade, 28; at Chicka 
mauga, 100, 129. 

Searles, Lieut. Charles A., killed 129. 

Sequatchie Valley, described, 31; troops in, 54, 55, 57, 58, 60; 
raided, 156, 159. 

Sheffield, Col. James L., at Chickamauga, 97. 

Shelbyville (Tenn.), 40, 42; captured, 44, 46. 

Shellmound (Tenn.), 59, 177. 

Shenandoah Valley, war in, 15. 


[251 ] 



INDEX 


Sheridan, Gen. Philip H., West Point graduate, 17; commands 
division 47, 56, 60; at Chickamauga, 87, 93-96, 107-111, 115, 
142, 145, 149, 151; Chattanooga, 165, 167; Orchard Knob, 190, 
217; Missionary Ridge, 204, 205, 208, 227; commended, 170, 
171; characterized, 22. 

Sherman, Col. Francis T., at Chattanooga, 165, 167; Missionary 
Ridge, 204, 227. 

Sherman, Gen. William T., reinforces Chattanooga, 159, 183-185, 
187; commands Western army, 169, 234; at Chattanooga, 231; 
Tunnel Hill, 206, 211, 213, 221; Missionary Ridge, 186, 187, 
192, 193, 201-205, 208, 212,-214, 217, 222, 226, 229, 230; March 
to the Sea, 5, 10; commended, 171; Memoirs, 207. 

Sirwell, Col. William, at Chickamauga, 113. 

Slocum, Gen. H. W., reinforces Rosecrans, 159. 

Smith, Gen. A., at Missionary Ridge, 204. 

Smith, Gen. James A., at Missionary Ridge, 205. 

Smith, Gen. John E., at Missionary Ridge, 204, 213, 226. 

Smith, Col. Orlando, at Wauhatchie, 179. 

Smith, Gen. Preston, at Chickamauga, 89; killed, 90. 

Smith, Gen. W. F., chief engineer, 164, 169, 172, 174, 183, 184. 

Snodgrass, —, house near Chickamauga, 107, 112, 116. 

Snodgrass Hill, battle at, 81, 120, 122, 151, 154. 

South Carolina, invaded, 10. 

Stanley, Gen. David S., commands cavalry, 18, 46; of regular 
army, 23; on furlough, 61; at Chickamauga, 93, 100, 113. 

Stanley, Col. Timothy R., at Chickamauga, 142. 

Stanton, Edwin M., secretary of war, 171, 217. 

Starkweather, Col. John C., brigade commander, 28, 69; at Chick¬ 
amauga, 101, 126-130; at Chattanooga, 166, 204, 206, 225; 
Stevenson, 167; report, 128, 129. 

Steedman, Gen. James B., commands division, 19; at Chicka¬ 
mauga, 83, 114, 117, 120, 138, 142, 144; commended, 148. 

Steinwehr, Gen. Adolph von, at Wauhatchie, 188; Missionary 
Ridge, 212. 

Stevenson, Gen. Carter L., on Lookout Mountain, 192, 195, 197, 
199; at Missionary Ridge, 205, 206; report, 198, 199. 

Stevenson (Ala.), railroad junction, 28, 52, 53, 56, 59; supplies at, 
7, 161-163: garrison, 57,166; road to, 156; headquarters, 167. 

[ 25 2 ] 


INDEX 


Stewart, Gen. A.P., Confederate officer, 44; at Chickamauga, 96, 
97, 104, 105, 139, 141, 143; Missionary Ridge, 205, 206, 214, 
216, 217. 

Stoughton, Gen. William L., at Missionary Ridge, 204. 

Stovall, Gen. Marcellus A., at Chickamauga, 99, 100, 104. 

Summerville (Ga.), 63, 75. 

Sweet, Col. Benjamin J., 20; wounded, 29. 

Tennessee, actions in, 27; in two districts, 167; barrens of, 39-41; 
railway in, 6; forts, 16; Union troops, 169, 231, 232; troops 
from, 10, 25, 66. 

Thedford’s Ford (Ga.), 70. 

Thomas, Gen. George H., commands corps, 12,63, 64; in Tulla- 
homa campaign, 43, 47; at Chickamauga, 22, 72, 74, 75, 78, 
79, 82-84, 88, 91-94, 103-117,120,121,127; denominated “Rock 
of Chickamauga”, 82; protects his corps, 139; withstands at¬ 
tacks, 144-146; withdraws, 112,118-126, 152, 153; at Chatta¬ 
nooga, 155, 232; commands army, 164, 168; besieaed, 171,172; 
plans for advance, 183, 184, 186, 187, 193, ,218; reconnoisance» 
188, 189; at Orchard Knob, 190, 191; Missionary Ridge, 202-215, 
220-222; reports, 119-121, 123,200, 216; commended, 148,149, 
171; characterized, 14, 15, 81. 

Thompson, Lieut. Oliver, killed 121. 

Thruston, Gen. Gates P., at Chickamauga, 110, 122. 

Thurman’s (Tenn.), 57. 

Tracy City (Tenn.), 56. 

Trenton (Ga.), troops at, 61, 176, 187. 

Triune (Tenn.), 41. 

Tullahoma (Tenn.), 1, 6; advance toward, 14; fighting near, 45, 
47; Bragg at, 52,53,98; campaign for, 28,30,39-50, 134, 224. 

Turchin, Gen. John B., commands cavalry, 18, 19; at Chickamau¬ 
ga, 92, 93; withdraws, 122, 123; at Chattanooga, 166; 

Brown’s Ferry, 175; Missionary Ridge, 204; commended, 
148. 

Valley Head (Ala.), 55, 61. 

Van Cleve, Gen. Horatio P., commands division, 18, 60; in Tul- 
lah'oma campaign, 43; at Chickamauga, 78, 86, 88, 93-95, 97, 
104, 107-109, 113, 133, 140, 142. 

[253] 


INDEX 


Van Derveer, Col. Ferdinand, at Chickamauga, 93,103,106,111, 
114, 140; Chattanooga, 166; Missionary Ridge, 204; com¬ 
mended, 148. 

Van Horne, Thomas B., Army of the Cumberland , 110. 

Vicksburg (Miss.), siege of, 231. 

Viniard,-, house near Chickamauga, 81. 

Virginia, troops from, 54, 66, 70, 78. 

Vittetoe,-, house near Chickamauga, 81. 

Von Baumbach, Maj. Carl, at Chickamauga, 132; Missionary 
Ridge, 227-229. 

Wagner, Gen. George D., in Chickamauga campaign, 58, 60-62; 
at Chattanooga, 165; Missionary Ridge, 204. 

Walker, Gen, W. H. T., Confederate officer, 68, 69; at Chicka¬ 
mauga, 77,82,85,89,96-98,102,110,139,141; Lookout Moun- 
ain, 192; Missionary Ridge, 205, 206. 

Walthall, Gen. Edward C., at Chickamauga, 98; Lookout Mount¬ 
ain, 197, 199. 

Wars: Mexican, 15, 17, 21, 34, 35; Indian, 15. 

Wartrace (Tenn.), 40, 42. 

Washington (D. C.), orders from, 4, 67. 

Wauhatchie (Tenn.), 61; action at, 176-180. 

West, Captain George M., killed, 130. 

West, Col. Theodore S., commands regiment, 30; at Chicka¬ 
mauga, 132. 

West Point (N. Y.) Military Academy, graduates, 12, 15-17, 21- 
23, 35. 

West Virginia, troops in, 8. 

Wheeler, Gen. Joseph, cavalry commander, 33, 181: at Chicka¬ 
mauga, 70, 79, 99; raiding, 156, 159-161. 

Whiteside (Tenn.), 177. 

Whittaker, Gen. Walter C., at Chickamauga, 83, 114; Chatta¬ 
nooga, 165; Wauhatchie, 179; Lookout Mountain, 186; com¬ 
mended, 148. 

Wilder, Gen. John T., brigade commander, 44; in Tullahoma 
campaign, 43, 44; Chickamauga campaign, 58, 60, 62, 64; at 
battle of Chickamauga, 72, 77, 82, 97, 109, 111, 153; at Chat¬ 
tanooga, 158. 


[254] 



INDEX 


Willard, Capt. J. P., aide to Thomas, 122. 

Williams, Gen. Alpheus S., at Chattanooga, 168; guarding rail¬ 
way, 177. 

Willich, Gen. August, in Tullahoma campaign, 42,43; at Chicka- 
mauga, 93, 111, 118; withdraws, 123; at Chattanooga, 164, 
165; Orchard Knob, 190, 191: Missionary Ridge, 204, 225, 226; 
commended, 148. 

Wilson, Col. Claudius C., at Chickamauga, 85. 

Wilson, Gen. James H., cavalry raid, 170. 

Winchester (Tenn.), 52, 53, 160.. 

Winkler. Maj. Frederick C., commands regiment, 177; at Mis¬ 
sionary Ridge, 229. 

Wisconsin, troops from, 25; in army of Cumberland, 27-33; in 
Tullahoma campaign, 44, 50; at Dug Gap, 69; Chicka¬ 
mauga, 126-134; reinforce Chattanooga, 177, 178; at Mission¬ 
ary Ridge, 225-232. 1st Infantry, 27-29, 44, 69, 126-129, 

167, 225; 2nd infantry, 227; 3rd Infantry, 168, 177; 10th In¬ 
fantry, 27-29, 50, 69, 126, 129, 130, 167, 201, 225; 13th In¬ 
fantry, 20; 15th Infantry, 27, 29, 59, 87, 126, 130, 131, 167, 
191, 192, 225, 226; 18th Infantry, 226, 227; 21st Infantry, 20, 
27, 29, 30, 44, 69, 126-129, 167, 225; 24th Infantry, 27, 30, 
126, 131, 132,„ 167, 227-229; 26th Infantry, 168, 177, 178, 229; 
1st Cavalry, 20, 27, 30, 50, 132, 133, 159; 1st Heavy Artillery, 

168, 230; 3rd Battery, 20, 27, 31, 133, 168, 229; 5th Battery, 
27, 31, 32, 133, 168, 230; 6th Battery, 230, 231; 8th Battery, 
32, 33, 133, 134, 168, 229, 230; 10th Battery, 168, 229-231; 
12th Battery, 230, 231. 

Wolseley, Field-Marshal Sir G. J., Viscount, commends Ameri¬ 
can officer, 36. 

Wood, Gen. S. A. M., at Chickamauga, 101. 

Wood, Gen. Thomas J.. of regular army, 23; commands divis¬ 
ions, 18, 58; at Chickamauga, 80, 87, 93-96, 104-107,109, 111, 
113, 116, 117, 131, 142, 145, 147, 152; withdraws, 123; at Chat¬ 
tanooga, 165, 168; Orchard Knob, 190-192; Missionary Ridge, 
203-205, 225. 

Woodbury (Tenn.), 41. 

Woods, Gen. Charles R., at Lookout Mountain, 193; relieved, 203. 

Zollicoffer, Gen. Felix K., 15. 

[255] 






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